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IN THE

KINDERGARTEN

BY

SUSAN E. BLOW

AUTHOR OF "SYMBOLIC EDUCATION," "MOTTOES AND COMMENTARIES
OF FROEBEL'S MOTHER PLAY," "LETTERS TO A MOTHER," ETC.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

SOME readers of this book may be surprised to see how conflicting world-views masquerade not only in popular literature and in semi-philosophical writings, but also in methods of instruction in the schools, and, above all, even in the programmes of the kindergarten! This certainly ought to encourage us to look again at the claims made for the educational creed of Froebel, which lays so much emphasis on the child's original self-activity. In fact, this book should set in a new light Froebel's place as the great educational reformer for the period of infancy.

While self-activity itself is an inspiration to the disciples of Froebel, it is a stone of stumbling to many educators who have adopted with enthusiasm the doctrine of evolution. They have understood evolution as a blind impulse given by nature to develop or unfold—an impulse given not only to plants and animals, but also to chemical elements, planets and suns, and even to comets and nebulae.

It is admitted, however, that the evolution below the stage of life consists in fitting inorganic substances for the needs of organic life. Arrived at life, the development assumes the form of self-activity, and students of evolution ought to look at and

recognize in all its shapes this new form of existence. Mechanic shapes are the effect of external collisions or relations to outside bodies. But life is the manifestation of a power to react on the environment and modify it for its own purposes.

Life can perform by its self-activity two kinds of adjustments. It can adjust itself to its environment; it can modify its environment so as to adjust that external condition to its own needs and purposes.

Evolution in nature, in fact, points toward the assumption of a transcendental power of self-determination on the part of plants, animals, and men, in so far as progress or development is due to efforts of animals or plants or men to adapt themselves to their environment, or, on the other hand, to adapt the elements of their environment to their own needs.

Wherever life exists there is a transcendental power of self-determination. Kant used this word transcendental to describe freedom as something which sets aside the links of causation in its environment and sets up in their stead its own causal activity. The plant overcomes inorganic matter and its causality and assimilates or digests it, making it into vegetable cells having the same idiosyncrasy as itself—the oak, for example, making the soil and nitric acid, carbonic acid, and other elements, into the cells of oak leaves and oak wood and acorns. The plant thus sums itself up at the end of its process by beginning (in its seeds) a series of new individuals of the same species, each one capable of interrupting the mechanical chain of causality in the external

order of nature, and substituting for it its own causality, possessing more or less individuality.

The animal has much more of this individuality than the plant, for it possesses not only assimilation (or digestion), but also feeling and locomotion.

The self-determining power of the animal goes on to build for itself organs of tasting, smelling, hearing, and seeing. This makes its evolution.

Even the plant seizes from its environment what is suitable and makes it into tissue wherewith to form its organs and its structure. The animal increases its apparatus for seizing and appropriating its environment, and constructs new organs or instruments not only for assimilation or nourishment, but also for locomotion and sensation. These are progressive forms of self-activity—manifestations of a rudimentary will-power building for itself a means of operating upon the external world.

Underneath all manifestations of life we perceive action according to purpose or design.

If the living being is conscious of these purposes or designs they become motives.

Motives are higher, and more complete manifestations of self-activity—in fact, they indicate the arrival at freedom proper.

The motive contains in it a recognition of an external environment not in harmony with the self, and also a recognition of a possible action of its own which may modify that external existence and bring it into harmony with the self. For example, I may see an apple; as a mere existence it is not, and can-

not as such be, food. I possess appetite, but only by the action of devouring the apple may I convert the apple into food. The motive is the concept of its use to me, forced on the apple—the apple being destroyed in the realization of my motive. I made the motive by thinking away the reality of the apple and substituting for it the thought of the reality of my food. Then I make this thought-motive a reality by a second act of my will, by eating the apple. There is, therefore, a twofold act of the self, first I form a motive in my mind and secondly I realize that motive.

Motives therefore unfold and make explicit my freedom, and are not, as Victor Cousin taught, the mediation which sets aside my freedom. He supposed that an act could not be perfectly spontaneous and free unless it were an act done before the mind had time to formulate its motives. By this theory he hoped to answer the fatalists who held that the will must be necessitated by the strongest motive. There can be “no freedom, but only a constraint from motives—the strongest of the motives constrains the will.” But all this mistake arose through incorrect analysis—the fatalist supposed that the perception of the external reality (the apple, for example) was itself a motive, whereas it could not become a motive until the mind had combined it with another percept, namely, its hungry self; and by this combination of its hunger with the object it did not as yet think a motive—it did not complete the thought of a motive until it added the idea of

the seizure and destruction performed on the apple by the act of eating it. Take away the thought of the annulment of the apple's reality, and you take away the thought of using it as food.

The motive always has in it the thought of the annulment of a reality or at least of some change of a real condition. And, whereas the determinist supposes himself to have an immediate reality in a motive, his motive is only a thought relative to the annulment of the objective reality (the apple, e. g.) before him.

On the plane of human life the apparatus for knowing nature is very much extended, and so is the apparatus for moving and combining objects of nature and transforming and adapting them for the uses of man. But even the animal, even the plant has self-activity. The animal has motives also, and even if they are not of a high order, they manifest as far as they go his ability to annul the chain of external causality first in thought and secondly in act.

There is one great step which differences man from the animals; to man objects are not seen as isolated particulars, but are seen as individuals of species and as existing in a causal relation to other objects in the world.

This gives a greatly enlarged scope for the creation of instruments for the use of the will in acting upon nature. Man as a language-using animal, sees each object as a specimen of a class of objects, and in seeing it thus he sees, as it were, a halo of possibility or potentiality about each object. Each object is as it is,

but it might have been different in this or that respect because of some external cause, or because of some defect in the object's reaction if it is a living being.

Moreover, each object is looked at by the human self as possessing the capacity of being so modified by the action of man as to take it out of its natural functions and impose upon it a function of service for man. The water brook may be converted into a pond and its force applied through a water wheel and other machinery to aid man in the transformation of nature.

This activity of thought which sees the possible in the real is the great self-activity which distinguishes humanity.

In philosophy, for instance, man can see these potentialities as presuppositions. Through presuppositions man can see the evidence of a Divine Being, even in brute, inanimate, matter. He can see the necessary immortality of thinking beings like himself.

He can by presuppositions perceive the grand purpose of all nature as an evolution—he can recognize time and space as a cradle for the development of individualities and their ascent into immortal beings.

All philosophy, science, literature, and art, and especially religion, become possible to this human being, who can discern not only what he is, but read in the actual being of his environment all of its potentialities—present, past, and future.

W. T. HARRIS.

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 5, 1908.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

WITHIN the past thirty years all grades of education from the kindergarten to the university have been more or less influenced by the scientific doctrine of relativity as the controlling principle of the universe; by the working hypothesis of physiological psychology that "mental action may be uniformly and absolutely a function of brain action," and by the undue ascendancy of industrial aims over the mind of the American people.

The primary object of this book is to trace the results of these influences upon the kindergarten. The hope with which it has been written is that portrayal of their results within one small province of education may help to direct attention to the disasters they have caused and are causing in all provinces of education.

The plan of the book is a very simple one. Each of the above-mentioned modes of thought is concretely presented in the typical example of a kindergarten programme. Each programme is discussed with the purpose of throwing its creative principle into clear relief. Finally, some suggestion is given of the influence of this principle in other spheres of life and thought.

In addition to its general aim this book has a secondary and more specific purpose. It endeavors to set forth the theories of Froebel with regard to the education of little children. ✓

The educational creed of Froebel contains four reciprocally dependent articles. The first is that man is a self-creative being; the second, that in virtue of this fact education shall encourage self-expression; the third, that encouragement shall be given only to those modes of self-expression which are related to the values of human life; the fourth, that all great human values are revelations of the aboriginal self-determining energy which achieves its own ideal form in self-consciousness. This final article does not deny the influence of man's biologic and historic heredity, nor does it deny the influence of either his physical or his social environment. It does, however, insist both upon the priority and the primacy of self-determination.

The creators of concentric programmes either reject or ignore all these articles of the Froebelian creed. The creators of free-play programmes accept the first and second, but either reject or ignore the third and fourth. The creators of industrial programmes accept the first three, but deny or ignore the fourth, and thereby are betrayed into practical methods which violate the articles they theoretically affirm.

It is due to readers of this book that I should explain my reason for devoting its final chapter to a discussion of different philosophic world-views.

The conflicting practice of kindergartners implies divergent conceptions of education. These divergent conceptions of education are not mere eddies in the stream of thought, but correspond with different directions of its main current. In its jubilant sense of conformity with nature, and in its swift surrender to fatal impulse, the free-play kindergarten repeats in its tiny circle the self-destructive sweep of naturalism. In its tendency to conceive the child as shaped and fashioned by the historic process; in its reaction from intellectualism to an exaggerated voluntarism, and in its practical emphasis upon functional values, the industrial kindergarten betrays the influence of pragmatism. In its conception of the child, its symbolism and its freightage of free activity with ideal values, the Froebelian kindergarten reveals a lineage from the philosophy of idealism. A study of educational issues in the kindergarten which should omit consideration of these three world-views would therefore dismiss its subject without any final explanation.¹

In the discussion of pragmatism I have restricted myself to that form of the doctrine which has affected the practice of the kindergarten.

In my presentation of the philosophy which underlies the kindergarten I do not claim to have repeated exactly the conscious thought of its founder.

¹ The connection of the concentric programme with Herbart's "World View" is shown in chapter V. Herbart's "World View" never obtained general currency.

Froebel was a religious mystic. His power of intuitive divination far exceeded his power of philosophic statement. I believe that the philosophy of idealism as presented in the final chapter of this book is implied in Froebel's mystic conception of the dogma of the Trinity and in his own conception of man as Gliedganzen. Furthermore, I hold that this is the only philosophy which adequately interprets his educational procedure.

My grateful acknowledgments are due to Prof. Charles Hubbard Judd, of Yale University, for his kindness in explaining to me an important question of genetic psychology, and to Prof. John Angus MacVannel, of Columbia University, for help received from his monograph on "The Educational Theories of Herbart and Froebel," for his courtesy in reading the proof of this book, and for valuable advice.

SUSAN E. BLOW.

CAZENOVIA, N. Y., June 13, 1908.

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EDUCATIONAL ISSUES IN THE KINDERGARTEN

CHAPTER I

THE CONCENTRIC PROGRAMME

THE kindergarten is the attempted embodiment of a few great educational ideas. The imperfect apprehension of any one of these ideas enfeebles its practice; the false apprehension of any one of these ideas distorts its practice. Moreover, the inadequately or falsely apprehended idea is betrayed into strange alliances, and thereby undergoes a radical change which is reflected in every detail of practical work. Hence, during the past twenty-five years there have arisen three great departures from the principles and methods of the historic kindergarten. The practical outcome of the first departure was the concentric programme; that of the second the free play programme; that of the third the industrial programme. To illustrate and discuss these several programmes, elicit the ideas which created them, and present the contrasting principles and practice of Froebel will be the effort of this book.

The characteristic feature of the concentric programme is the connection of all exercises with a concentration center, and the consequent subordination of gifts, occupations, and games to the purpose of illustrating a chosen theme. As example is better than description, I present a concentric programme which received the prize of fifty dollars offered by the Patria Club of New York for a kindergarten exercise adapted to training children in patriotism, and which, in a preface prepared by a special committee of the club, is declared to be "the best among many admirable exercises sent by skilled kindergartners from various parts of the United States." The theme of this programme is the life and character of Abraham Lincoln, and the exercises are planned for the four school days preceding his birthday.

FIRST DAY

Morning Talk.—The early home of Lincoln in Kentucky. Lincoln's mother. The removal to Indiana. The "half-face camp." Little Abe's bed of leaves. His kind stepmother. His school days. Hospitality and self-respect of his father, in spite of poverty. How Abraham "did his sums." How he learned to write. His first earnings. His flatboat.

Gift.—A sequence. 1. "The half-face camp." 2. The fire shovel and Abraham's four favorite books. 3. His flatboat. 4. The fireplace by which he worked. 5. The table at which he wrote letters for the neighbors.

Occupation.—Cutting and pasting. Cut out shovel and paste on card. Speak of Lincoln's faithfulness in doing difficult tasks, and encourage the children to emulate it.

SECOND DAY

Morning Talk.—The youth of Abraham Lincoln. He is trusted on a long journey down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. Removal to Illinois. Helps his father build the log-cabin. Hires out to split rails, being paid in cloth for his clothes—four hundred rails for one yard of homespun. Carrying the hogs to New Orleans in flatboat. His honesty when a clerk, walking several miles to return six cents which he had unwittingly overcharged a customer.

Gift.—Tablets, squares, and half squares. Arrange to represent flatboat. May be loaded with second gift cylinder beads as barrels of produce, or with paper objects, pigs or other stock, known to have been carried by Lincoln.

Occupation.—Sand-table. Ohio and Mississippi rivers, from Illinois to Gulf; make flatboat of four square tablets or folded paper. Do not enter into minute detail as to the topography; rather offer a description that may give an idea of the mighty rivers and the time necessary to float down them, their aspect both day and night, the change in the climate and population observable as the boat drifted south, etc.

THIRD DAY

Morning Talk.—Lincoln as "captain," storekeeper, postmaster, surveyor. Walked one hundred miles in his homespun clothes to help make the laws in the

Legislature. Kindness and honesty as a lawyer. Lincoln and the pig. Lincoln's belief concerning slavery.

Gift.—Sticks; measuring and counting - lesson. Connect with Lincoln's surveying experiences, giving names of different farms, and making as graphic as possible.

Occupation.—Fold beauty forms in red, white, and blue paper, by dictation, to make a frame for Lincoln's picture.

FOURTH DAY

Morning Talk.—Lincoln as member of Congress and President. Causes of the Civil War, given impartially, and not too much in detail. The Emancipation Proclamation. Joy at the close of the war. A little of the story of Uncle Tom's Cabin may be helpful in making the children feel admiration and sympathy for the slaves, and the necessity of their being set free.

Gift.—Peas-laying. Form of beauty.—Connect with the Capitol by copying some detail in architecture, pavement or carving which may be shown in a picture of the exterior or interior of the building.

Occupation.—Paste chains with which to decorate Lincoln's picture—symbolic of the chains which he removed from his fellow man.

Games.—It is very inspiring to the children to dramatize the life of Lincoln in the simpler phases of his career. Generally these are the principal games during the four days allotted to the study of his life. The children come to have a genuine love for him, and to feel that to be worthy of their country they must be like him in character. (Show portrait of Lincoln during the morning talk.)

In order that we may realize how widely this programme deviates from Froebelian aims and methods, let us imagine that a pioneer of the kindergarten movement, withdrawn by untoward causes from knowledge of passing events in the educational world, is making her first visit to a kindergarten after an absence of many years. With a shock of surprise she becomes aware that nearly the whole of the first brisk morning hour is given up to story and talk. She recalls the missionary zeal with which she hurled at ancient school methods her revolutionary insight that "play is the point of departure for education because it is self-active representation of the inner life from inner necessity and impulse." She remembers the changes rung upon this insistent theme; the fine scorn with which kindergartners inveighed against "pouring into the child"; their fervent confessions of that prime article of faith, "the doer is the ancestor of the learner"; their triumphant proclamations of the truth that "man, made in the image of his Creator, must from the beginning of life be conceived and treated as a creative being." Yet here are sixty children sitting around a circle doing nothing, and one grown-up person pouring out herself and pouring into them. What has been happening during those years of her enforced seclusion? Is the kindergarten tottering and are its very foundations giving way?

At last the morning talk is over, and the children, seated at tables, are ready to begin building. The pioneer's heart beats with fresh hope. Memories of the delight of her own little ones in their freely created forms revive in her mind, and she waits with eagerness for the moment when each child before her shall give sign through his product of what is passing within him. But the spirit of Seventy-six is dead in the kindergarten of Ninety-six, and twenty children mechanically follow the directions for making a "half-face camp," Abraham's four favorite books, his flatboat, the fireplace by which he worked, and the table at which he wrote letters. The exercise drags through its weary length to its end, and it is time to march to the circle. The delight of old-time ball games and jolly races stirs in our pioneer's veins; pictures of children who seemed really transformed into birds and butterflies crowd the canvas of memory; busy farmers, millers, carpenters, wheelwrights pass in gay panorama before the eye of imagination. But all these images of the past vanish as she turns her attention forcibly to the actual circle upon which little victims of the concentric programme are dramatizing the life of Lincoln. By the time the dreary drama is over, our veteran is prepared for the worst, watches almost without inner protest the cutting and pasting of shovels, and listens with chastened and sub-

dued amazement to the still outpouring director who, intent upon filling children's minds with a "thought mass," and pointing its moral, dilates upon "Lincoln's faithfulness in doing difficult tasks, and encourages her little pupils to emulate his example."

Our pioneer kindergartner must make a heroic wrestle with "many thoughts of many men" before she can appreciate the conspiring influences whose outcome she has beheld in the revolutionized kindergarten. For the moment we dismiss her to a struggle which we, too, shall make in sequent chapters of this book. Our immediate purpose is to form some fair judgment of the concentric programme, and this involves an effort to discriminate between defects due to its constructive principle, defects incident to the perversion of educational ideals in themselves correct, and defects due to lack of individual wisdom with regard to subjects which may be profitably presented to the minds of little children. No theory of education may be blamed for the attempt to suggest to children between the ages of four and six the causes of our Civil War; and not the concentric ideal, but the bad judgment of the kindergartner is responsible for the effort to thrill infant hearts with the Emancipation Proclamation. The Froebelian doctrine of symbolism is not impugned by its pitiful perversion in the exercise "of pasting chains

with which to decorate Lincoln's picture—symbolic of the chains which he removed from his fellow man." On the other hand, the programme cited has four marked defects arising from its constructive principle and common to all programmes of its type. The first of these defects is the assumed priority of conscious thought over impulse and activity; the second is the imposition of an externally unified whole of thought; the third is the sacrifice of specific values in exercises with the gifts and occupations, and the fourth is the substitution of arbitrary connections for those causal ties which it is one great aim of all sound education to reveal.

What becomes of that cardinal principle of progressive pedagogy that "in the beginning is the act," if children may not act until their minds have been filled by the kindergartner with a thought content? What becomes of originality when every detail of every exercise is planned and prescribed? How shall each gift be so used as to throw into relief its own specific quality if all exercises must illustrate some chosen theme? Finally, what are we doing for a human mind when we respond to its yearning for the discovery of causal ties by such pitiful exercises as "an effort to connect with the Capital through copying some detail in architecture, paving, or carving?"

The programme cited is one of the earlier embodiments of the concentric ideal. It is the hybrid product of a mixed marriage between Froebelian instrumentalities and non-Froebelian aims and methods. Its author is, however, serenely unaware of the antagonistic ideas arming for war "below the threshold of her consciousness." To us, on the contrary, it should now be evident that the aim of this programme is instruction and its method an attempted unification of many distinct exercises through their connection with a concentration center. Later and more conscious efforts to realize this aim and carry out this method have resulted in a protracted struggle of varying fortunes. Instinct with their own creative purpose, the Froebelian gifts, games, and occupations have proved recalcitrant to the yoke of foreign and tyrannical ideas. Hence, wherever traditional school aims and concentric methods have prevailed it has been found necessary to eliminate many of Froebel's gifts and occupations, exclude numbers of his games, and discard some of his most characteristic types of exercise. The result of such eliminations, exclusions, and rejections is that the kindergarten loses its distinctive merit and the Froebelian instrumentalities cease to be an organic whole through the active use of whose related elements the child organizes his own thought, feeling, and will.

Scores of concentric programmes have been created by kindergartners, and their themes have been as varied as the mental proclivities of their creators. The exercises of different kindergartners have circled and whirled around Hiawatha; around the Seven Little Sisters; around selected Mother Plays; around Mother Goose rhymes; around pine trees, water, and potatoes, and finally incited by the suggestion of Dr. Hall that "in the nearness of children to animals there is a rich but undiscovered silo of educational possibilities," they have been set to gyrating around our furred and feathered brethren of forest and field. Whatever the subject chosen as core of concentration the results of the method have been the same. The specific value of each form of material has been destroyed; the sane and healthy balance of the games has been lost; gifts have been hopelessly mixed or recklessly discarded; forms of knowledge have been eliminated; forms of beauty minimized to a vanishing point; fortuitous connections have taken the place of causal ties; symbolism has been scouted and flouted; originality has been sapped and the apperceptive mass of the kindergartner ruthlessly imposed upon the minds of her pupils. Surely this procedure does what education should not do and leaves undone what it should do.

It may be said that as it exists in the kinder-

garten the concentric programme is not the outcome of a conscious attempt to apply the principles of any plan of education, but is simply a method of procedure spread by contagion from higher grades of school work. It may also be urged that any fair attack upon the concentric method should be directed against its theoretic presentation and practical illustration by the educators who are responsible for its existence and extension. Admitting the force of this challenge, I shall endeavor to meet it as directly as possible.

It is matter of familiar knowledge that the pedigree of programmes of the type I have been describing traces back to the Ziller-Rein school of Herbartian educators. It is also quite generally recognized that the theoretic basis of such programmes is that principle of concentration which demands the connection of every exercise with a *Gesinnungs-Stoff* or matter appealing to sentiment and imagination. This unifying core is selected from culture products belonging to successive periods of race development which it is claimed repeat themselves in the development of each individual, and it must possess an ethical value whose extraction and application is the goal of concentric exercises. Obviously the crucial question is that of concentration, for if the principle of concentration be proved untenable, it is superfluous

to consider any criterion for the selection of concentration material.¹

The following general programme, which Dr. De Garmo quotes from Dr. Rein, will illustrate the application of the principle of concentration to the first year of school work.²

Studies:	{	1. Core of Concentration	{	Drawing, Singing, Num-
		2. Nature-Study		ber, Reading, and Writing.

1. *Ethical Core of Concentration* (*Gesinnungs-Stoff*); Grimm's Fairy Tales. These form the center, or core, of instruction. The other branches are concentrated about them; and by them the remaining topics are largely determined.

2. *Nature-Study*.—All the subjects that are suggested by the Fairy Tales, receiving a special illumination from them and thereby awakening an intensified interest, are first chosen for treatment. School life and individual experience furnish much supplementary matter. (See list of object lessons below.)

3. *Drawing*.—For this purpose the objects mentioned in the Fairy Tales and in the nature-study are used.

¹ For discussions of this subject, see Introduction to Herbart's Science and Practice of Education, by Henry M. and Emmie Felkin, pp. 121-154, D. C. Heath & Co.—Ufer's Pedagogy of Herbart, pp. 54-104, D. C. Heath & Co.—Apperception, Lange, pp. 109-151, D. C. Heath & Co.—Herbart and the Herbartians, De Garmo, pp. 101-165, Charles Scribner's Sons.

² Herbart and the Herbartians, De Garmo, pp. 143-144.

4. *Singing*.—The choice of songs is determined by the moods developed by instruction and by school life. The various songs must express emotion at fitting times.

5. *Number Work*.—This is connected closely with the things that are considered in the various culture and nature subjects.

6. *Reading and Writing*.—The material is chosen from the topics treated during instruction in Fairy Tales and Nature-Study.

It is admitted by candid Herbartians that the most formidable difficulty confronting the concentric programme is the fusion of subjects which have no natural affinity in a single apperceptive mass. Experience would seem to indicate that this difficulty is not only formidable but insurmountable. As an example of what I am forced to call the absurdities into which the concentric methods betrays its votaries, I quote an illustrative lesson on the Treatment of the Number Three by Dr. Karl Just Altenburg, in which the venturesome attempt is made to seek in a fairy tale an appealing point of departure for an arithmetic lesson.

AIM

How many persons were in the home of the little girl of Sternthal (first fairy tale) when her father and mother were yet alive?

Clearness (analysis and synthesis).—There was first

her father (1) then her mother ($1+1$) and then the good little girl ($2+1$). Together there were therefore three.

- But now her father died ($3-1$) and there were left mother and daughter; then her mother died, too ($2-1$) and the little girl was left alone. At last the little girl went away ($1-1$) and there was nobody left in the house.¹

It is self-evident that no child will learn anything from this exercise which he did not already know. Waiving, however, the question of its futility and forbearing all comment upon its method, which blindly assumes that because numbers are small, complicated analyses and syntheses are easy, I will only ask whether any person can believe for a moment that a fairy tale will seize more strongly upon imagination or that its ethical import will be more readily distilled because of the attempt to make it a medium for teaching arithmetic, and, conversely, whether the number three will appeal more sympathetically to the heart of childhood because of its lugubrious association with the death of a father and mother and the wandering of a forlorn orphan.

That arithmetic is not the only study which refuses to blend in a pleasing penumbra around a

¹ Pedagogy of Herbart, Ufer, p. 121. I have cited only that portion of the lesson which connects the number three with the fairy tale.

literary core of consciousness will be apparent to any reader who will study carefully the following concentric programme for children of the first grade.¹

FIRST GRADE

Literature.—The Fir Tree, Andersen.

Science.—(a) White Pine as a type of evergreens, since it is more common here than any other evergreen tree.

(b) Austrian Pine.

(c) Scotch Pine.

(d) Norway Spruce.

(e) Balsam Fir.

Reading.—"A Pine Twig" and "Story of a Pine Tree," in Nature Stories for Young Readers. Also sentences on the board taken from the Science and Literature work, like those immediately following:

Written Language: Sentences based on Literature, thus:

The fir tree lived in the forest.

It was not happy.

It wished to be tall.

A little rabbit sometimes jumped over the tree.

This made the tree ashamed.

Or based on Science, thus:

The fir tree is green all winter.

Sometimes the snow covers it.

Then it is a white tree.

The snow does not break the limbs. They bend down.

¹ Cited from Dr. Frank McMurray in Herbart and the Herbartians, De Garmo, p. 123.

See how they are fastened into the trunk.

I cannot break off the twigs.

Writing.—(All the small letters this year.)

If the children are ready to study *r*, take the words *fir, rabbit, green, tree.*

If some other letter should be studied, similar groups of words bearing on the study of the fir will suggest themselves to the teacher.

Drawing.—(a) Drawing of pines and firs, with colored chalk or crayon.

(b) Drawing, and sewing in perforated board, of evergreen trees, of cones, and of rabbit.

(c) Moulding—trunk of evergreen, tub in which it was placed, toys that adorned it.

(d) Drawing of different scenes in the story, as of woodcutters hauling the trees from the forest, etc.

(a, b, c, are from Science, d is from Literature.)

Number.—Number of needles in a bundle of White, Scotch, or Austrian pine; in two bundles of White pine; in two, four, five of Scotch or Austrian pine.

Number of wings on two, three, etc., seeds.

Number of pairs of legs on rabbit.

Number of wheels on wagon that hauled the tree away.

How many span of horses?

Music.—"High in the Top of an old Pine Tree."

Poems.—"Pine Needles."

"The Little Fir Trees."

"The Pine Tree's Secret."

The most interesting feature of this programme is its attempt to derive science lessons and constructive work from a story. That the attempt results in fortuitous connections is manifest, and

were the programme to fall into the hands of an intelligent person unfamiliar with the theory of concentration it would doubtless inspire a question why any external or arbitrary association of ideas should be thrust upon or insinuated into the minds of pupils by teachers. To this question two answers might suggest themselves. The first is that some natural distaste of children for constructive work, drawing, modeling, counting, the observation of natural objects and other kindergarten and school exercises needs to be overcome, while the second may hold that the native interest of children in these specific forms of activity should be utilized to make selected themes prepotent as determiners of the neural associations through which a preferred apperceptive mass may be created and a desired type of character formed.

No intelligent person would halt long over the first answer, for it is impossible to believe in the implied absence or weakness of the constructive and classifying instincts, or admit the lack of that eager curiosity to test objects by the five senses, which is the bud of the higher intellectual powers. Professor James tells us "that up to the eighth or ninth year of childhood one may say the child does hardly anything else than handle objects, explore things with his hands, doing and undoing, setting up and knocking down, putting together and pulling apart," and that "con-

struction and destruction are really two names for one activity, for both signify the production of change and the working of effects in outward things." The child's delight in drawing, modeling, and cutting is an expression of this inborn constructive instinct, which being itself a stimulus does not need stimulating. The desire to count springs spontaneously out of the impulse to classify, or, as Froebel puts it, "In the development of number ideas we have an illustration in what manner and by what laws the child ascends from the perception of individual things to the more general and the most general concepts." Finally, it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that children are curious about the qualities of objects in and for themselves, loving the shapes, groupings, colors, and odors of external things, just as they love "the softness of mud, the wetness of water, and the magnificent soapiness of soap." It would seem, therefore, an act of supererogation to set a child's thoughts gyrating around the story of the fir tree in order to beguile him into counting its needles, sewing its cones, modeling the tub in which it is placed, or drawing the rabbit who occasionally jumps over it.

Forced to reject the first horn of our dilemma, let us examine the second, and ask ourselves whether, granting the native and absorbing in-

terest of children in material qualities, in grouping and counting things, in making and breaking things, we may and should utilize these interests to give certain ethical ideals concretely embodied in stories sovereignty over the imagination. In other words, if we do not need the story of the fir tree to induce children to count, cut, sew, draw, model, and curiously observe, do we need counting, drawing, modeling, sewing, and observation exercises to create around the story a retinue of attendant ideas which, adding to its pomp and dignity, will intensify its appeal to imagination?

It is only necessary to put this question clearly to realize that any effort of the kind described must be an abortive one for the simple reason that nothing so sets a mind against any subject as perpetually harping upon it. The healthy subjection of every normal child to the power of contrary suggestion would make the little victim who was bidden to draw the fir tree, sew its cones, count its needles, model its tub, and study the letter *r* in *fir*, *rabbit*, *green*, and *tree*, hate the persistent evergreen with all his heart and soul and might, and refuse to be reconciled to it even when decked in its Christmas glory.

From practical programmes based on the principle of concentration we must now hasten to consider defects inherent in the principle itself. Its

most obvious error, as has been already suggested, is the assumption that mutually repellent subjects may be fused in a single apperceptive mass. The educators who are responsible for enthroning this principle would seem not to have laid sufficiently to heart Herbart's division of instruction "into two main lines, the one for understanding, the other for feeling and imagination." In this division he clearly recognizes an important difference between scientific and humane studies. Defining this difference more closely we become aware of a momentous contrast between physical nature and human nature, and realize that science and the humanities must differ in their aim and method, in the forms of mental activity to which they appeal, in the convictions to which they give birth, in the practical solutions of social problems which they suggest, and in the "emotional undertones" which they create.

It is a suggestive remark of Professor Huxley that the one act of faith in the convert to science is "the confession of the universality of order and of the absolute validity at all times and under all circumstances of the law of causation." The discovery of causes and the reduction of these causes to an interrelated system is the confessed aim of science. Hence the distinctive method of science is experimental; the form of mental activity to which it makes preponderant appeal is the

understanding; the conviction to which it gives birth is that all particular facts are explainable through the totality of existent and precedent conditions; the plans which it suggests for the betterment of human nature are based upon the improvement of conditions, and the emotional undertone which it creates is one which inclines toward fatalism and pessimism. Studies relating to human nature, on the contrary, presuppose not the law of causation, but the principle of freedom; the method for which they call is that of introspection in its ascending degrees; the forms of mental activity to which they appeal are imagination, conscience, reason, and rational will; the goal toward which they point is not the conception of a fated universe, but of an infinite community of free beings who have learned so to think and act that self-activity never defeats its own divine nature; the plans for uplifting humanity which they inspire are plans whose accent is upon education, and the emotional undertone which they create is one of energetic optimism.

No thoughtful person will deny that humanistic and scientific studies complement each other, and that both are necessary to insure sanity of intellect, poise of feeling, and rationality of act. On the other hand, it would seem self-evident that between studies that cannot realize their

own aim, cannot follow their own method, and cannot reach their own goal without absolutely contradicting each other, the chasm is too great to be bridged by any plan of concentric education.

In his Talks to Teachers, Professor James remarks that "the best possible sort of system into which to weave an object mentally is a rational system or science." "Place the thing," he continues, "in a classificatory series; explain it logically by its causes, and deduce from it its necessary effects; find out of what natural law it is an instance, and you then know it in the best of all possible ways." "If you know a law," he adds, "you may discharge your memory of masses of particular instances, for the law will reproduce them for you whenever you require them," and he concludes that a "philosophic system in which all things were connected together as causes and effects would be the perfect mnemonic system in which the greatest economy of means would bring about the greatest richness of results." This statement is an illuminating exposition of that phase of education which relates to the teaching of all branches of science. Scientific subjects should from the beginning of education be presented with constant reference to the discovery of causal processes. On the other hand, all the studies which, like literature, art, and history, are expres-

sions of the free human spirit, should be so presented as to quicken that appreciative power to which and through which alone their value is revealed. As the pupil matures he should retrace ascending and widening circles of causal activity and should create in himself ascending and increasing circles of intellectual and emotional appreciation. The reader who understands this statement knows the difference between concentric and vortical education and holds the clew to one great contrast between the principles and practice of Froebel and that of the educators who are responsible for the promulgation and application of the principle of concentration.

Not only are the distinctive values of science and the humanities lost through efforts to relate them to a common center, but special sciences and special groups of the humane studies require to be differently presented in order that their principle may be grasped, their revelation understood, their gift of power appropriated, and the particular form of mental energy to which they appeal called into exercise. These truths are so important and so little understood that I may not shun the effort to throw upon them some little light.

Nature studies fall into two groups, one of which includes mathematics and physics, the other botany and zoölogy. Physics and mathematics

are related as body and soul, or, in other words, mathematics is the animating principle of physics. The revelation of this group of studies is a universe of quantitatively related forces; the mathematical gift of power is theoretical and practical mastery of inorganic nature, for whether man digs a cellar, builds a house, invents a machine, computes the motions of bodies, or measures relations of force he must use mathematics as his instrument. Finally, mathematics calls forth and disciplines that form of mental activity which, abstracting from the differences of objects, learns to think a world of magnitude. It is therefore one step of withdrawal from sense perception and one step of that mastery of thought through which mind ascends to higher knowledge of the world.

Passing from the first to the second group of nature-studies we discard the principle of mathematics in favor of the principle of life. Life is a formative activity related to an environment which it modifies and to which it adapts itself. The revelation of the biologic sciences is an organically related universe and an evolutionary ascent of being; their gift of power to man is ability to improve plants, animals, and his own physical structure; and, finally, by training the understanding to think relations of reciprocal dependence they hasten the ascent of mind from the

conception of phenomenal to that of noumenal being.¹

When we turn from nature studies to humane studies we leave behind us a realm of fate and enter a realm of freedom. The last word of the physical sciences is that each thing is made what it is through the totality of existent and precedent conditions. The first word of literature, art, and history is that man is a free being, able "to set aside internally and externally the stream of causation in which he finds himself." Potential freedom becomes actual freedom through social combination. The subject matter of history, literature, and art is the relationship of human freedom to human solidarity. History reveals the growth of freedom in the state. It records an advance from governments in which only the ruler is free, "and even he has only the semblance of freedom," through oligarchies wherein the few

¹ In the elementary course of the school the introduction to both physics and biology is made through geography. Says Dr. Harris: "Through the geographical window of the soul the survey extends to organic and inorganic nature. The surface of the earth, its concrete relations to man as his habitat and as the producer of his food, clothing, and shelter, and the means of intercommunication which unite the detached fragments of humanity into one grand man, all these important matters are introduced to the pupil through the study of geography and spread out as a panorama before the second window of the soul."—*Psychologic Foundations of Education*, p. 322.

are free and the many slaves, to governments which increasingly aim to make all men free by guaranteeing to each man participation in the governing power and qualifying him through education for the responsibility with which this participation invests him. Literature and art search out all the actions which reënforce man's power to participate with his fellows and all the actions which, on the contrary, destroy or minimize this power, and by presenting both types of action in the form of concrete examples illuminate imagination with ethical ideals. In brief epitome, the principle of history, literature, and art is rational freedom, and their revelation is liberty realized in and through social combination. But while at one in their principle and their revelation, they differ in their gift of power and in the form of mental energy to which they make preponderant appeal. Literature and art allure imagination by a concrete presentation of the beautiful in conduct and in life, and confer as their gift of power a sensitively discriminating taste. History challenges the individual to moral choices through concrete definition of the form of will as realized in corporate action, and confers as its guerdon the gift of a self-directing conscience.¹

¹ Readers familiar with *Psychologic Foundations of Education* will recognize that in the past few pages I have closely followed its statements. Readers not familiar with this book

The gist of the argument presented against the theory of concentration is that in so far as this theory prevails it attacks both the objective and subjective value of every branch of study. In its practical application it forces the substitution of arbitrary and contingent connections for causal relations and attacks literary appreciation by using stories as "cores of concentration" for all sorts of exercises.

During Alice's sojourn in Wonderland she ventured to remark that "the earth takes twenty-four hours to revolve on its axis." "Talking of axes," rejoined the Duchess, "chop off her head." This experience is a somewhat startling example of the dangers incident to the merely accidental or external association of ideas. To such fortuitous association we are all by nature prone. To deliver us from this sin of unregenerate intellect is one chief duty of education. By substituting causal for contingent connections science discloses to intellect the unity of the world and increases the possibility of communion between man and man. By deflecting intellect from the search for causes, and creating more or less contingent ap-

and interested in the question of educational values should study carefully Chapter XXXIV Psychology of the Course of Study in Schools, Elementary, Secondary, and Higher. I have omitted all reference to grammar and the studies allied to it because they have no direct bearing upon the activities of the kindergarten.

perceptive masses, concentric instruction, could it succeed, would create a bias of mind unfavorable to the grasp of the universe as a related whole and would defeat the struggle of men toward a unitary humanity.

By substituting sympathetic appreciation of rational ideals for native prejudices literature contributes even more largely than science toward that creation of mankind out of men which is the inner spring of all human striving. Nothing so isolates one man from another or one race from another as different prejudices. These alienating and antagonizing prejudices are aborigines of our minds. They are opinions formed in the underworld of instinct. Some are products of heredity, some of environment, and some of individual experience. All of them are tinged and many of them deeply dyed with emotion. They are defiant of coercion and invincible by logic. They are tyrants of the mind, and their tyranny can be overthrown only as rational ideals, marching in the valiant and beautiful forms of literature, capture and forever after hold the citadel of phantasy. When children all over the world listen to those nursery rhymes and fairy stories in which the elementary traits of the race mind are revealed; when boyhood all over the world yields itself in glad surrender to classic myth and Bible story; and when the spirit of youth every-

where receives the baptismal regeneration of the great world poets, then indeed shall the individual soul be enfranchised and all antagonistic nations be fused in one jubilant and victorious humanity.

The principle of concentration claims to be rooted in the doctrine of apperception as explained by Herbart. This explanation has two psychologic defects, of which the first is the assumed primacy of conscious intellect over feeling and volition. "With Herbart," says Lange, "apperception was confined chiefly to such cases in which the acquisition of the new is preceded by excitation of the circle of thought, that is, a contemplative lingering observation, an arching and pointing of concepts."¹ Herbart himself affirms that "the circle of thought contains the store of that which by degrees can mount by the steps of interest to desire, then by means of action to volition."² This attempt "to derive all psychical processes, especially the subjective feelings, impulses, and desires, from ideas and intellectual processes"³ is repudiated by later psychologists and educators, and it is now quite generally admitted that "the forces which in the act of apper-

¹ Apperception, Lange (Eng. tr.), p. 267.

² Science of Education, Herbart. Translation by Henry M. and Emmie Felkin, p. 213.

³ Outlines of Psychology, Wundt, p. 13.

ceiving awaken and guide the masses of ideas are the secret powers of the emotional soul" (Gemüth).¹ With this decision contemporary psychology reaffirms the insight of Froebel "that the center, the real foundation, the starting point of human development, and thus of the child's development, is the heart."² In this insight is rooted the educational method of Froebel, which proceeds from the assumption that in typical facts presented originally as typical acts resides the apperceiving energy which unifies experience and forms character. Goethe tells us that flour cannot be sown and seed corn ought not to be ground. The defect of concentric education is that it attempts to sow flour. The merit of the kindergarten, as I hope to show hereafter, is that it evolves all the values of thought and life from the seed corn of the typical deed.

The second psychologic fallacy embalmed in the method of the concentric programme is the proposition that "'presentations' (Vorstellungen) are the elements of mental life, and their combinations, permutations, and interactions cause all

¹ Apperception, Lange, p. 268.

² Pedagogics of the Kindergarten, p. 42. The German original is clearer in its statement "dasz der Mittelpunkt, die eigentliche Grundlage, der Ausgangspunkt der Menschlichen und so der Kindesbildung das Gemüth und die Gemüthliche sei."—*Pädagogik des Kindergartens*, p. 33. See Symbolic Education, p. 247.

the rest of the manifold forms of consciousness.”¹ Concentric instruction is really a form of educational atomism. Scientific atomism may emphasize either the independence of each atom in the atomic infinitude or the processes of composition and decomposition through which it essays to explain the actual world. In like manner educational atomism may put its stress either upon sensations as the original elements of mind or upon the associative processes through which sensations are supposed to be combined into percepts and percepts blended in those composite mental photographs which are all that psychologic atomism discerns in concepts or general ideas. Rousseau and Pestalozzi are atomic psychologists and educators of the former type.² Herbart and his disciples are atomic psychologists and educators of the latter type. “The object of synthetical instruction,” writes Herbart, “is twofold; it must supply the elements and prepare their combination.”³ The idea of relativity is apperceivingly active in his mind, whereas it had not attained threshold value in the minds of his predecessors. Froebel discards psychologic and educational atomism in both its earlier and its later form. He

¹ *The Science of Education*, Herbart. Translated by Henry M. and Emmie Felkin. Translators' Preface, p. 33.

² See *Symbolic Education*, Chapter I.

³ Felkin's Translation, as above, p. 159.

conceives of mind as an aboriginal energy seeking expression in deeds, and through deeds interpreting both itself and the world. In the structure of mind he discovers the key to education, and he must always be revered as the originator of that higher pedagogy whose initial insight is the deep meaning which lies hid in childish play, and whose triumphant achievement is a path which, issuing from play, makes swift and joyous ascent toward a true world view and a conforming life.

CHAPTER II

THE FROEBELIAN ANTITHESIS

THE Froebelian antithesis to concentric education is vortical education. The point of departure for vortical education is the typical fact. What thought masses are to the Herbartian, typical facts are to the Froebelian, and without clear comprehension of what is meant by a typical fact it is impossible to understand the practice of the historic kindergarten.

(1.) Let us approach the meaning of a typical fact by asking ourselves what we mean by any fact. Do we mean a single point of experience taken in detachment from the line it begins or ends? If so, we are thinking of something that does not exist. Each thing is what it is because of its relations to all other things. Therefore, to know any object or event apart from its relations is not to know it at all. To know it in some of its relations is to grasp it as a relative synthesis. To set it in the totality of its relations is to convert this partial synthesis into an absolute synthesis. We may see a mere point of fact; we may see an

arc of fact; we may see a semicircumference, a circle, or a spiral of fact; we may see a vortical ascent and expansion of fact; or, finally, we may see a spherical totality of fact.

Thus far we have only discussed ascending definitions of a fact, and from our present point of view should relegate all adequate apprehension of facts to the period of maturity, leaving for childhood those detached unrealities which we know as sense objects and isolated events. We should hold that children must live in an atomic world and should deride the idea of quickening in infant minds any prescient sense of the ties by which objects are related and events bound together. But what if among the objects of sense-perception there are some which provoke surmises of relations and principles? What if life and literature offer types of character which reveal not mere points but arcs on the circle of rationality? What if the heart of childhood thrills with prophetic intimations of all master truths? What, above all, if the human mind ascends to insight, not through fusing many single sensations into those apperceptive masses we call sense objects, and forming from images of these objects the composite pictures we call general ideas, but by a series of effluxes of the mind itself and the imposition of its native forms upon the objective data of experience?

Dwelling in thought upon these possible alternatives, a new pedagogy begins to define itself, and the questions emerge whether the most universal truths have not always been first discerned under the disguise of concrete examples, and whether the one great object of early education should not be to select and present those visible embodiments of creative principles which may be approximately classified as typical facts, objects, actions, characters, relations, and processes. At the heart of each valid synthesis of facts works the force which, raying out in all directions, generates the spherical whole. A typical fact is one which stirs in the prescient imagination at least a vague awareness of this generative force.

(2.) It was through the spur of a typical fact that the mind of Darwin was incited to ask the question which he answered in his theory of evolution. The animals of the Galapagos islands resemble species found in South America. They have been modified through a process of adaptation to insular conditions. No continental species are represented save those which could by some means have crossed the intervening sea. Such similarities under different conditions, such modifications and such exclusions constitute in their totality a typical fact illustrating very completely the general thesis that different species of plants and animals have been produced through modifica-

tions of a common ancestral stock by adaptation to differing environments. This typical fact was the lighted match which, falling into a combustible mind, produced that great conflagration of intellect in which the doctrine of a special creation of plants and animals was burned to ashes. It also kindled that brighter light which made possible the vision of nature as an evolutionary ascent of being.¹

The course of history suggests that the initial point of every line of human progress has been some typical fact. It was a typical presentation of the three great mysteries of life—illness, old age, and death—that drove Sakya Muni to those years of contemplation whose outcome was the great religion of the Orient. It was through a typical fact, the Cross of Calvary, that occidental humanity received the revelation of a self-sacrificing God. The falling apple was the immediate provocative of Newton's theory of gravitation whose issue is related as opposed to an atomic universe, and, as we have seen, the fauna of a group of small islands spurred the mind of Darwin to that formidable wrestle with nature, whose outcome has been the greatest revolution ever wrought in human conceptions of God, man and

¹ *Origin of Species*, D. Appleton & Co., 1871, p. 362. See also *Darwin and After Darwin*, Romanes, Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, p. 237.

the world. Such typical facts are thought-points as opposed to thought masses. They bear no resemblance, however, to the mathematical abstraction, but are like the germinating point in which a vital force begins its process of self-organizing activity.

(3.) Typical facts appeal to imagination, and through imagination to feeling and will. Froebel's insistence upon them declares his recognition of imagination as the predominant form of mental activity between the ages of four and six. His genius, however, also divined a deeper truth, and he perceived that, in view of the young child's primary and persistent need for a self-expressive activity, typical facts must be presented in the guise of typical acts. Seizing, therefore, upon instinctive games, he charged them with ideal values, and by getting children to play with typical objects and represent typical characters, relations, and processes, he made the first complete educational conquest of that realm of phantasy in which all young souls dwell. His creative thought may be summed up in a very few sentences. Since children spend their lives in a waking dream, education must so influence them that their dreams shall be prophecies of truth. Since their waking dream is an active drama, the form through which preventient imagination must seize upon truth is the typical deed. What a child does he tends to

behold. What he plays he is, he tends to become. Through creating in play an ideal world he will be prepared for an ideal interpretation of the actual world. Representing in play an ideal self, he will be incited to that self-surrender and self-conquest whose goal is self-fulfillment.

As its name implies and its practice suggests, the concentric programme is intent upon forming in the mind a circle of thought. In discussing this programme I pointed out that the psychology it presupposes makes interest, desire, and volition derivative from conscious thought. The psychology implied in the traditional procedure of the kindergarten traces the pedigree of conscious thought back to interest and desire, expressing themselves in act and becoming aware of themselves through seeing their image in deeds. Froebel's insistent plea is that within typical deeds resides the apperceiving energy which will direct and unify thought. His only core of unity is the child himself conceived as self-creative, and therefore as possessing germinal tendencies toward all the values of adult life which are in reality approximate definitions of self-activity. The method of the kindergarten which is rooted in this conception of the child may be most briefly described as an attempt to aid these native tendencies to find their outlet in ascending spirals of expression, which upon each successively attained plane of de-

velopment merge in a larger spherical unity of thought, feeling, and will.

(4.) The typical facts, or, as I may now amend my statement, the typical acts of the kindergarten, include varied play with typical objects and varied representation of typical characters, relationships, and processes. The greater number of criticisms made against the kindergarten have been leveled at the gifts or typical objects and have owed their sting to two popular misconceptions. It has been supposed that the gifts were intended to supply material for object lessons, and it has been tacitly or explicitly assumed that the purpose of these object lessons was to assist children to arrive at certain general concepts of form through the processes of comparison, abstraction, and generalization.

Most of the arguments urged against the gifts before the advent of the free-play heresy may be condensed into the statement, that being geometric solids and planes they divert the tendency of the mind to compare concrete things with each other, and prompt rather the comparison of type forms with individuals, which is unnatural. It is said, for example, that a child should compare a plum and an apple, or an apple and an orange; and not either of these fruits with a perfect sphere. The rejoinder is apt, that since the orange and apple resemble each other because both resemble

a sphere, the very first comparison between them must either elicit the typical form or float in the vague. But all conscious comparison between an orange and an apple or between either fruit and a sphere is foreign to children four and five years old, and the kindergarten has no mandate to call into premature exercise any form of mental activity. The spheres of the kindergarten are balls which children roll, bounce, toss, catch, whirl, and spin; the cubes are blocks with which they build; the squares, triangles, sticks, and rings are not geometric polygons and lines, but materials for making pictures. In a word all these typical forms are primarily playthings, and Froebel's simple contention is that playing with them concentrates attention on them and thereby makes them prepotent in the selection and organization of experience. The selective interest of a baby brought up by hand singles out bottles from among all the objects of nature and art and devotes to them his absorbed attention. This is because bottles are intimately connected with his most appealing and engrossing experience. For precisely the same reason the kindergarten child whose balls and blocks are connected with plays which have given him keen enjoyment singles out of the confusion of sense presentation objects allied to these typical forms. And since, unlike bottles, geometric archetypes are really the keys to all form, the

direction of attention to them means a valid classification of primary elements of experience.

It is a superficial grasp of Froebel's purpose in making "the archetypes of nature the playthings of the child" to suppose that what he expected from their use was merely that children should see all around them spheres, cubes, cylinders, pyramids, and prisms. This would be analogous to the supposition that we learn the alphabet in order to reduce all the sentences and words of books to their component letters. The truth is that precisely as we learn the phonetic alphabet, in order to get at the sense of what is written in books, so we learn the alphabet of form, in order to get at the sense of what is written in the great book of nature, and in order to write correctly, and if it may be with beauty, the language of the graphic pictorial and plastic arts.

(5.) It is a well-known fact that the first search for an alphabet of sense-perception was made by Pestalozzi, and that its outcome was his famous doctrine of form, number, and language. Froebel perceived that the alphabet offered by Pestalozzi would not enable children to spell out all the words in sense-perception, and he has provided in the kindergarten gifts, occupations and games more or less satisfactory alphabets of savor, odor, muscular movement, color, and musical sound. Recognizing, however, that only through form can

we adequately classify different kinds of objects, and adequately distinguish between objects of the same kind, he placed the accent of the kindergarten gifts upon an alphabet of form which is likewise an alphabet of size and number. "Specific life," he writes, "shows itself in specific structures conditioned by form and size. Form again, manifests its nature in the systematic arrangement or articulation of its component parts; size shows itself in its divisions. Both size and form have multiplicity and divisibility, hence both imply and depend upon number." ¹

The archetypes of form have meanings of their own which we must learn to translate if we would understand what nature is trying to say to us. And as we learn to understand a foreign language through practice in speaking it, so we learn to translate the language of form through its experimental and creative use. Will not children who have rolled balls and cylinders on level and inclined planes, who have tipped cubes and made them slide, and who have whirled and spun spheres, cubes, cylinders, and cones be prepared for appreciation of those relations between form and motion which are fundamental facts of physics? Will not the axial divisions of spheres, cubes, cylinders, and cones made familiar through the building gifts, peas-work, and modeling, pre-

pare for a more intelligent grasp of crystalline forms? Will not the kindergarten child enter more sympathetically than other children into nature's reason for giving flowers cylindrical stems and animals cylindrical legs? Will he not better appreciate "the appropriateness of cylindric forms for carriers of food and working supplies, for roots of trees and veins of animals, for drinking and breathing tubes through out the animal and vegetable world?"¹ Will not the varied exercises throwing into relief the freedom of the sphere from bristling edges and pricking corners, lead nascent thought to seal with intelligent approval nature's choice of spheroidal forms for the heads of men and animals, and for fruits, vegetables, flowers, and seed? Will not the twirling plays wherein all forms lose their angles and approximate to spheres give some clew to the activities through which pebbles are rounded and worlds shaped? In short, will not wisely directed play with archetypal forms gently lead little neophytes of thought out of the realm of nature's effects into the realm of her causative processes?

(6.) Passing from the scientific to the æsthetic interpretation of the world, let us remind ourselves that ideal art is never an external copy of

¹ The Study of Type Forms and Its Value in Education, John S. Clark. Prang Educational Co.

nature, but a reaction of the mind against nature. It is an attempt to seize nature's living energies rather than their dead results, and its advance is marked by increasing ability to express generic ideals. It has been said that "the superiority of Japanese paintings of flowers is due to a perfect memory of certain flower shapes instantaneously flung upon paper and showing not the recollection of any individual blossom, but the perfect realization of a general law of form expression, perfectly mastered with all its moods, tenses, and inflections."¹ The Japanese artist has entered into nature's creative act, and through knowledge of and sympathy with certain generic forms of expression he produces individual examples of a common type superior to the individual examples of nature herself. Astir within him is the ideal toward which the Iris or Chrysanthemum or Lotus energy in nature aims, and therefore he is able to fling freely upon paper original images of this ideal. In like manner the eye of ancient Greece was fixed not upon the imperfect achievements, but upon the ideal striving of the man-making energy, and through her interior vision she was able to reveal to dwarfed and distorted humanity the grandeur and beauty to which it might dare aspire. Sublime Zeus and gracious Aphrodite, statues of heroic Ares and

¹ Out of the East, Lafcadio Hearn, p. 119.

chaste Artemis defined great arcs on the circle of the ideal human and made men aware how divine is that spirit which is forever seeking incarnation in human form. In brief, the ideal reproduction of nature implies assimilation of various forms of creative energy.

Refusing to copy nature's products the artist seeks communion with her spirit and participation in her generative processes. Like the scientist he withdraws from the visible realm of effects into the invisible realm of causes. He will not be fettered by nature's defective embodiment of her ideals, but recreating these ideals in his own soul he gains power to recreate them in the world, and thus makes himself nature's highest instrument and her most complete interpreter. He turns from visible light to behold "the light that never was on sea or shore." He looks away from the rose "which his eye externally doth see," to the archetypal rose which from all eternity "has blossomed in the mind of God," and declining to recognize in men as they are the ideal of manhood, he defines that ideal itself by the inclusion in a single form of many scattered excellences, and by accentuating the excellences separately discerned.

(7.) Manifestly, the selection of scattered excellences implies a criterion of taste. All peoples have some standard in accordance with which

they choose types of beauty, and if the art of Greece surpasses that of other nations, it must be because of the superior truth of her selective idea. Greece conceived both gods and men as free beings, or original sources of self-activity. To her mind self-activity was alike the final cause and ultimate goal of life, and therefore the visible expression of freedom, whether in the resilient poise of sitting figures, in the unhasting and unimpeded energy of moving figures, or in that serenity of expression which is the outward sign of inner collectedness, and self-mastery was to her consciousness beautiful. Defining truth as self-activity she beheld "in the shining of self-activity" the "splendor of the true." Insight into the heart of Greece inspires the words which Swinburne, speaking in her name, addresses to Mother Nature in his Litany of the Nations:

I am she that made thee lovely with my beauty
From north to south,
Mine the fairest lips took first the fire of duty
From thine own mouth.
Mine the fairest eyes sought first thy laws and knew
them
Truths undefiled;
Mine the fairest hands took freedom first into them.
A weanling child.

The "subordination of reality to the ideal" is characteristic of all high expression of the human

spirit. Literature and art "translate the inner meanings of nature and human life." Literature translates these meanings through words; art translates them through forms. Literature must seize upon the word and art upon the form or line that expresses each shade of meaning with the greatest clarity, precision, comprehensiveness, and sympathetic appeal. Understanding that the distinctive feature of ideal art is the adequate representation of generic types, we are able to define another value of play with type forms. It has long been admitted that since the more specific forms of nature are all allied to geometric archetypes, their characteristic marks will be more readily seized when these archetypes are known. As Mr. Clark puts it in his valuable monograph on *The Study of Type Forms*, "In sketching from nature unaided by a study of the types, there is almost invariably an obliviousness to the proportion of surfaces and lines and an insensibility to differences in the essential character of circular, elliptical, or oval curves. Therefore, concrete objects are falsely represented." When to such defect of observation we add defect of feeling or failure to appreciate the appeal of forms to sensibility the ideal interpretation of nature becomes impossible, and art reduces itself to mere mechanical copy of her external aspect. Speaking of emotional analogies in relation to form

Wölfflin says: "A line composed of short, delicate curves is commonly called tremulous, while one with wider and shallower vibrations indicates dull humming or buzzing. A zigzag rustles and splashes like falling water, and when very pointed sounds shrill like a whistle. The straight line is quite still; in architecture it suggests the "quiet simplicity of the antique."¹ All kinds of forms, the rectangular, the spherical, the cylindrical, the ovoidal—all kinds of lines, vertical, horizontal, oblique, circular, elliptical, spiral, vortical—are instinct with purpose and charged with emotion. The artist must enter into their purpose and respond to their emotional suggestion if he aspires to interpret nature's energies instead of being fettered and bound by nature's products. Without knowledge of archetypal forms he cannot see nature correctly. Without feeling for archetypal forms he cannot interpret nature sympathetically. Without using archetypal forms and lines creatively he cannot attain to true knowledge or sympathetic appreciation of them, for man knows only what he does, and feels only what he expresses. It would seem, therefore, indisputable that free sport with archetypal forms and lines must be the terminus *ab quo* of that ideal reproduction of nature which "plays with conventionalized form and subordinates reality to it."

¹ Cited by Karl Groos in *Play of Man*, p. 65.

(8.) With this insight we return once more to the procreant idea of the kindergarten. The child can penetrate the purpose and respond to the emotional suggestion of forms only as he uses them creatively. His play stirs within him some dim prescience of the repose of the straight line, the self-fulfillment of the circular curve, the aspiration of the spiral, the exhilaration of vortical ascent and expansion. Again, through these special forms of creative activity his attention will be directed to the expression of analogous activities in nature and some suspicion of their purpose will be quickened within him. In brief, what a child does has a determining reaction upon what he thinks and feels. What he thinks and feels determines his selective interest, and his selective interest determines which among the many influences streaming toward him shall be welcomed by his mind and become the materials out of which he builds his world.

To assimilate the generic energies of nature and give them more perfect expression is a transcendent achievement. By itself, however, this achievement is not art. The distinctive principle of art is order, and under this general idea are included "rhythm, measure, proportion, and all those modes of arrangement used by artists which may be summarized as composition."¹

¹ The Fine Arts, G. Baldwin Brown, p. 10.

This principle of order is man's free gift, the addition of something in himself to what he receives from nature. "Animals run and caper; man regulates the run and caper by the principle of order and creates the dance. Birds 'utter successive notes pleasing to the ear,' man adds the element of ordered time and creates music. Apes delight in imitative gesture, man rises from mere imitation to the mimic dance and thence to the drama. Many animals 'delight in color and glitter and enjoy bright and tinted objects.' Man alone spaces objects at intervals and thus creates decorative art. Animals show constructive ability and build not only for purposes of utility but from motives of pleasure and display. Man seeks to embody in his constructions the principles of proportion, and thus creates architectural beauty."¹ If to-day

Earth proudly wears the Parthenon,
As the best gem upon her zone,

it is because man has been able to create a beauty for which nature furnishes no original. It is true that Mr. Herbert Spencer believes animal shapes may have suggested the general form of Greek temples. The suggestion seems forced, but even

¹ These illustrations are condensed from the book already referred to, *The Fine Arts*, G. Baldwin Brown. See pp. 1-18. I put the whole passage in quotations because the idea is borrowed even where the words are changed.

granting it validity, it is a far cry from the poodle to the Parthenon. Whatever indeed may have been the original suggestion of nature, it had been long outgrown when the Acropolis was crowned with this miracle of architectural grandeur and loveliness. The artist who conceived this perfect temple was no copyist of nature, but a higher incarnation of *natura naturans*, and the consummate beauty which he called into being was the outcome "of a long historic striving after proportion, after a satisfactory division of a whole into parts, after a rhythmical interchange of form and void." ¹

(9.) In order to appreciate great works of art, as well as in order to become in any degree an artist himself, the individual must not only know theoretically the principles governing composition, but must have that spontaneous emotional accord with them which we call good taste. Such spontaneity of sympathetic comprehension is best achieved by practice in composing. Children should therefore be led to create beauty of proportion and since proportion inheres in and is most simply created with geometric elements, practice in the grouping and spacing of different kinds of lines and in the symmetric cutting of different polygons would seem to be the true method of initiation into the arts of space.

¹ The Fine Arts, p. 16.

If this conclusion be accepted it will become evident that play with type forms has a second artistic value. It not only aids the mind to discern those generic energies whose more perfect expression creates the substance of art, but it also hastens the discovery of those principles of rhythm, measure, and proportion which create the form of art, and which, proceeding as they do from the spirit of man, reveal the structure of intelligence.¹

(10.) Thus far we have considered the kindergarten gifts only in their more obvious aspect as a series of typical objects through whose creative use the child learns to spell out the primary meanings of form and to appreciate the elements of artistic order. That Froebel expected other results from the plays he suggests with these typical objects is evident from his own insistent and reiterated statements of his aims and purposes. The following passages suggest a point of view which the perusal of his books will abundantly confirm:

I have not only forms for the child's eyes which are to make him acquainted with the outward world

¹ See *Psychologic Foundations of Education*, pp. 352-59. I have omitted all reference to the value of play with type forms as related to Manual Training and Constructive Industry because this value has been so often pointed out. See the monograph already referred to, *The Study of Type Forms and Its Value in Education*, pp. 21-23.

which surrounds him; I have symbols which unlock his soul for the thought or spirit which is innate in everything that has come out of God's creative mind. If the ripened mind is to know this thought, its embodied image must make an impression on the yet unconscious soul of the child and leave behind it forms which can serve as analogies to the intellectual ordering of things.¹ . . .

We must render perceptible to the child the unity of the world, absolute existence, the world within, and these in an earthly childlike fashion. . . . Such things we have to give to children through the system of ordered games and occupations which I have created.² . . .

God clothed His own image in a mass of clay and was not ashamed of His creation; neither will I be ashamed to set forth in little blocks of wood my ideas upon the nature of man.³

The kindergartner who has achieved intimacy with Froebel's thought is constantly surprised that his critics so rarely attack him in what is either his most indefensible or his most impregnable point. This point of danger is defiantly exposed in the sentences quoted. What must any sane person think of an effort to render perceptible not only the unity of the world, but absolute existence? And is not any educator clearly daft who attempts to set forth in little blocks of wood his ideas upon the nature of man?

¹ *Reminiscences of Froebel*, pp. 210-11.

² *Froebel's Letters*, Michaelis-Moore, p. 57.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

Waiving the question of Froebel's possible insanity, let us give our attention to the typical exercises through which he tries to realize the aim so boldly declared. These exercises are of three kinds. In the first kind given wholes are resolved into their component parts and from these component parts is reconstructed the original whole. The second kind of exercise is known in the kindergarten as a sequence. In sequences each separate figure is developed from its immediate predecessor and from it in turn is evolved its immediate successor, so that the series, when complete, shows a linkage of related forms. In the third kind of exercise there is not only a serial evolution, but an evolution which arises from a conscious attempt to mediate given extremes. These three types of exercise are carried out in every Froebelian kindergarten, and their merit is approved by sixty years of experience. Their primary object is to overcome gently the fragmentariness and discontinuity of childish thought. The child who takes apart and puts together must give his attention to what he is doing, and for the few minutes in which he is thus busily engaged he ceases to be the victim of chance incitement. The child who develops one form from another is beginning to live in little arcs of thought, instead of mere detached points of thought. The child who connects antitheses through a mediatorial

series is beginning to work for and with a conscious purpose. In short, through organizing evolutionary and mediatorial activities self-active intelligence begins to organize, evolve, and mediate itself.

By themselves alone the values indicated justify the exercises of which they are the result. These exercises have, however, a second value, which, while logically derivative from, is psychologically equal to those already considered. Through actively resolving wholes into parts and parts into wholes, the child creates in himself a selective interest which causes him to respond with quickened attention to the relations of parts and wholes in the external world. In like manner interest in evolutionary processes is aroused by creating sequences, and the canceling of antitheses through mediatorial forms leads to the singling out of analogous processes in the complex of experience, and induces a bias of mind favorable to the interpretation of all presented antitheses as mere termini of, or poles of, relations. There is no mystery in the method by which these results are reached. He who connects becomes connected and looks for connections. He who develops becomes developing and looks for developments. He who transforms apparently excluding antitheses into the relative termini of an including process becomes in so far a bridge builder, and

thereby a discerner of the truth that there are no bridgeless chasms. Evidently we have simply arrived once more at the generative thought so often expressed in this chapter. What we do we become. What we become we continue to do, and through what we do and become we interpret the powers not ourselves with which we come in contact.

(11.) I anticipate a question. Granting that acts of organizing will direct attention to organic wholes; that evolutionary exercises will awaken interest in evolutionary processes; and that the active mediation of antitheses will create a tendency to single out of the complex of experience mediatorial activities, what is the value of arousing these special forms of selective interest? The answer to this question admits us to the citadel of Froebel's thought. The goal of education is a true world-view and a conforming life. The key to a true world-view is the nature of mind. Mind is a generic and, therefore, self-creating energy. It is what it does, it does what it is, and it is aware of that active doing which is its being. Thought, feeling, and will are not independent faculties but related aspects of its indivisible energy. A completely realized mind must have completely objectified itself, and completely realized itself in this self-objectifying act. Every thought that mind can think must have

uttered itself in a creative deed; the relations and processes of thought, no less than its detached distinctions must have been objectified; finally, the aboriginal self-determining energy must have duplicated itself as well as objectified its distinctions, relations, and processes. This completely self-objectified and self-duplicated mind is God. The cosmos is the boundless volume of His objectified ideas. The relations and processes of nature correspond to the relations and processes of eternal intellect. The evolutionary ascent of nature is the revealed path of an eternally realized ascent of mind. Man is the crown of nature, because in him is incarnate not God's thought, but His thinking, not God's deeds, but His doing or willing, not divine self-determinations, but divine self-determining. In virtue of this self-determining energy man is a free being; in virtue of the fact that self-determining energy is generic energy, he is intrinsically a social being, and must make himself actually what he is ideally through the corporate progress of history, and through those ascending forms of social organization which we know as the hierarchy of human institutions. In brief, nature is the becoming of mind; man is self-realizing mind; God is eternally self-realized mind. Hence, to know the structure of mind would be to know God, nature, and man, and to live in conscious and free con-

formity with the structure of mind would be to fulfill with joy the most compelling demands of the categorical imperative.

The path of history is a devious and toilsome one, because on their march toward a hidden summit men are forever losing their way. The path of education, as broken by Froebel, is one of rapid and joyous ascent, because it issues from the deepest impulses of the human spirit and aims consciously at their realization. In his own mind the little child carries the key to nature, man, and God. Because mind is analytic, synthetic, evolutionary, self-antithetic, and self-duplicating it rejoices to do the smallest deeds which are cast into these forms. Through doing such deeds selective interest is awakened in the correspondent deeds of nature, and imagination illumined with a foregleam of their meaning. Through the half-blind tendencies it discerns within itself, emergent intellect, interprets the wholly blind tendencies of nature and glances toward an absolute mind in whom all these blind tendencies exist as completely realized ideals. The logic of Christ which, from the imperfect love of man, argued the perfect love of God, and beheld adumbrations of this love in the phenomena of nature is amplified in a method of education which from every typical activity of the human spirit argues an analogous but transcendent activity in the Divine

First Principle, and beholds in nature its obscure oracle and adumbration.

(12.) The prime article of Froebel's educational creed is that the seeds of every thought it will ever be worth while to think, every deed it will ever be worth while to do, and every sentiment it will ever be worth while to feel are indigenous to the soil of the mind, and that the chief duty of early education is to abet their native tendency toward development, by inciting typical acts which will issue in typical mental attitudes. This is his theory of vortical as opposed to concentric education, and the final reason for his emphasis upon typical acts as contrasted with thought-masses. His educational aim is stated by himself with admirable clarity in the following letter to an intimate friend:

Often and often, so you say, passages which I read in the Sunday Journal¹ evoke from the depths of my inner consciousness like thoughts which I have originated for myself, and like experiences which I have gone through in my own life until I grow quite astonished and puzzled. What you thus confide to me relates to one part of the sweetest, best, and purest fruit of my life, one part, namely, of what I mean to do or have already accomplished (through my children's games and occupations) toward clearing a pathway through the tangles of human life. I am endeavoring to bring man through the knowledge of his

¹ Froebel's Educational Organ.

own inner feelings and the experiences of his own life to a forefeeling, a perception, and, finally, to a clear consciousness of this great fact, that for all the deepest conceptions which govern life there exist universally active life experiences which are found to be repeated in the case of every man who examines the development of his own career with careful scrutiny and endeavors to bring himself to a consciousness of its meaning.¹

Some years ago in an attempted contrast between traditional methods and the method of Froebel I made the following statement: "Our too common defect is that we try to pour into the child knowledge he is not prepared to receive, and in which he feels no interest. Hence our teaching floats in the air unattached by cords of experience to the life of the child. Now Froebel is the evolutionist among educators. He will plant no full-grown oak of thought. He will not even plant a sapling. He insists upon the acorn, and even this shall be planted only in a soil prepared for its reception by fertilizing experiences." I repeat this statement in order to comment upon its insufficiency, for as I have been trying to make clear, the final truth is that Froebel will not plant at all, but that his aim is to nourish self-germinating seeds of thought, feeling, and

¹ Froebel's Letters as above cited, pp. 96-97.

will through abetting the child's native impulse toward varied forms of creative activity.

Let us learn a new lesson from the lily of the field. Hidden deep in the earth is the bulb where life sleeps. Warmed by the sunshine, fed by spring showers this life stirs, swells, mounts, and blossoms into a beauty greater than that of the king in his glory. Life was *in* the bulb. What it needed was heat, moisture, and light. When the inner impulse to grow was awakened this life reached out eagerly for all the food it could appropriate from earth and air, to build into a body the ideal stirring within it. So is it with the mind. Latent in it are creative energies. It wants to create itself. It wants to recreate the world. Quickened these energies and mind itself will reach out for knowledge as the material through which alone it can realize its own deepest impulses.

Broadly speaking, the Froebelian gifts and occupations relate to the theoretic and practical mastery of nature, and play with them admits children to the outer courts of the two great temples of science and art. Passing from the gifts and occupations to the dramatic songs and games, we enter a new realm, and play takes on a character which prepares for the humanities, as contradistinguished from the sciences and arts, by beginning the revelation of social or ideal selfhood.

From time immemorial attempts have been made to capture the imagination of childhood through stories wherein the great ideals of human life were presented in the form of concrete examples. For many ages the same ideals have been illustrated in pictures. It remained for Froebel to induce the child to present these ideals to himself, and he accomplished this signal achievement through that unerring intuition of genius which enabled him to divine the relation between the strongest impulses of childhood and the supreme values of human life.

In their native play children are forever seeking to interpret human deeds, characters, and relationships by reproducing them. Since, however, much of the environing life which they reproduce is not truly human, and since they have no touchstone by which to test the alloy of experience, imitative play misses its aim and darkens instead of illuminating imagination. In the kindergarten games, on the contrary, children hold up before themselves the image of an ideal world and an ideal self, and thus make themselves aware of the difference between what is and what ought to be. Through this discovery of the ideal, conscience is generated, and a short cut is made to that higher plane of consciousness upon which the mind becomes capable of self-direction, self-development, and self-conquest.

(13.) In order to avoid possible misconception, it is necessary to define what is meant by an ideal self and an ideal world. The ideal is the historically unrealized, but it is never the unreal. Rather is it the one great reality through whose power the unreal is forever overcome. Since the dawn of history the march of man has been in a definite direction. The path along which humanity moves goes somewhere. Doubtless it is one of those winding paths through which alone, as Goethe reminds us, steep summits can be approached, but it has a summit which through all its twists and turns it is forever nearing. Surveying this path from its beginning to its present end we become aware of its direction and its goal. That goal is what is really meant by the ideal. Never completely realized in any single human life, nor in any mundane sphere, it is, nevertheless, the incentive of all individual and collective endeavor. Its approximate realization in individuals creates heroes and saints. Its self-approximating energy working through corporate humanity creates higher civilizations. Mr. Fiske has said "that a community of intelligent beings living in free obedience to a perfect moral law is the goal toward which ever since our solar system was a patch of nebulous vapor the cosmic process has aimed." Completing his statement with the affirmation that this blessed community

is not only the goal of evolution but its archetype, we may define the ideal as the throb of eternal reality in the heart of all that is vanishing and unreal.

With the conception of a community of perfect beings as both archetype and goal of the cosmic process, we begin to understand that human institutions are the agencies through which mankind is created out of men. Between mere natural man and the object of his brutal lust the ideal of the family intervenes with the amenities of courtship and betrothal, the solemnity of marriage vows, and the cumulative moral sense of freely assumed responsibility. Between man and the animal greed which snatches at food and beats and slays all rival snatchers, civil society intervenes with the complementary ideals of specific vocation and reciprocal service. Between the spirit of man and bestial revenge the state intervenes with the majesty of law and the panoply of justice. Between man and the pitiful cowardice born of immemorial struggle with wild beasts and wilder elements the church intervenes with authoritative declaration that since God is on the side of His creatures, the least and lowest has no cause to tremble. Thus redeeming man from lust, greed, revenge, and fear, human institutions transform the victim of instinct into the freeman of the Spirit.

In so far as civilization prevails over savagism, spiritual humanity receives into its encircling arms the immature, the feeble, nay, even the brutal individual, and begins the work of his deliverance. Come unto me, whispers the family, and learn to trust and to love. Come unto me, calls civil society, and learn to serve and be served. Come unto me, commands the state, and learn the beauty of law and the glory of organized liberty. Come unto me, sings the church, and learn how to hasten the glad time, the brave time, the free time when neither shall any man fear himself nor cause another to fear. And now in these latter days the school, youngest of great institutions, adds its urgent and touching appeal. Come unto me, all ye who are ignorant, and be enlightened. Come unto me, all who are feeble, and wax in strength. Come, learn of the labors wrought and the agony endured for your sake by that great toiler and sufferer, humanity, as he bore the yoke and wrestled with the riddle of the centuries. Not for the few he fought and bled and conquered. For all was his strength spent and his blood poured. Come learn to see with his far-piercing eyes; learn to labor with his disciplined strength. Then shall you, too, join the victorious march of man toward the promised land of freedom and of love—then shall you become even now a member of that blessed community which religion por-

trays mystically in her New Jerusalem; which St. Augustine lifts before the eyes of a despairing and vanishing world in his City of God; which Dante celebrates as the consummate blossom of creation in his great white rose of Paradise; of whose animating spirit, Goethe sings in his mystic chorus, and which enlightened science increasingly recognizes as the goal toward which from the beginning the cosmic process has aimed.

Those who have "among least things an under sense of greatest," will not sneer at Froebel because he dares to break a path which, issuing from the plays of childhood, mounts toward the Holy City. It is no disgrace to gravitation that while swinging the planets it rules the apple's fall, and Eternal Love is not less sublime because while throned in the majesty of universal dominion it stoops in the lowly form of matter to be the servant of all. If these things be true, must we not approve Froebel's effort to get little children to play the ideals of life, in order that they may the more inwardly appreciate them and applaud him for straightening and thereby shortening the path of history?

(14.) The merit of the kindergarten games will be more clearly discerned if we pause to define accurately the meaning of typical characters. A typical character is the concrete embodiment of some generic or creative aspect of human nature or

of some native passion which collides with generic selfhood. Typical characters may be of all degrees of complexity. The three men of Gotham who went to sea in a bowl are typical characters of an elementary kind, because they illustrate that all too common rashness which must bring disaster. Hamlet is a complex typical character exemplifying the collapse of purpose under a strain disproportionate to native strength. The characters represented in kindergarten games must have three marks. They must be typical, elementary, and ideal. Children should not waste time dramatizing the merely capricious. They should not represent elementary types of evil. They should not represent complex types of either good or evil.

The duties of life arise out of its relationships, and the doing of duty creates ideal types of character. The good man is an affectionate son, a kind brother, a faithful husband, a protecting and tender father, a stanch friend, and a genial comrade. He is also an industrious member of the economic organization and a grateful recipient of its lavish bounty. He is a patriot ready to respond to the call of his country. He feels the appeal of a common humanity and is prompt to help the needy and succor the weak. He lives in sympathetic touch with the invisible source of life, and through the two great acts

of religion, worship, and sacrifice, perpetually renews the tie which binds him to the heavenly powers.

In view of this close connection between relationships, duties, and character, it is evident that if we desire to reveal the ideal to children, or better, if we wish to help them discover it for themselves, we should incite them to play that they are kind fathers, tender mothers, obedient sons and daughters, affectionate brothers and sisters, busy members of the working world, soldiers marching in defense of flag and fatherland, and worshipers old and young answering the call of the solemn bell and wending their way to the mysterious building whose spire, like a great finger, points to the sky. So obvious, indeed, is this method of revealing the ideal that it was instinctively adopted by unlearned peasant mothers in ages beyond the reach of our chronology. The kindergarten simply does with more conscious intent and clearer vision what maternal love has always tried to do.

(15.) In dramatizing elementary types of character children necessarily portray primal relations, but in addition to such incidental suggestion of social wholes the kindergarten offers a number of games into which the portrayal of character does not enter, and whose exclusive accent is placed upon the tie of fellowship. To this class

of plays belong all the games calling for reciprocity between the child in the center of the circle and those forming the ring; the breaking up of larger into smaller rings; the wreath and star games; the wandering and marching games; the family games; the games which throw into relief the dependence of the family upon organized industry and those which suggest the bond between different branches of industry.

It is impossible to make brief reference to these social plays without running the risk of exposing the kindergarten to ridicule, and the danger is the greater because the majority of those who will read this book have "apperceptive masses" with which its suggestions cannot "fuse" without undergoing a radical change. For thirty years exponents of the kindergarten have denied that they were making an absurd effort to define institutional ideals to children between the ages of four and six. For thirty years they have insisted that what they were really trying to do was to lead children "to love what they ought to love and hate what they ought to hate." Nevertheless, the circle games have been repeatedly derided as assumed attempts to make children prematurely aware of institutional ideals, precisely as plays with balls, blocks, tablets, sticks, and rings have been attacked on the ground that object lessons in geometry were not suitable to children of such tender

years. Within the past few years, however, the despair of protesting Froebelians has been mitigated by two great discoveries. Modern child study has discovered the superior merit of Catholic over Protestant methods of developing the religious sense, and modern psychology has discovered the priority of action over conscious thought and tirelessly repeats that what we do we attend to; what we attend to becomes prepotent in determining our associations; and our associated ideas constitute the apperceiving mass through which we interpret experience. These discoveries are themselves great apperceiving ideas to which Froebelians may hopefully appeal. For what the kindergarten does is simply to quicken domestic, economic and patriotic impulses through the same appeal to imagination by which the Catholic Church quickens religious impulse, and it makes the appeal to imagination more potent by enlisting the child's own activity in the revelation of the ideal.

(16.) In addition to the impersonation of typical characters, and the portrayal of typical relations, Froebel suggests the representation of typical processes, such as the series of activities through which we get milk and bread; the process of house-building, and the making of a wheel. Games of this kind are so planned that they not only hint the dependence of the individual, but

the interdependence of different industries. The baker depends upon the miller and farmer; the carpenter upon the woodman; and without the wheel the whole industrial world would fall to pieces. From the moral point of view it is not a matter of small moment whether children take food, shelter, clothing, and transportation as natural and inalienable rights, or whether they realize in some measure the conspiring activities which make possible these gifts of life. From the intellectual point of view it makes a wide difference whether children form the habit of seeing mere points of fact or whether they are led to discover increasing arcs of fact. Whoever lives in broken pieces of himself must see a piecemeal world. He who attains continuity of thought and purpose will look away from those fragments of activity we call things to the energies that include them. Hence, taken in connection with the sequences created in gift exercises, the games representing processes give the mind a bias which, with increasing years and enlarging experience, will predispose toward an evolutionary view of nature, of individual life and human history.¹

¹ While the accent of the Froebelian games is placed upon human character and relationships, physical nature is not ignored and in a number of plays are represented typical phenomena of the inorganic world, typical aspects of plant and animal life and typical attitudes of man toward these

"The universal," says Emerson, "never interests us until it is housed in an individual." Conversely, what interests us in the individual is the universal. Since we are so made that we will not refrain from seeking the universal, it is evident that a child's mind may be permanently warped by the coercion of fictitious or contingent apprehending ideas. Education, therefore, must furnish imagination with valid types; geometric types as the first means of reducing to relative unity, "the chaos of sense-experience"; typical plants and animals to illustrate the great classes into which the vegetable and animal worlds are divided; the immortal types of the human form bequeathed to us by the genius of Greece, to teach us how divine it may become; typical human characters as portrayed in history and made transparent in literature, in order that we may understand the brotherhood of man, and that each one of us may not be shut up with a heart which knoweth only its own bitterness, or bounded by a joy with which no stranger can intermeddle. Can we speak of friendship without thinking of

three spheres of being. See Froebel's Commentaries on the Weathervane and Light Songs, The Flower Song, The Garden Gate, The Little Gardener, Beckoning the Chickens and Pigeons, The Fish in the Brook, The Shadow Songs, The Farm Yard Gate. See also in Letters to a Mother, the following chapters: From Wind to Spirit, The Soul of the Flower, The Discovery of Life.

David and Jonathan, Achilles and Patroclus, Py-lades and Orestes? Can we think of patriotism without recalling Curtius and Regulus, William the Silent or our own Washington? Can we dream of ideal motherhood without an immediate vision of some great picture of the Madonna and Child? Finally, what is the beating heart of our Christian religion if not the recognition of one typical life as the standard by which we measure both the human and the divine? When adult humanity gets rid of types it will be time enough to ask how we may do without their indispensable assistance in the education of the young child. Until that impossible moment let us use without misgiving types of form, types of character and situation, types of relation and process, being sure in our own minds that a type is the concrete embodiment of a universal standard, the picture form in which all great ideals must be first revealed to the eye, the heart, and the imagination.

(17.) The concentric programme and its Froebelian antithesis embody mutually exclusive ideals of education. In the former, the core of unity is a subject selected by the teacher; in the latter, the core of unity is the child at play. The concentric programme clusters about its selected subject a number of more or less arbitrarily related ideas; its Froebelian antithesis follows and guides self-

evolving energies as they ascend in widening spirals toward ever greater spherical totalities of thought, feeling, and will. The method of the concentric programme is a method of the understanding. It aims to create a circle of conscious thought and appeals through the discriminating intellect to feeling and volition. The method of the kindergarten is the method of literature and art, and its primary appeal is to imagination. Remembering that "truth embodied in a tale shall enter in at lowly doors," it pictures universal truths through concrete examples. Anticipating that great dictum of contemporary psychology, the priority of the deed, it presents these concrete examples in the form of productive processes and dramatic representations. It abets the native effort of childhood to create a miniature world which shall interpret the actual world. In this miniature world human characters and relationships assume elementary but ideal forms; the archetypes of nature interpret her products, suggest her causal processes, and declare her æsthetic ideals; evolutionary doing reacts to produce evolutionary seeing, and the constant resolution of antitheses quickens a hopeful presentiment of the truth that there are no obstacles which mind may not vanquish, no contradictions the free spirit may not annul. By playing all the ideals which interpret nature and human life the kindergarten

flings its rainbow bridge between the heart of childhood and the vision of manhood, and through the allurements of the beautiful impels intellect to the wrestle for truth, and persuades will to a prevailing struggle for goodness.

CHAPTER III

THE METHODICAL TREATMENT OF LITERATURE

THE most meritorious deed of the educators who originated the concentric programme is their insistence upon the value of classic stories. It is unfortunate that they should have undone this righteous deed by using such stories as cores of concentration for all sorts of exercises, and by subjecting them to what is called a methodical treatment. The disastrous results of the first mistake have been already considered. In illustration of the second I quote the story of *The Wonderful Kettle* "treated" for the benefit of children in the first school year.

THE WONDERFUL KETTLE¹

I

Once there was a very poor little girl, who lived with her mother near a great wood. They had noth-

¹ I quote from Herbart and the Herbartians, pp. 145-47. The story as there told is translated from *Das Erste und Zweite Schuljahr* and we are assured by Dr. De Garmo that it gives a good idea of the general method of treatment.

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ing to eat, and grew very hungry. Then the little girl went out into the woods. Here an old woman, who knew already that the little girl was hungry, met her. So the old woman gave the little girl a kettle, and said to her, "If you say to the kettle, 'Kettle, cook,' it will cook you good, sweet rice. But if you say, 'Kettle, stop,' it will stop cooking." Then the little girl took the kettle home to her mother, and told her all about it. After this they did not need to go hungry, for as often as they pleased they ate good, sweet rice.

II

One day the mother went away from home, and left the little girl all alone. Soon she became hungry, and said to the kettle, "Kettle, cook"; but she had forgotten all about saying, "Kettle, stop." The kettle kept on cooking more rice, until it ran over. Then the kitchen became full of boiled rice, then the whole house, then the street, and at last all the houses. Nobody knew what to do.

At last the mother came home, and called out, "Kettle, stop." It stopped cooking at once; but whoever wanted to get into that town had to eat his way in through the rice.

METHODICAL TREATMENT

A. (1) I have told you about a little girl. Who had died? Could they give her food any longer? The poor girl must have often suffered hunger, why? What must she have had, not to be hungry any more? Children name many kinds of food. There are warm foods and cold ones. How are warm foods

prepared? (Kitchen, stove, fire.) How long must rice cook? May it cook forever? What would happen?

I will tell you of a little girl who often had to go hungry.

(2) Story to "as often as they pleased, they ate good, sweet rice."

B. (1) What did the old woman give the girl? What was she to say to it? Could the mother say this, also? How did she know about it? What would the kettle do? How long would it cook? Do you suppose the girl had thought of this? If she had not, what would happen?

(2) Story to "and nobody knew what to do."

C. (1) How long will the kettle go on cooking? Who could stop it? Where is the mother?

(2) Story to the close. Repetition by children. Uniting of the three sections. Questions on the whole. Several pupils tell the whole story.

(3) The child had not remembered what the old woman had said. Who had? Has anyone ever told you anything that you ought to notice and remember? (The teacher, parents, brothers, and sisters, etc. Children give examples.) Who had not forgotten what the old woman said? What could the mother do when the rice ran over? Who had forgotten it? Who did not know what to do? If you have forgotten something, what can you not do? But if you have remembered, what can you do? What does the teacher (papa, mamma) say when you have forgotten something? What should you not do? What should you do?

(4) "We must not forget what we are told to do."

(5) Application: e.g. What should you do when you meet the teacher? (Greet him.) When you meet

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people on the street? When your mother goes away and tells you something, what must you do? etc.¹

The treatment of a story illustrated in the above example is an attempt to carry out in the teaching of literature what Herbartians call the five formal steps of instruction. The following tabular presentation of these several steps is given by Dr. De Garmo.

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|---------------------------|---|
| 1. Preparation—Analysis | } Apperception of percepts. |
| 2. Presentation—Synthesis | |
| 3. Association | } Thought. The derivation of and arrangement of rule, principle, class. |
| 4. Systematization | |
| 5. Application— | From knowing to doing—use of motor powers. ¹ |

It will be observed that the five steps of instruction fall into three divisions, the first and second divisions containing each two steps, and the final division but a single step. The first step prepares for a new subject by calling into consciousness the apperceiving ideas through which it may be related to the existent store of experience, while the second step attempts a vivid presentation of the subject thus prepared for. Through the third and fourth steps the general principle concretely illustrated in the particular example is elicited, while in the final step a practical application of

¹ Herbart's Outlines of Educational Doctrine, Lange and De Garmo, p. 59.

this principle is made to the life of the pupil. In the methodical treatment of the story of *The Wonderful Kettle* all these steps are conscientiously traversed. In sections A (1), B (1), and C (1) we are shown how the mind is prepared for each new lesson. In sections A (2), B (2), and C (2) we are called on to traverse the second step of vivid presentation. In section 3, beginning with the sentence, "The child had not remembered what the old woman had said," we advance to the third step whose aim is to compare and combine new and old ideas, in order that connection and harmony be established between them and that a general principle may be extracted from them. In section 4 the extracted principle "that we must not forget what we are told to do," is stated in the form of a categorical imperative, while in the final section this general mandate is applied to the particular instances of the child's duty to greet his teacher or other persons whom he may happen to meet on the street, and his obligation to remember everything his mother may bid him do.

Is it too much to say that such methodical treatment of a story must kill any interest children might otherwise have felt in it, and neutralize any influence it might have exerted upon them? Constant interruptions break the continuity of the narrative and distract the attention of

the little listeners. The reiterated demands for repetition of the story up to a certain point must antagonize minds eager to hasten toward its climax. In the struggle to drag above the threshold of consciousness all that children may know about different foods, and the manner of preparing them, the minimum of interest which has survived interruptions, distractions, and forced repetitions must be effectually strangled. Finally, the anti-climax. "Do you always remember to greet the teacher?" can appeal only to the moral sense of little prigs who lack all sense of humor.

Several false psychologic assumptions are involved in the methodical treatment of literature. It is a grave mistake to suppose that children should precipitate in the form of conscious and compelling principles the feelings stirred within them by the presentation of typical characters, collisions, and catastrophes. On this subject Herbert himself has written wisely, and it seems strange that his disciples should have departed so far from the counsel of their master. "Interrupt a narrative," he says, "with moral precepts and children will find you a wearisome narrator. . . . But give to them an interesting story, rich in incidents, relationships, characters, strictly in accordance with psychological truth, and not beyond the feelings and ideas of children; make no effort to depict the worst or the best, only let a

faint, half-unconscious moral tact secure that the interest of the story tends away from the bad toward the good, the just, the right; then you will see how the child's attention is fixed upon it; how it seeks to discover the truth and think over all sides of the matter; how the many-sided material calls forth a many-sided judgment, how the charm of change ends in preference for the best."¹ Fidelity to these suggestions would do away with four of the five steps of method, and call upon the narrator only for the one feat of vivid presentation.

The ascent of mind is from the particular fact, through the symbol to the concept or general idea. By the word symbol, as here used, is meant that change which takes place in a mental image when ceasing to be a mere copy of some external person, action, or event, it begins to translate the inner meanings of nature and of human life. In this sense the personages and collisions of literature are symbolic, because they present general types of character and experience under the revealing disguise of concrete examples. A good story must call forth in the mind of those who listen to it a series of vivid mental images, and the total series of images must converge toward the goal of some general idea. To picture the deeds of

¹ Science of Education, Herbart. Felkin's translation, pp. 88, 89.

David, Achilles, Curtius, is not merely to run through the mind a train of images, but to speed the train toward a terminus in the definition of heroism. On the other hand no mistake can be greater than to forestall the arrival of mind at the terminus of a general idea by either forcing upon it an external definition or dragging such definition prematurely from its own reluctant subconscious depths. A concept has been defined as a rule for the formation of images.¹ The images created by genius conform to true rules, and therefore assist the mind to grasp true rules. Any general type of character will be more or less adequately apprehended, as it calls up in memory a larger or smaller number of illustrative images. Such images hovering around the general idea are like the separate child angels whose faces in many old pictures blend in the halo which surrounds the head of some devout saint. The severest criticism to be made upon the methodical treatment of literature is that it refuses to nascent thought that lingering contemplation of truths incarnate through which alone it can mount securely toward truth universal.

A second psychologic assumption no less practically misleading than that just considered is that new facts seize upon the mind with greater

¹ Psychologic Foundations of Education, W. T. Harris, p. 38.

force when they readily fuse with familiar ideas. Let us boldly announce the converse of this assumption and declare that new facts seize upon the mind with greater power when they antagonize familiar experience. We recall Plato's affirmation that knowledge begins with wonder, and we know that wonder arises when some new object or event refuses to blend with previous knowledge. The Wonderful Kettle is a good story, because it startles the mind with a kitchen utensil which can cook at command, thrills the free soul with a glad sense of free power, and hints that freedom implies obedience to law. It is pathologically treated when attention is diverted from its inspiring idea by tedious rehearsal of the manner of preparing different foods and by the hammering of such minor moralities as greeting acquaintances met on the street. There is more apperceiving energy in the feeling of astonishment than in any existent store of consciously related ideas. It may possibly be open to debate whether Herbart really held that "apperception conforms exclusively to older concepts which are superior in strength to the new,"¹ but there can be no doubt of the fact that his disciples place undue emphasis upon that form of apperception which assimilates a new experience to the older content of consciousness, and are somewhat ob-

¹ Apperception, Lange, p. 260.

livious of the constitutional necessity of mind to make itself foreign to itself, in order that it may come to itself. Hence, their practical exercises tend perpetually toward repetition of the familiar and elaboration of the obvious.

A third psychologic fallacy lurking in the methodical treatment of literature is that it is either possible or desirable for young children to be made aware of all that may be going on within their own minds. Ignoring the vast difference between knowing, and the knowing of knowing, this treatment calls for acts of "second intention," possible only to the attained introspective power of mature intellects. One of the characters in Wilhelm Meister remarks "that it is the nature of the Germans that they bear heavily on everything, and that everything bears heavily on them." The educators responsible for the methodical treatment of literature paid the penalty of being Germans. So did Grube, when he expected of little children exhaustive and exhausting analyses of numbers up to ten. Germany is the deepest thinking nation in the world, and through her heroes of contemplation leads mankind. But her lesser sons sometimes have to bear the defect of her surpassing merit.

Shall I defy the coward fear which shakes my soul, and risk the horror of relegation to that limbo of outgrown absurdities wherein wander

the ghosts of faculty psychologists, by avowing my conviction that the motive of the appeal which the methodical treatment of literature makes to that form of mental activity commonly called the understanding is directly traceable to the Herbartian dictum that the "soul is a simple wherein nothing exists but ideas, their relations and interactions." Such an analysis of mind predisposes pedagogy toward undue accent upon the relations between conscious ideas, and undue neglect both of the feelings which hold ideas in solution and of the deeds through which they are precipitated in crystal forms of thought. Mind is an energy, one and indivisible; feeling, willing, and knowing are special modifications of this energy; sense-perception, memory, imagination, understanding, reason are special modifications of that form of mental activity which we call knowing; all the forms of mental energy interpenetrate, and at no given moment is the mind exclusively determined as any one form. Nevertheless, it remains true that in different stages of development, and at different moments in all stages of development different forms of mental activity are predominant over others, and that in childhood the predominating form is not understanding which laboriously seeks the relations between conscious concepts, but imagination joyously transmuting sense-images into general ideas. Childhood is

not the age of prose, but the age of poetry, and it is a caricature of education to attempt to make children aware of relations and principles which should only stir in the semiconscious depths of the soul as prescient surmises.

The methodical treatment of stories is not only an offense against the spirit of childhood; it is also an assault both upon the form and spirit of literature. The supreme merit of literature is its respect for human freedom. It wins by allurements, but never coerces by authority. It announces no moral imperatives, but appeals to "admiration, hope, and love"; stirs liberating and aspiring impulses, and is content to warn against evil by portraying its ugliness and tracing its results. "The playhouse," says one of George Macdonald's canny Scotch heroes, "is whaur ye gang to see what comes o' things as ye canna follow out in ordinar life." Good stories well told enrich the mind with concrete types of character which interpret human nature, and concrete situations which hint solutions of the problems of human life. Commenting upon the characters in Shakespeare's plays Goethe says that they "act before us as if they were watches whose dial plates and cases were of crystal which pointed out according to their use the course of the hours and minutes, while at the same time you could discern the combinations of wheels and springs that turned

them." In actual life we often fail to discern the feelings out of which convictions arise, and to connect actions with the convictions from which they result. Any true literary product makes us aware of this intimate connection between impulses, deeds, and convictions, and also traces the social recoil of each deed upon the doer. Thus it helps us to understand the springs of action in ourselves and others, and to define to ourselves which actions and motives make for and which against the life of man in society. Yet it knows no thus, no therefore, and no must, and never appeals directly either to understanding or conscience. Its animating principle is neither truth nor goodness, but beauty. Free itself through love, it dares to trust our love and freedom, and by this generous faith calls forth the energy through which "we erect ourselves above ourselves."

My reason for dwelling at such length upon the psychologic fallacies embalmed in the methodical treatment of literature is that the influence of this method has been felt in the kindergarten. As a single illustration of the way in which stories have been tangled in a web of collateral information and of the more or less ludicrous and far-fetched moral imperatives distilled from them, I quote from the Kindergarten Review for December, 1904 and January, 1905, some Suggestions for Programmes based upon Nursery Rhymes.

JACK AND JILL

What a little boy and little girl did to help their mother: What the water was to be used for (washing, drinking, etc.) How many have helped their mothers this summer? Children's bumps: What to do for them; must be brave and learn to endure pain. The country well; well sweep; bucket and rope; pump *vs.* city faucets.

DING DONG BELL

The kind little boy. What took him to the well. Kindness to animals. Why we love the pussies. What they do to help in the house.

LITTLE BOY BLUE

Care of sheep and cows. Not only fed but kept from danger. They trample the cornfields. Children must not stop to play when sent on errands, or sleep when they should come to the kindergarten. Haycocks make a nice sleeping place. Straw rides. Calling sheep and cows by horns.

THREE LITTLE KITTENS

What mittens are made of; difference between mittens and gloves. Which keep the hands warmer? Careless children lose things—mittens, hats, books. Need to be taught to find them. Children can wash little things and so help mother.

PUSSY CAT, PUSSY CAT

London a big city—bigger than New York. Queen lived there; good Queen Victoria; queens wear fine

clothes; live in grand houses; but mice even get in them. Pussy cat scares them away. Little children may help great folks.

THERE WAS A CROOKED MAN

Did you ever see a crooked man or child? Should never make fun of such; should be glad if you are straight; how much is done for crippled children; hospital at Forty-second Street. The doctor from Vienna who operated on Armour's child.

Some years ago I was told of a class, the members of which were studying the Iliad as a manual of botany, numismatics, and ancient geography. The wrath of Achilles, which the sovereign poet announces as the theme of his epic, was a subject indifferent to these eager searchers for names of unknown plants, lost localities, and vanished coins. Is there not a similar profanation of the best literature for little children when our nursery classics are made points of departure for information about wells, pumps, faucets, mittens, gloves, hospitals, surgical operations, and children's bumps? And if Mother Goose be so lovable that, despite this distortion, she can still allure childish hearts, will even her charms prevail when her every rhyme is made the text of a moral homily culminating in a practical application to the duties of daily life? I am glad I was a child in the good old days when I could enjoy the com-

radeship of Jack and Jill without a solemn thought of duty to my mother or an arresting sense of how heroically I should bear my bumps; when Tommy Stout and Little Boy Blue preached only by example, and when the Crooked Man himself declared a secret of which the interpreter who calls upon children to rejoice that they are straight, and warns them against making fun of deformed people, has never dreamed.¹

In brief epitome of the foregoing criticisms, I challenge the methodical treatment of stories because it forces attention to the relations between consciously defined ideas, whereas the aim of literature is to interpret the meaning of nature and life through concrete images, and the spirit of childhood demands such images as modes of

¹ In addition to the inherent defect of its principle the systematic treatment of literature constantly betrays its votaries into the error of diverting attention from the true implication of a story or rhyme by harping upon a moral which is foreign to its intent. It seems incredible, for example, that moral exhortations to be grateful for straight backs and warnings against laughing at deformed persons could be deduced from a rhyme which fairly bristles with the statement that a crooked mind must perforce see a crooked world. As Mrs. Whitney puts it in *Mother Goose for Grown Folks*:

"Once begin with a crook
 You'll go on with a crook;
 Crooked ways, crooked luck, crooked people,
 Crooked eyes, crooked mind,
 Crooked guide posts will find
 Yes, a crook in the very church steeple!"

transit from particular facts to general concepts. The stories selected for little children should furnish clews to experience by presenting elementary types of character and situation, and they should be told in simple, straightforward fashion without repetitions, questions, the intrusion of useful information, the distillation of general principles, or the hammering and pounding of minor moralities.

The concentric programme and the methodical treatment of literature are the characteristic features of what can only be described as an attempted revolution in pedagogy. The procedure for which it contends has already refuted itself in practice. Seeking a common core for mathematical, biologic, and humane studies, it lost the specific core of each study. Blind to the priority of action over conscious thought, it foolishly attempted to build character out of "presentations." It expected from immature minds an impossible act of unification. It refused to trust the allurements of the beautiful and the repulsiveness of the ugly. It aroused antagonism through its incessant and intrusive good advice. Are we not forced to conclude that the revolution attempted was a mistake?

CHAPTER IV

LITERATURE AND LIFE

THE nursery rhymes transmitted by word of mouth from generation to generation are one of the instrumentalities through which mankind begins the making of men. In them is preserved for childhood the child-thought of humanity. They portray elementary types of character and elementary problems of life and they have been sifted through the minds of so many generations of men living under so many varieties of conditions that they have lost all local, temporal, and accidental features. They are the world-literature of the infancy of our race, and correspond remotely with the few supreme world-poems which touch the hearts and solve the problems of all mankind.

It may help us to appreciate the universality of our nursery rhymes to recall to mind a few of the typical characters they celebrate. Who has not blushed to discover Cross Patch in herself? Who has not met many a Jack Horner pluming himself on the pie he had no part in making?

Who has not fled from that scold of Surrey, whose overzealous energy has ruined her temper? Who refuses sympathy to the mother of a progeny so numerous and so clamorous that they distract intellect and destroy serenity; and what human heart can be cold to the passion of that village wife of long ago, smarting under the disappointment of a husband "no bigger than her thumb" angered by the shiftlessness shown in his ungartered hose and stung to contempt by the necessity of prodding him into rhino-hygienic habits? One by one they rise before us, these defining characters of our nursery rhymes. Here is the old man of the wilderness still asking his pointless questions: yonder the woman, angry without cause, sticks fast in her apple tree; the soul forever restless, because forever seeking satisfaction in "vic-tuals and drink," looks out at us through discontented eyes: the man who has made himself a mere toy, because he would do nothing but play, follows the drudge dulled by unremitting toil; and, last figure of our moving panorama, we recognize that perpetual type of commonplace humanity, Solomon Grundy, about whom his biographer can only record that he was born, christened, wedded, and that he sickened and died.¹

The value of typical characters is that they be-

¹ I borrow many of these illustrations from Mrs. A. D. T. Whitney's *Mother Goose for Grown Folks*.

gin the work of sorting humanity into classes. One of the great mistakes made in psychology is to suppose that the mind proceeds by abstraction, comparison, and generalization to general ideas. If the books on child study prove any one fact more conclusively than all others, it is that nascent thought seizes upon every single object as representative of a class, and that to little children all men are papas, all animals bow wows, and all ceilings skies. The lesson of this fact is that the attention of children should be directed to those objects, actions, persons, and events which are representative of true classes, in order that they may not lose themselves in the labyrinth of experience. The typical characters of literature give clues to human nature and act as "assimilative nets," with which the mind fishes for, catches, and holds different kinds of men. That all this fishing, catching, and holding is without the conscious connivance of the fisher goes without saying. Indeed, the fact that it should never be made conscious is the one point which must be insisted upon out of pity for tormented childhood, reverence for literature and insight into the processes of mental development.

Passing from the study of nursery rhymes to that of traditional tales we find in the latter a significant advance which gives them unique and permanent value. Out of the classes into which

humanity has been ordered emerges the ideal human being. This ideal man is first of all a free-man of the universe. He is emancipated from all material needs. He is visible and invisible at will. He knows the secrets of nature, and she is plastic to his purpose. Space constrains him not, and he has triumphed over time. Where he would be there he is. What he would do he infallibly accomplishes. His character is drawn with strokes as telling as they are few. He is brave, kind, generous, pitiful, teachable, and prompt to serve. His life is spent slaying giants and rescuing imprisoned princesses. In a word, he is man's earliest vision of his own ideal self as conqueror and deliverer, and to acquaint little children with him is to quicken the ideal self in them.

In the myths of Greece, of Rome, and of the Teutonic peoples the rude outline of ideal humanity sketched in household tales takes on solid form and resplendent color. The hero is now on one side of supernatural origin. Often, however, he has a contrasting twin, a brother who betrays him, or a sister whom he must deliver. Lacking such a twin he has upon his otherwise invulnerable body one vulnerable spot. Because of omens pointing to his future greatness he is driven from his home. He becomes a tireless wanderer. During his wanderings he overcomes all kinds of monsters. He gains supernatural knowledge. As

moral consciousness deepens in the old story-tellers he is set to do deeds which involve his own sacrifice. But this sacrifice is a prelude to final victory, and the myth ends with the return of the hero to his home and his triumphal ascent of his rightful throne.

This typical hero, son of a god, one of twins, exposed to fatal injury by a vulnerable spot, haunted by omens, persecuted and banished, seeking service afar, slaying monsters, gaining supernatural knowledge, returning to his native country, freeing his twin brother, ascending his throne—what is he if not an embodiment of all that is deepest in the human soul and in human life? With the impulse to claim for him divine heredity, the psychologic accident is born and the wrestle of centuries begun between races content to hold that man is an accident of the universe and races whose hope, whose joy, and whose high destiny are bound up in the faith that there is kinship between man and God. The evil twin surprises us that imagination is haunted by man's double selfhood, and the struggle between him and his nobler brother celebrates that holy war wherein the soul is at once hero and betrayer, the battle ground, the battle, the temporary defeat, and the final victory. Out of a similar foreboding springs the impulse to give the hero that spot of fateful import whose meaning is that the touch

of human imperfection clings even to nobly aspiring and achieving souls. Finally, the omens which drive the hero from his home are mythical expressions of the fact that commonplace men are always pitted against the great man and do their best to get rid of him.

The wanderings of the hero need little interpretation. Within the soul "latitude widens and longitude lengthens"; "within it are zones, seas, and continents," but without physical geography spiritual geography would be forever unknown. Therefore man, who is one world "has another to attend him," and ceaselessly exploring the earth he discovers himself.

As the wanderings of the hero foreshadow the triumphs of intellect, so his conquests predict the triumphs of will. The attendant world must be not only interpreted but dominated. The Nemean lion and the Lernean hydra must be slain; the Arcadian hind and the Erymanthian boar captured and domesticated; the stables of Augeus must be cleansed; the golden apples brought from the garden of the Hesperides, and even Hades must be invaded and its guardian led to the upper world. The destiny of man is to subdue and transform the earth and dwell in it securely its master and its lord.

As I ponder the deep truths which steal into the heart through the gateway of our occidental

myths there comes to me a new and thrilling suggestion. Men's souls to-day are sad because nature seems to them so totally depraved. But what if mere brute man, who is all he should not be, needs as his counterpart a brute nature which is all it should not be? What if being free, man must create himself and if he can only create himself by recreating his world? What if, her own great deed accomplished when man is born, nature lays herself at his feet and appeals to him to make her all she could never be? What if our fields and gardens, our domesticated animals, our villages, towns, and cities, our railways stretching connecting lines across the continents, our steamships plying their uniting course across the seas, mean that man is slowly creating an ideal world, and through this creation is fashioning an ideal self?

Perhaps the deepest thought which in obscure presentiment hovers before the creators of occidental myth is that the hero can win his cause only by sacrificing himself. "Woe is me," says Thetis in the *Iliad*, "Woe is me the mother of a hero." For a hero must serve, a hero must suffer, the highest hero must die for men. Yet since in the eternal order sacrifice and self-fulfillment are correlative ideas the hero though he die shall live forever and reign forever on his rightful throne.

To know this hero of occidental myth is to love

him and to grow into his likeness. We invert the relationship between life and literature when we say that literature copies life. The truer statement is that life copies literature, and that the heroes of myth, legend, and poetry create the heroes of history. Hegel reminds us that the history of Greece had its inception in the ideal youth, Achilles, and its consummation in the actual youth, Alexander. The question is pertinent whether, lacking the hero of the Trojan War, Greece could ever have incarnated her spirit in the hero of Arbela. Or, to face frankly the supreme example of the power of literature over life, who dare deny that without the Messianic dreams of Hebrew prophets the world might still be awaiting its Messiah. "Ever before us journeys the mighty ideal; it never was known to fall in the rear." The prescient soul haunted with visions of its higher self flings a portrait upon the canvas of literature. Common men gaze upon the portrait until their dull and mean existence becomes intolerable, and goaded by the beauty of the ideal they cease not from their striving until they have incarnated it in life.

No less significant than the identities of occidental myth are the distinctive traits which reveal the racial souls of Greece, of Rome, and of the Germanic peoples. The hero of Greek legend is above all beautiful; the hero of Roman legend

patriotic, the hero of Germanic legend insistent upon the rights and claims of his own individuality. Achilles is the golden youth of the world; Curtius the devoted youth of the world; Siegfried the daring, defiant, jubilant, self-destructive youth of the world.

History knows not one but many chosen nations, and Greece was the nation elect of history to realize the ideal of freedom in the form of beauty. She transfigured all the phenomena of nature into human forms of majesty and loveliness. She interpreted the higher impulses of the human heart as mandates of the gods, and as she had made nature human, made man divine. She was the great play-nation of the world, and her sons created graceful and beautiful bodies by calling into balanced exercise all typical forms of physical activity. She was the great art nation of the world, and having created majestic and beautiful men, carved in imperishable marble her more majestic and beautiful statues of heroes and gods. Greece was the great literary nation of the world, summoning from the depths of her rhythmic spirit the noblest meters; creating not only the epic, the drama, and the lyric, but nearly every form known either to prose or poetry; elaborating the criticism of language as the material of literary art and bequeathing to the world what has ever since remained its standard work of literary

criticism. She was the standard-bearing nation of the occident, and alike in myth and history hurled her high defiance against Asiatic polygamy, despotism, pantheism, and that perverted self-renunciation which leaves no self to renounce. Finally, Greece was the great philosophic nation of the world and through the Platonic doctrine of the self-moved and the Aristotelian insight into completely realized self-activity (entelechy) proclaimed the original source and ultimate goal of that freedom whose varied incarnation had been the incitement of all her historic striving. For all these reasons Greece was and shall forever remain the great culture-nation of the world, and her appeal to each new age and generation is "to mount from fair forms to fair deeds, and from fair deeds to fair thoughts," until it stand at last in presence of that "uncreated loveliness," which to behold is to adore, and to adore is to recreate.

Beauty is the only spiritual feature of matter—is, indeed, spirit shining through matter. The clod is not beautiful, but there is beauty in the crystal which manifests formative energy and reflects the universal light. The flower is more beautiful than the crystal because it reveals a freer activity. The human form disciplined by selected exercises is beautiful because it is ideal activity incarnate. Human character is beautiful

when through self-restraint and self-direction it has achieved spontaneous accord with the ideals of freedom. Human speech becomes beautiful through voluntary subjection to the ideal restraints of musical words, lofty diction, rhythmic measures, and stately cadences. Always and everywhere beauty is the outward and visible sign of freedom, and implies self-restraint and self-transcendence. Because her national life was one long wrestle for freedom, Greece is the great revealer of beauty, and her prototype is the youth Achilles, beautiful in form and feature; beautiful in his prowess, beautiful when bowed with anguish and self-reproach, he bids strife to perish from among gods and men; beautiful when consecrate to death, Athena sets about his head a crown of golden mist and from it makes to blaze a dazzling flame; beautiful most of all when touched by tender pity for an enemy at his mercy he surrenders to aged Priam the body of his son.

As Greece is the nation elect of history to reveal the ideal of freedom in the form of beauty, so Rome is predestined by the world-spirit to embody the ideal of freedom in the corporate forms of will. From her we inherit laws preventing that collision of each with all which reduces reasonable action to zero, and reënforcing the valid deeds of individuals with the strength of the community or nation. Lacking the common tradi-

tions through which most primitive communities are held together the outlaws who settled on the seven hills became the originators of the idea of contract. Since in a contract two wills combine there is suggested a common will superior to and transformative of individual caprice. In the pledge of the community as a whole to maintain contracts inviolate, and in the pledge of each individual to honor and defend the community which safeguards his rights, this higher will becomes more clearly emergent. Purpose is born in men and new words are coined to express what it contributes to the shaping of character.¹ Purposeful men demand purpose in nature, and a veritable Ethics of the Dust is created by putting purpose into every fragment of the external world and organizing all lesser purposes to accomplish the supreme purpose of the state. The human heart throbs with a new emotion and all Romans become patriots. The mythical embodiment of patriotism is Curtius, the self-devoted

¹ "Through the study of Latin the boy or girl gradually becomes permeated with the motives of that serious-minded people. He comes to realize the special significance of those words that express the ideals of Roman character (and the ideals of all character) words which we have preserved in our translation into English—gravity, soberness, probity, honesty, self-restraint, austerity, considerateness, modesty, patriotism."—*Psychologic Foundations of Education*, Wm. T. Harris, pp. 271-72. (A suggestion of Rosenkranz.—Ed.)

youth clad in shining armor and leaping into the gulf which could only close when it had swallowed Rome's most precious treasure. To the historic lineage of this mythical hero belong Regulus, Cato, and Cæsar, the Roman armies marching to the conquest of the world and the prætorian courts which secure military conquests by establishing Roman jurisprudence.

Rome falls but the eternal city is lifted by St. Augustine out of earth into heaven, and in the fullness of time the millennial struggle of the Latin mind, and the aspiration of ten silent Christian centuries blend in the soul of a world poet who chants "Cosmic patriotism" in immortal verse.

To know and love Achilles is to begin to love freedom as beautiful personality achieved by the self-creating spirit through overcoming the natural self. To know and love Curtius is to hear from afar the mighty challenge of mankind to man, to be haunted by that high impulse of devotion "before which our mortal nature trembles in surprise"; to be smitten with a foreboding that the free human being must die not only *to* his lower self but *for* his higher self incarnate in the state. But what shall be said of Siegfried? Does his defiant and self-destroying career suggest any implication of freedom? Does it reveal a racial soul? Does it perchance forecast a racial peril?

The various tribes of the Germanic race stand out among all the races of men as by nature most clamorous for satisfaction of immediate impulse, and most insistent upon recognition of their immediate personality. They will do what they choose; they will be valued for what they are, and they will promptly slay any man who dares to interfere with their free action, or refuses them the honor they claim as their due. Bold, spirited, adventurous, fierce, they defy nature, other men, and all the gods. Once for all they are here and they will make good their right to be.

We need only look within and around us to assure ourselves that the old Teuton and Saxon are still very much alive. "I must be loved just as I am," whispers the maiden descendant of Hengist complacently, unaware that she is merely reverberating ancestral impulse. "Knock me down if you can and if not get knocked down yourself," shouts her brother to his mates. "The cowboy on the American border lands," says Dr. Harris, "announces his approach to a settlement by daring the whole village out to fight him; the miners of Poker Flat, the hunters and trappers of the Northern Wilderness manifest also a chivalrous personality which demands immediate recognition, and which will risk life without the slightest hesitation for this motive." American stories for children celebrate the adventures of boys and

girls so abundantly able to protect, support, and educate themselves that fathers and mothers seem mere relics of an outgrown past. At last even education falls into ancestral toils, and declining upon the heresy of free play insists as the latest discovery in method that children can become all they ought by doing as they please.

The energy of life beats high in our ancestral impulse, and I for one would not surrender my own racial inheritance for that of any other race. "Other peoples," says Hegel, "have definite objects in which they seek supremacy. They seek wealth or beauty, or abstract right or power or caste distinction, but the Teutonic race seeks the satisfaction of the heart."¹ The free spirit obscurely aware of freedom demands that freedom shall be honored. The contradiction which rends the soul of all Germanic peoples is that each individual claims freedom for himself alone and blindly identifies freedom with the gratification of immediate impulse. Because of this contradiction the Germanic races are the most savage and self-destructive the world has ever known. But history vindicates all her chosen peoples, and having charged these self-destroying savages with regenerate ideals she is even now sending them forth to redeem the world.

So mighty is the defiance of the Germanic

¹ Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, Eng. transl., p. 363.

spirit that it is powerless to bring forth out of itself the constraining ideals through which alone its deepest impulse can be realized. It can, however, divine the destiny its soul portends, and it has adumbrated the catastrophe which threatens it in that tragic myth all of whose chief personages are betrayed by imperative impulse into fatal deeds and whose climax is the destruction of gods created in the image of fated men. Of this tragic myth the story of Siegfried is an integral part. A great genius has interpreted his story in verse and music, and has taught us all to love the forest lad sounding his merry horn; rushing upon fierce beasts through pure delight in combat; forging with mighty strokes his magic sword; imitating the love song of birds; slaying the dragon and possessing himself of Tarnhelm and ring; breaking the spear of Wotan; bursting through the wall of flame; waking and winning the sleeping Valkyr and learning from her the mystic runes which should have made, but did not make him wise. No story in all the world paints such an appealing picture of light-hearted, wayward, and reckless youth. No story in its sequel reveals so clearly the dangers which camp about the freedom-loving, law-defying, adventurous, and undisciplined soul. For any youth, and especially for any youth of Germanic lineage, to know and love and mourn for Siegfried is to be haunted

by presentiments of all the fatalities which threaten himself.

If the reader has divined that each of the three great peoples of the occident has foreshadowed in myth and illustrated in history a distinct aspect of free personality, the question will press, whether the revelation be complete. From Greece we learn that in free personality beauty attains consummate expression; from Rome that personality implies a common and therefore transcendent will; from the Germanic peoples that it is dæmonic, and unillumined by its own ideal, rushes madly to destruction. But what becomes of beauty if its vanishing types point to no archetypal reality? What becomes of transcendental will if there be no transcendent person in whom it inheres? And what avails a passion for freedom so compelling that it joyfully embraces death if in that mad embrace freedom be forever crushed and slain?

The spiritual orient ends and the spiritual occident begins, not with Greece, but with that wonderful tribe which, wandering from the East, halts for a while in Chaldea and Egypt and settles finally a consciously chosen people in a promised land. Asia is the mother of religions. She brought forth Brahm and tried to still the craving of her soul with his formless and impotent infinitude. Descending into more energetic depths of

the spirit she rose therefrom bringing Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu locked in a deathless struggle. Quickened by the cycles of nature so correspondent to and interpretive of the cycles of the intellect, she conceived Osiris, who through death achieved divinity. But her haunting question was not adequately answered, nor her historic mission accomplished until with the concordant voices of Hebrew prophets and psalmists she proclaimed God a Free Person, degraded proud nature to His handiwork, glorified man as His image, and revealed righteousness and loving-kindness as His eternal attributes.

It has been said "that the first man who restrained the native instantaneous movements of the self-preserving, self-reproducing instincts had morality revealed to him." Such self-restraint declares that the ideal and permanent self has victoriously confronted the natural and vanishing self. Of all historic peoples the Hebrew was most intimately aware of this antagonism between natural and ideal selfhood and most immediately assured that the mandates of the ideal self were uttered with divine authority and would be enforced by divine compulsion. "The objective validity of the moral" was the point of departure for the Hebrew religion, and since the inseparable correlate of morality is will, through the logic of conscience, ascent was made to the idea of a per-

sonal God. This great concept attained, the subsequent history of the Hebrew people records one long wrestle with its implications, and gradually the national mind decides upon righteousness and loving-kindness as the determining attributes of Jehovah. "The Lord God is merciful and gracious" and "Like as a father He pitieth his children." And yet this loving God is also a righteous God and "will by no means clear the guilty."

Great philosophers have made us aware that loving-kindness and justice are necessary implications of personality. A selfish God would refuse to share His being. But such a selfish God could not be personal, because personality demands that the self make itself objective. Hence personality presupposes an altruistic God who bestows real and not merely seeming being upon His creatures. Again true being presupposes freedom, and the creature possessing it must be held responsible for his deeds. Therefore God cannot be loving unless He is just and by returning upon each doer the moral equivalent of his deed recognizes his freedom and dignity.¹

Only those who know how far imagination and conscience outrun conscious definition and realize

¹ The argument advanced is borrowed from Dr. Harris and is to be found in a monograph entitled *Hegel's Voyage of Discovery*, read before the American Philosophical Association, December, 1903.

that without their antecedent activity reason would have nothing to define, can appreciate the divine message given through the Hebrews to all mankind. Appreciation deepens with recognition of the fact that conscious definition too often leaves the definer cold to the practical demands of the truth defined. The glory of the Hebrew people is not only that it gave us the one true God, but that it gave us a nation living by faith in God. The deliverance of Israel from Egypt was by His might; the land flowing with milk and honey was His gift; national prosperity was from God's hand; national adversity was His chastisement; national enemies were His scourging rods; national captivity was the affliction with which He visited His people because of the multitude of their transgressions, and the undying national hope was that the redeemed of the Lord should return and come with singing unto Zion.

Between the chosen people and the true God there was established a covenant of righteousness. Their pledge to Him was obedience; His pledge to them blessing for themselves and through them for the whole world. Disobedience was desertion to false gods and destruction for the deserter. Never has the objective validity of the moral had more signal recognition. Never has practical denial of the moral imperative been more clearly set

forth as the sole and sufficient cause of individual and national disaster.

The heroes of Hebrew story are many, but their spirit is one, and whether they subdue kingdoms, stop the mouths of lions, quench the violence of fire, or raise the dead to life, their victory is always the triumph of a faith which works righteousness. To influence childish imagination with their prevailing deeds is to kindle in the hearts of children something akin to their believing, loyal, and resolute temper. It is well to know Achilles, Curtius, Siegfried, but if by the pathway of the good, man climbs most securely to that eminence of spirit whence he discerns final truth and perfect beauty, it is dangerous not to know Abraham, Moses, David, Elijah, Daniel, and the Hebrew youths unharmed in the furnace of fire.

The latest supposed discovery in morals is, that there are none. The one fixed fact about morality is that it must be fluid. Nature ascends by making creatures with more brains. Let us conspire with nature to create men with more brains. Whatever contributes to this result it is expedient to do, and this versatile and adaptive expediency is the genial successor of all despotic and stultifying moral imperatives. With this discovery thought retreats from the Hebrew intuition that to morality belongs objective validity upon

that contingent morality which even to-day is characteristic of farther Asia,¹ and as a logical result abandons all lingering faith in an eternal intellect to which human intellect corresponds. Man is the orphan of a universe indifferent to his fate and must either succumb to, defy, or outwit the dread unknown.

History is concrete psychology, and to follow the historic evolution of an idea is to discover its psychologic implications. Momentous, therefore, is the historic ascent of Hebrew imagination from the objective validity of the moral to the vision of a personal God, and to divination of justice and love as His necessary attributes. These intuitions attained, mind is impelled by its own dia-

¹ "We wonder if the *worst idea of Asia*, that morality has no immutable basis, but is a fluctuating law dependent upon some inexplicable relation between the individual and the Creator, or the individual and the All, will ever come over here. The Indian holds that a line of conduct may be right for one man, or indeed imperative, but wrong for another, or indeed insufferable; *that a world-wide law is unthinkable; and that each man will be judged because of his obedience to some law external to himself yet peculiar to his own personality.* The kings' obligation to the divine is not the peasants'; the ordinary Brahmin must be monogamous, while the Koolin Brahmin may have sixty wives; the trader may cheat where the carrier must keep contract; the usual Hindoo must spare life, while the Thug may take it and yet remain sinless. That opinion subverts the very foundations of morality and conduct." (Italics mine).—*Asia and Europe*, Meredith Townsend, pp. 142-43.

lectic to deeper presuppositions. To visit upon a finite being the complete return of his deed would be to annihilate him. Therefore, justice cannot be wholly just until it mete the equivalent of deed upon a perfect doer. This perfect doer, moreover, is presupposed not only by divine justice, but by divine altruism, for love cannot be satisfied with giving until it has given itself. Implicit therefore in the concept of a Personal God, whose necessary attributes are justice and love, is that doctrine of the Logos, which holds that from all eternity a Perfect Person must have completely objectified Himself in a Second Person equal to Himself but distinguished from Him by the fact of derivation and also that doctrine of creation which discerns that, in thinking his derivation, the Logos calls the world of Nature and Man into actual being.¹

We all know how this final implication of personality was first revealed to men. Alike by those who accept and those who reject it, its historic source is traced to the consciousness of Jesus Christ and its initial form recognized in His immediate relationship to a God whom He knew as His father and to men whom He knew as His brethren. His life and death conferred supernatural value upon each individual of the human race

¹ For an explanation of these two doctrines, see Chapter XII.

because they declared every man to be a child of God, worthy that God should die for him, and called to be perfect as his Father in heaven is perfect.

Coiled within the recognition of each man's supernatural value is recognition of his ideal self, and identification of this ideal self with the ideal self in all other men. The man for whom God dies is mankind. Mankind in men is the ideal self in men. Being one in all men it makes all men one. Hence whatever is granted to one man must be claimed for all men, and whatever any individual claims for himself, he must spend his life to bestow upon his brother.

The Christian intuition of ideal selfhood explains and by explaining heals that breach between man as he is and man as he ought to be, whose pain was the original point of departure for the Hebrew religion. And as it completes the striving of one great historic race, so it initiates the striving of another. Christian missionaries carry to Germanic savages the message of the Gospel. They tell men—by nature most assured of their own supernatural value and heart-hungry for recognition—of a God who died for them. They stir in spirits eager for high adventure the ideal of service. The rude warrior who made good his right to be by slaying all who dared contest it, surrenders to a self-sacrificing

God, and emulating His love is transformed into a brave, courteous, and pious knight who spends his life seeking to right wrong and to succor the oppressed.

It was said in the earlier part of this chapter that life copies literature. This is true, but the relationship between life and literature is too complex to be stated without paradox, and it must now be affirmed that literature transfigures life. Without Achilles, Alexander might never have been, but without the unknown champions who upon the borderland between Asia and Asiatic Greece defended the impulses out of which were crystallized occidental ideals, there had been no Achilles and no Homer. So without the self-destructive deeds of countless Teutons there had been no Siegfried and no Götterdämmerung, and without historic knighthood there had been no Arthur, no Galahad, and no mystic vision of pure spiritual life embodied in legends of the Holy Grail.

To see what we should be is to discover what we are and to rouse the native self to desperate struggle. Becoming a Christian, the fierce savage who for ages had made good his being by slaughter, found at last the one foe he must slay, the one foe who might slay him. If Christianity gave the Teuton God it also gave him the devil, and in the warfare it set raging within his soul he

knew the devil often won the victory. Inordinate impulse was lashed to frenzy by ideal restraints, and in moments of madness the whole of life was freely staked against immediate gratification. Again, projecting racial madness into myth the Germans created the legend of Faust. They had learned that there can be no twilight of the gods, but they were intimately apprised of a final and fatal twilight of the individual soul.

The legend of Faust and the legends of chivalry are mythical expressions of an antithesis which history must resolve. Faust asserts the old imperative impulse, knighthood recognizes an imperative ideal. The ancient instinct, and the accepted ideal seethe and whirl in the storm-tossed spirit of a race, which had named its soul after the storm-tossed sea.¹ History shows the submerging impulse, the ever more clearly emerging ideal. There shall be no claim for one man which is not recognized as the right of all men. Germany gives the world gunpowder and thereby "makes all men equally tall and strong." She invents printing and makes it possible for all men

¹ See Max Müller's *Science of Language*, American Edition, vol. i, p. 380. Also Grimm's *Dictionary* under the word Seele, "In its original form Saiwalô . . . earlier connected with the word See (Saiwig) . . . by the word Seele (soul) the Germans called to mind the restless waves of the sea (lake or ocean) which seemed to resemble the ceaseless working of their own inner powers," etc.

to be wise. Seizing upon Luther as her champion she proclaims the right of individual thought. Confronting with unflinching faith the negative outcome of this daring deed in the horrors of the French Revolution, she sings the triumphant song which reverses the doom of Faust and appeases the soul-hunger immanent in aboriginal impulse by setting the free man on a free soil among a free people. Last of all, with sublime introspection she vindicates her racial instinct in a philosophy which adequately defines freedom and reveals it as the Creator of Hebrew Religion, Greek Art, and Roman Law.

Freedom we call it, for holier
Name of the soul there is none;
Surelier it labours, if slower,
Than the metres of stars or of sun;
Slower than life into breath;
Surelier than time into death,
It moves till its labour be done.

As Germany solves the theoretic implications of freedom, so the English-speaking branch of the Germanic race discovers the practical instrumentalities through which freedom may be established and confirmed among men. Discerning that free men must not only be well governed but must themselves become participant in the governing power, England invents local self-government

and America creates a national government of, for, and by the people. Self-government demands intelligence and public schools spring into being. The free man must not be pent in space nor limited in communion; hence, steamships and railways carry him around the world and bring the world to him. Over electric wires are flashed each day the news of the nations. Public libraries make the wisdom of the past accessible and empower each man to live in communion not only with contemporary but with historic humanity. History began when the solitary were set in families. It will attain the ideal it has forever approached when through the federation of the world it creates the cosmopolitan individual.¹

With justified pride Englishmen remind the world that they have given it Runnymede, and Shakespeare—the first great charter of liberty, and the imperial genius who saw, as poet had never seen before, the ethical demands of freedom. Literature arose in concrete response to the obscure search of intellect for the conditions under which men might live together. To this important question the dramas of Shakespeare are the poetic reply. They portray all typical col-

¹ See in *The Poetry and Philosophy of Goethe*, S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago, a paper by Dr. Wm. T. Harris on *The Poetry and Philosophy of Goethe*, to which this chapter owes many obligations.

lisions between particular men and the social whole and mete to each colliding individual the exact equivalent of his deed. The arbitrariness of Lear, the ambition of Macbeth, the jealousy of Othello cleanse men's souls of these debasing passions. The vacillation of Hamlet fires will to stern resolve. The great historic plays fan the flame of freedom in the soul by portraying its struggle to incarnate itself in a national state. As to Germany belongs the poet of the individual, so to England belongs the poet of society. Through its supreme poet each of the two great branches of the Germanic race has interpreted to itself and to all men its own master impulse.

With recognition of the federated union of the world and the cosmopolitan individual as the goal toward which humanity has always struggled, we resolve the complex relationship existing between literature and life. Literature transfigures life by discerning and portraying the lineaments of generic or divine humanity. Life copies literature because it approximately defines her own ideal. Incarnating this ideal she makes possible a more accurate and more comprehensive definition. It has been said that no great general was ever born in a nation of cowards, and no great philosopher in a nation of fools. It may be added that no great poet was ever born in a nation lacking all mystic vision. The wave which dashes

highest on the shore is borne there by the power of the ocean. The supreme individual is the triumph of mankind. He vindicates his right to be by creating a humanity assimilated to himself.

The world is always repeating Pilate's question, What is truth? Philosophy accepts and interprets the answer of Jesus, Truth and the Ideal Person are one, and bestows as her greatest largess insight into the implications of personality. Her definitions and presuppositions appease the intellect, but unallied with literature they leave the will languid and the heart cold. The ideal person concretely presented, appeals to intellect, emotion, and volition. With the totality of his selfhood he invokes the totality of ours, and responsive to his challenge we gaze with admiration, glow with love, and flame with high resolve.

Creating a larger and more generous humanity, literature necessarily creates a nobler speech. By the criterion of language man is distinguished from the brute. It arises when men begin to live together and its use implies ascent into the common mind. It is impossible until men have learned to think some general concepts, and therefore its advent celebrates the emergence of the ideal. While ideals are few and indistinct, language must be poor and vague. Until society has created individuals capable of original feeling,

thought, and action, it must gyrate in a tedious round of conventional words and phrases. Nothing but distinction of mind can create distinction of speech. The men and women of great literature are cast in larger molds than their actual prototypes, and use a nobler language. Their speech grasps each idea in an accurate and lucid definition. Challenged to do heroic deeds their answering words echo the clang of steel. Their phrases sparkle with fine allusion and glow with illuminating images. Their sentences move with stately grace to musical measure. Being great they express greatness. When in the actual world intelligence has become transparent, will heroic, sensibility delicate, and life harmonious, living men shall speak even as they.

The debt of man to literature is great. So is the debt of man to history. But to neither nor both does man owe everything. Existent humanity is often explained as a kind of self-creation out of nothing. It is well to remind ourselves that to make something out of nothing is impossible even to omnipotence. God Himself only makes to be that which has always been, and the broad creation, proceeding ever afresh from His thought and love, is the ceaseless reaffirmation of His eternal and all-inclusive deed. Man can make himself actually only what from the beginning he is potentially, and his self-realization is progressive

self-definition. Being a personal energy he creates himself in and through communion with persons. History records the stages of man's self-realization in ever enlarging communities. Literature portrays the stages of man's self-discovery and points forward to the greater communities through which he shall explore himself more completely, and climb higher above himself. Both history and literature reach toward a consummation which is unattainable on earth and in time. The deed which earth demands of man is ascent into the human species. The exciting experience to which eternity and infinity invite him is ascent into the divine genus. When through communion with all souls throughout the cosmos each soul perfects itself, the prophecy of literature will be fulfilled and the purpose of history accomplished.

CHAPTER V

HERBART AND FROEBEL

IN discussing the concentric programme and the methodical treatment of literature, I have dealt with that form of Herbartianism which invaded the kindergarten. It has been far from my intention to imply that were Herbart alive he would sympathize with the educational practice of his more radical disciples. Professor Stoy, leader of the conservative Herbartians, expressed the conviction that "Ziller's novelties were harmful exaggerations."¹ The educators who created a practical plan of work out of these exaggerations would seem to have accepted with a too unquestioning assurance the three main tenets of Herbart, that the *final* aim of education is morality; its *immediate* aim many-sided interest; and the means of arousing this desired interest, the presentation of thought-masses. With minds intent upon this aim and method their attention directs itself to creating "connected unities of subject matter," and apparently they remain se-

¹ Herbart and the Herbartians, De Garmo, p. 185.

renely unaware that a constraining thought-mass can never be imposed by one mind upon another, but must somehow be compacted by each mind for itself.

Had the originators of concentric instruction given their careful attention to Herbart's discrimination between primordial and derived presentations, they might have avoided some of their more glaring mistakes in the education of little children. According to Herbart's psychology the only original power of the soul is "that of entering through the medium of the nervous system into reciprocal relations with the external world. These relations supply the mind with its primordial presentations—the sensuous ones of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, pleasure, pain."¹ The interaction of these primordial presentations produces the derived presentations which in their varied developments form the greater part of the mind's contents.² It follows that the building of thought-masses must begin by laying a strong foundation of primordial presentations, and this is precisely what Herbart himself attempted to do. The duty of instruction as he conceived it was "to guide from below upward two series, separate yet ever simultaneously progressing toward

¹ Science of Education, Felkin's translation. Introduction by translators, p. 33.

² *Ibid.*, p. 34, sentence slightly transposed.

the highest immovable point.”¹ These series he distinguished by the names cognition and sympathy. The series of cognition was to begin with exercises for sharpening sense-perception; the series of sympathy with stories presenting concrete types of action and character. The appeal of the former series was to the child’s several external senses, and its object was to create an apperceptive mass whose reaction upon a progressive experience would tend toward a correct interpretation of nature; the appeal of the latter series was to his taste or immediate likes and dislikes, and its object was to build up a sound moral apperceptive mass out of numerous simple æsthetic judgments of repugnance and agreement.²

Herbart was familiar with the experiments of Pestalozzi, and through his doctrine of apperception, which insists upon the necessity of assimilating new perceptions by the total amount of previous experience, he added an indispensable supplement to the theories of the Swiss reformer. With the idea of apperception active in his own mind he was necessarily dissatisfied with the

¹ Herbart’s A. B. C. of Sense Perception. Eckoff Int. Ed. Series. The reader will perceive that the passage cited is one of Herbart’s many statements that instruction should be divided into two main lines, the one for understanding, the other for feeling and imagination. See Chapter I of this book.

² *Ibid.*, p. 89.

alphabet of sense-perception offered by Pestalozzi. Like Froebel, he perceived that there might be not one but many alphabets of externality, e.g., alphabets of tastes and odors, of the muscular sense, of color and musical tones, and of the mathematical elements, form, number, and size. Like Froebel, again, he perceived that the most important alphabet of external sense-perception was that which would enable children to begin spelling out the truths of mathematics. For without mathematics "the objective data of experience cannot be correctly apperceived," nor can that causal interest be satisfied which "impels search for the laws binding these data together."¹ Cognizant of these truths Herbart provided a system of instruction which "analyzes all forms into triangles, and discovers the ratios of the sides of

¹ "Sense-perception on the part of the student supplies, of course, the first elements of knowledge. But equally of course the educator who in the Baconian phrase should be the minister and interpreter of nature will arrange the sense-perceptions of the child, in, for example, object lessons exactly as he will any other work—namely, according to his view of the general purpose of instruction. The question then is what is the view that he should take? In the first place it will be conceded that the object of learning is doing and that before we can act properly, we must have properly learned. This we cannot do except by attention, by devotion to the object in hand. *It all comes to the accurate apperception of the objective data. In the second place the child seeks for the laws that bind these data together.* These laws may be at first of extremely crude empiricalness; the child may not even know the

the triangles one to another as depending upon the size of the angles." ¹ This mathematical alphabet, it is evident, will enable pupils to classify the infinitude of forms in nature under a finite number of geometric archetypes; will reduce these archetypes to unity by analyzing them into a single form; will explain the varieties of this form itself by showing that the ratio of its sides one to another is dependent upon the size of the angles; and finally, will direct attention away from all forms to formative processes and thus abet the child in that search for causal energy which is the final source of his interest in the inanimate objects of his environment. What he really wants to know is not an object but an object-making energy. Himself a causative power he can appease his intellect only with causes.

As Herbart perceived that mathematics offer the best point of departure for the comprehension of nature, so he recognized in good stories well told the best point of departure for all studies re-

term laws, but that is what it seeks. But the data as well as the laws are manifested in time and space; in other words in mathematics. . . . Mathematics, then, is the mental basis for apperceiving both data and laws." (Italics are mine.)—*Herbart's A. B. C. of Sense-Perception*, p. 82. Chapter contributed by Professor Eckoff.

¹ Herbart's *A. B. C. of Sense-Perception*, Editor's Preface, p. viii.

lating to the comprehension of man. His suggestions with regard to the selection of stories are admirable. They must not celebrate the exploits of children, "for the whole look of a well-trained boy is directed above himself."¹ They must present such men as he himself would like to be."² "They must show the bad plainly, but not as an object of desire."³ "If the effect of a story is to be lasting and emphatic it must carry on its face the strongest and clearest stamp of human greatness."⁴ To these valuable suggestions, and many others of similar purport, may be traced the inspiration of that one great meritorious deed of Herbart's more radical disciples—their insistence upon the educational value of fairy tales, racial myths, and periods of history important to the development of the race "so far as a poet or historian has described them in a classical manner."⁵

In his distinction of a series of studies for cognition, and a series for sympathy, Herbart simply reaffirmed the traditional practice of pedagogy

¹ Science of Education, Felkin's translation, p. 89.

² *Ibid.*, p. 89.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

⁵ Ziller, cited in Ufer's Pedagogy of Herbert, p. 73. Herbart's own series for sympathy is summed up as follows by Professor Eckoff: "The Homeric poems for childhood, historic writers for the growing boy, modern history for the youth approaching maturity, Platonic exclusiveness of aught however artistic, that might injure the moral picture

with its recognition of science and the humanities as the objective and subjective strands of education. In his discussions of these two series there is evident a deep insight into educational values. In endeavoring to provide for each series a foundation of primordial presentations he did original work, and to his honor be it remembered that he recognized in literature the most nearly accessible and best path of approach to all humane studies; that he discouraged desultory object lessons; discerned that the data of sense must be not only perceived but apperceived, and insisted upon mathematics as the true point of departure for the interpretation of nature.

Herbart's alphabets of cognition and sympathy were designed for the use of children who had attained school age. The worst defect of his plan is its exclusive emphasis upon assimilative activity, and its failure to provide any response to that demand for self-expression which is the most marked characteristic of childhood. This defect becomes still more apparent in the following sug-

of the world which is to be unrolled step by step like the natural picture—such is Herbart's plan put into one sentence and crumpled somewhat in the packing. . . . Homer occupies the same position as the initial point in the education of the sympathetic nature that the A. B. C. of Sense-perception, whose mathematical nature will become perfectly plain as the reader studies it, occupies as the initial point in the cognitive education."—*Herbart's A. B. C. of Sense-Perception*, p. 85.

gestions with regard to the education of younger children:

I have suggested marking out with bright nails on a board the typical triangles and placing them continuously within sight of the child in its cradle. I was laughed at. Well, people may laugh at me still more. For I, in thought, place near that board sticks and balls painted with various colors. I constantly change, combine, and vary these sticks, and later on plants and the child's playthings of every kind. I take a little organ into the nursery and sound simple tones and intervals on it for a minute at a time. I add a pendulum to it for the child's eye and for the unpracticed player's hand that its rhythmic proportions may be observed. I would further exercise the child's sense to distinguish cold and heat by the thermometer, and to estimate the degrees of heaviness by weights. Finally, I would send him to school with the cloth manufacturer to learn as correctly as he, to distinguish finer and coarser wool by touch. Yes, who knows whether I would not adorn the walls of the nursery with very large gayly painted letters. At the foundation of all this lies the simple thought that the abrupt and troublesome process of stamping things on the mind, called learning by heart, will be either not necessary, or very easy if only the elements of synthesis are early made constituent parts of the child's early experience.¹

"What will I be doing while you are knocking me down?" inquired a plucky youngster of the

¹ Science of Education, Felkin's translation, pp. 158-59.

older comrade who had threatened to lay him on the ground. I cannot read Herbart's suggestions with regard to the education of infancy without an irresistible impulse to paraphrase this query and ask, What will the child be doing while Herbart is building him up? Herbart's procedure is to be preferred to that of his more radical disciples because at least it avails itself of primordial presentations. Like theirs, however, it is a false procedure, because it conceives the educator as a builder, and the intellect and character of the pupil as something he may build. Furthermore, it conceives intellect as prior to and creative of feeling and will. Therefore: "Go to; let us build thought-masses in the child and they will build him."

The study of Herbart's pedagogics has been fruitful of good results, because it has directed attention to the process by which new experience is assimilated with previous knowledge, and old ideas reconstructed through new experience. The word *apperception*, which designates this assimilating and reconstructing process, stands for the most characteristic feature of the art of education as understood by Herbart, and suggests also his most important contribution to the science of education. When, however, we study his explanation of this process we are forced to admit that it has many serious defects. The more important of

these defects are that he emphatically denies the spontaneous activity and structural form of the mind and thereby loses two apperceiving agencies of the highest value, and that he ignores the now generally admitted fact that no strong apperception takes place without the conspiring influences of feeling and volition. It is his merit to have called widespread attention to an important process and to have aroused critical discussions as to its nature. It cannot be denied that his own description of the process is very inadequate.

Not only is Herbart's pedagogy rooted in an inadequate conception of the apperceiving process, but it is self-contradictory in its insistence upon many-sided interest as both the result of thought-masses and the agency through which they are created. Without interest, no circle of thought, and yet, without the circle of thought, no interest, for in it alone resides "the initiative life, the primal energy." A debt of gratitude is due to Herbart for his recognition of the significance of interest or involuntary attention, but educators are now rapidly coming to see that for wise methods of arousing and guiding interest they must turn to Froebel.

The pedagogy of Herbart is intimately connected with a pluralistic ontology and a mechanical psychology. He conceives ultimate reality as a plenum of independent monads, yet for some

reason, perhaps because of the exigency of explanation,¹ perhaps because his own mind was controlled by an apperceptive mass in which the idea of relativity was dominant, he admits some communion between these mutually excluding reals. In accord with his ontology and his apperception, mass "his psychology is of the association type."² The soul is a psychic monad devoid of all capacity, except that of self-defense against the attacks of other monads. "Its deed of self-defense produces presentations," and with their production its activity ceases forever, and everything that afterwards goes on within it is due to the energy of its "naturalized assailants."³ "The self is a result of the union and interpenetration of presentations. In their totality these presentations form the intellect. The furtherance or suppression of one presentation by another gives rise to

¹ "Herbart's method is to make any assumption whatever that will bring harmony and consistency into our thinking without regard to the explicability of the assumptions themselves."—*Herbart and the Herbartians*, p. 27.

² *The Educational Theories of Herbart and Froebel*, John Angus MacVannel, p. 62.

³ "The soul at first is merely blank formal unity of which nothing can be said excepting that it can act in self-defence; the soul shows its character by what it does in the struggle for existence. Its peculiar mode of self-defence is a sensation or presentation. It admits presentations to its domain. Admission proves to be occupation. Its former assailants are so to speak naturalized as ideas."—*Ibid.*, p. 62.

feeling in its two forms of pleasure and pain. The successful struggle of a presentation against others that tend to suppress it is desire,"¹ and "Will is desire combined with the supposition that it can be fulfilled."² In short, at Lotze puts it, "Everything further that happens in it, the formation of its conceptions, the development of the various faculties, the settlement of the principles on which it acts are all *mechanical results* which, when once these primary self-preservations have been aroused, *follow from their own reactions*; and the soul, the arena on which all this takes place, never shows itself volcanic and irritable enough to interfere by new reactions with the play of its states, and to give them such new directions as do not follow analytically from them according to the universal laws of their reciprocal actions."³

Several insistent questions torment the reflective mind as it ponders Herbart's ontologic and psychologic assumptions. If the soul can naturalize attacking monads as presentations, must there not be between it and them some degree of participation, and does not participation in any degree imply a transcendent including unity? If

¹ Herbart's Doctrine of Interest, Wm. T. Harris.

² Text Book of Psychology, Herbart, p. 82. In. Ed. Series.

³ Lotze, cited in The Educational Theories of Herbart and Froebel, by John Angus MacVannel, p. 70. (*Italics mine.*)

the soul is devoid of activity, where does it get energy to defend itself against its assailants? If it has even a minimum of energy to start with, why does it lose it after its one great act of self-defense? And finally, if the self is a product of free and independent ideas which, for some inexplicable reason, have a continuous tendency to assimilate, why assume a soul substance as the arena of their wars, treaties, and alliances? ¹

The most characteristic feature alike of Herbart's ontology, his psychology, and his pedagogy is an almost exclusive emphasis upon assimilative processes. There would seem to be a close connection between this emphasis and his own experience. He knew nothing in life but learning and teaching. We read that as a child he showed extraordinary power of understanding and remembering the thoughts of others." ² He himself tells us that "*Filling the mind*, this it is which before all other more detailed purposes ought to be the general result of instruction." ³ Out of the assimilated knowledge of the past will spring that sympathy with and conformity to conventional standards of action which is apparently

¹ See *The Educational Theories of Herbart and Froebel*, John Angus MacVannel, pp. 62, 63; 69, 70.

² *Science of Education*, Felkin. Introduction by the translators, p. 2.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

what Herbart understands by morality. Emerson reminds us how necessary it is to discriminate between the *thinker* and *man* thinking. No less important is it to discriminate between the teacher and man teaching. Herbart was thinker and teacher, not man thinking and teaching. Hence the challenge of world-transforming events failed to provoke in him any adequate response, and he lived through one of the most sublime periods of history not only without comprehension of its meaning but without that thrill of excitement and joy which in all susceptible souls prophesies the birth of a new era.

Never surely has there lived a man less responsive than Herbart to the spirit of his age. It was an age which, by smiting men's eyes with that greatest of all object lessons, the French Revolution, wakened them to knowledge of the fact that mind had attained its majority and that henceforth neither could intellect be appeased with tradition, nor will with convention. Great heroes of contemplation were wrestling with the problems implicit in this revolution of the popular consciousness and were solving them by creating a philosophy which sanctifies historic achievement as a cumulative revelation of the divine principle in man, and blazes a path of historic progress by demonstrating the necessity of institutions for the realization of freedom. Stung to

high resolve by the defeat of Jena and the Treaty of Tilsit, Germany was rising as one man to throw off a hateful yoke, and in repelling the invader from her soil was accomplishing that first great deed of national self-making, whose consummation has been the imperial union of all German states. With lightning flash of thought and voice of thunder, Fichte was making his countrymen aware that "*Will* is the efficient living principle of the world of reason, as motion is the efficient living principle of the world of sense." Goethe was startling Germany to far surmises by painting its portrait as a melancholy and ineffective youth wandering in aimless dreams between the natural and supernatural worlds, and, retranslating the heart of the New Testament, was writing with the pen of Faust "In the beginning was the act." And in the midst of all the mighty stir and tumult of a revolution which in every sphere was dethroning abstract intellect and enthroning concrete deed, Herbart was sitting peacefully in his study or among his pupils building up thought-masses out of primordial presentations, and shaping standard character out of assimilated ideas!

In striking contrast to Herbart's detachment from the life of the world was Froebel's enthusiastic response to the revolution taking place in popular feeling and striving to define itself in

philosophy. The *impulse* of his age surged in him when as a mere youth he wrote in the journal of a philanthropic friend, "You work to give men bread; be it the effort of my life *to give men themselves.*" The *ideal* of his age had clarified itself in his mind when he defined the final aim of education, not as morality, but as freedom. The *method of education* implicit in this aim had revealed itself to him when in 1828 he wrote to Krause: "In doing must all true education begin; in the *deed* must it be rooted; from the *deed* must it grow; out of the living, *creative*, self-observant and self-penetrating deed must it develop."¹ The remainder of his life was devoted to working out in practice the demands of this aim and method. An education whose method is to be rooted in creative and therefore free activity must necessarily begin with the beginning of life. Hence Froebel who had commenced his professional career as a teacher of boys ends it as the founder of the kindergarten and the author of the Mother-Play.

The two insights which enabled Froebel to create the kindergarten, were insight into the ideal values of human life as concrete expressions of the substance of freedom, and insight into play as that activity of childhood which achieves most perfectly the form of freedom. Play has a per-

¹ Aus Froebel's Leben, p. 141.

sistent form and a manifold content. Froebel borrowed its form and selected from its content. He wished to preserve the spontaneity which distinguishes play from work. He wished to abet the struggle of the soul toward concrete freedom by selecting from among the native plays of childhood those which are related to the ideal values of human life.

The antithesis between work and play has been often defined, but seems to be ever and anon practically ignored. Work is something done for a purpose. Play is something done for the pleasure of doing it. Without work, in which he holds himself to his set purpose, man would never learn to subordinate his whims and caprices. Without play, in which free rein is given to his own initiative, he could never develop individuality. Even in adult life alternations of work and play are necessary to physical health, mental sanity, and moral poise. In infancy and early childhood, or, to be specific, until the child is three and a half or four years old individuality is so feeble that without constant free and undirected play it would languish and die. The infant must spend much time doing just as he pleases, in order that he may ever please to be something or somebody in particular. At the age of three or four years, however, he enters a transition state which ordinarily lasts until the age of six. If

throughout this period of transition he does nothing but exercise his powers according to his momentary whim he becomes so capricious and self-willed that later it is difficult to waken in him any sense of participation in a social whole, or any reverence for the larger human experience. If, on the other hand, he is forced to work during this fluid period, individuality is enfeebled and originality sapped. He needs a method of education which, preserving intact the form of freedom, shall fill this form with the substance of freedom. To provide this mediatorial education is the specific function of the kindergarten.

It is said that some years ago the roots of grapevines in the wine-producing regions of Europe had become so weak through overcultivation that they lost all power of resisting the attacks of certain parasites.¹ Strength was renewed by grafting the highly developed vine upon the stock of the American "Concord" grape, a variety recently developed from the wild grape. The success of the experiment was due to the fact that there was identity of species between the scion and the graft. Grapevines could not have been successfully grafted upon oaks, but highly developed vines could be grafted upon their own ancestral stock.

¹ The *Phylloxera vastatrix* appeared in 1863 and soon after spread to all the grape-bearing countries of Europe.

In like manner the kindergarten seeks the renewal and development of physical, mental, and moral strength by grafting upon the native manifestations of childhood as expressed in play, the higher realization of their own implicit ideal.

Through his study of the different forms of childish play Froebel became aware of the fact that some of them point toward the practical arts, some toward the fine arts, some toward science and literature, and some toward the ethical life of man as incarnated in social institutions. In these creations of the human spirit Froebel found his standards of value. In different native forms of play he recognized the germinal tendencies of which these values are the higher expression. To guide the spontaneous energies of play over those paths which lead most directly toward the summits of ideal achievement was his confessed aim. His aspiration was to help children to do better what they themselves were trying to do, and because his instrumentalities and methods conspire to produce this result his disciples claim that he has transformed play into education.¹

Whoso understands the general purpose and method of the kindergarten will also understand

¹ In Chapter II of this book I have attempted to give a general outline of Froebel's plan. Kindergartners are asked to re-read that chapter in connection with the definition of Froebel's purpose given in the present chapter.

the complete accord of Froebel's spirit with the spirit of his age. As has been said, it was an age in which, for the first time in history, man became intimately aware of his own freedom. Its primal deed was the Emancipation Proclamation of Mind declaring that thereafter neither intellect nor will should bow to any external authority. Its second great deed was the transubstantiation of authority into freedom by the discovery of its inborn rationality. In exact correspondence with these two achievements of the *Zeitgeist* are Froebel's two revelations to education. The first of these revelations is that children shall no longer be shaped and fashioned by outside pressure, but shall be abetted in their native effort to develop through self-expression. The second and no less important revelation is that in many of their favorite plays what they express are generic impulses, and that, therefore, through freighting play with the values of human life we enable children to realize more rapidly and surely their own impelling ideal.

The preceding brief statement of Froebel's educational aim and method suggests the striking contrast between his procedure and that of Herbart. This practical contrast is rooted in a contrasting psychology. As has been indicated, the fundamental thesis of Herbart's psychology is that presentations are the elements of mental life,

and the self a product of their fusion. The psychology of Froebel, on the contrary, holds that the self is an aboriginal energy whose ideal form is self-consciousness, and whose history is a progressive realization and definition of its own implications. Self-consciousness is the knowing of the self, by the self, and such knowing implies both the distinction of subject and object, and the recognition of their identity. The life of the ego is therefore a process of continuous self-diremption, and of the reintegration of its dirempted elements in a synthetic unity.

Since the ego is not a mere something which incidentally possesses activity, but *is* self-activity, and nothing but self-activity, its primal and constraining impulse must be action, and it will rush outward into deed. Self-expression will precede assimilation and determine what shall be assimilated. For this reason Froebel seeks the point of departure for education in play which he defines as "self-active representation of the inner life, from inner necessity and impulse."

The opposition between Herbart and Froebel indicated in their pedagogics and defined in the contrasting theses of their respective psychologies, may be traced to an emotional root in the impenetrable coldness of the one and the fervid response of the other to the mood of a wonderful age, and to an intellectual root in the antithetic concep-

tions of ultimate reality which are the thought-precipitates of these contradictory emotional attitudes. To the atomic system of Herbart, which regards the universe as an aggregate of monads (and therefore not a universe at all), Froebel opposes an ontology whose creative idea is that ultimate reality is absolute reason or perfectly realized self-consciousness. It is true that Froebel must be classed as a mystic, and a mystic is a person who is making an inward transition from faith to philosophy by beginning to realize in the typical facts of religion a universal significance. Being a mystic Froebel never achieved a scientific statement of his ontologic convictions. Nevertheless, his writings make evident that in a more or less adequate form he was aware of the several great implications of absolute self-consciousness. These implications are a perfect subject who has eternally duplicated himself in a perfect object; a manifold cosmos pervaded by law and objectifying the infinite multiplicity of distinctions pervaded by the unity of divine thinking; an evolutionary ascent of nature determined by increasing participation in the divine first principle and culminating in man in whom is incarnate the form of self-consciousness, which is freedom; finally, the progressive realization by man of the substance of freedom through a social communion made possible by the fact that since every man

partakes of absolute reason, all men may and should be partakers of each other.¹

Froebel's psychology is that of the great thinkers who achieved the highest triumph of human intellect. His own more modest "acts of originality" are a study of childhood wherein its manifestations are interpreted by the light of the idea of self-activity; a method of early education respondent to these interpreted manifestations, and a series of instrumentalities indispensable for the reduction of the method into practice. Only as the kindergarten games and gifts are studied in detail does the student realize the rich contribution of Froebel's psychology to his pedagogics. From his conception of the child as a self-creative being flowed his emphasis upon the priority of the deed. From insight into the truth that institutions, arts, sciences, and literature are self-definitions of the mind in which all individuals participate sprang his idea of freighting the plays of childhood with the values of life. From his doctrine of the ascent of mind from the fact through the symbol to the general idea arose his accent upon imitative games, typical objects, acts, processes, and characters, and the natural analogues of elementary human experiences. From the assurance that self-consciousness implies self-duplication proceeded his idea of presenting to

¹ See Chapter XII.

the child in each stage of development an objective counterpart. From conviction of the necessity of objectifying the unity of consciousness, its structural form, and its manifold content sprang the three types of exercise known as forms of knowledge, beauty, and life. And to give only one more illustration, from the vision of self-consciousness as "an identity pervading its own distinctions," was born the attempt to make the instrumentalities of the kindergarten an organism wherein each member should be means and end for all the other members, and for the including whole.

No man can be so mightily possessed by an idea as was Froebel without being betrayed into some exaggerations. The enlightened lover of the kindergarten will crave criticism of his mistakes, as well as recognition of his merits. But criticism, to be sound and valuable, demands a practical knowledge of the way in which his instrumentalities are used, which thus far few if any of his critics have possessed. It must be conceded that his effort is unique and his results original. In his interpretations of childhood he surpasses not only all his contemporaries, but all his successors. By freighting play with ideal values he created a type of education which respects both the form and the substance of freedom. By recognizing the supreme value of that kind of ap-

perception which is dependent on the nature of the mind, he made a signal contribution to educational psychology. It would be his own dearest wish that others should do better what he has done so well. But he must be overtaken before he can be left behind.

CHAPTER VI

THE FREE-PLAY PROGRAMME

THE most lucid expression of the free-play programme, and the most complete illustration of its practical workings are to be found in a monograph entitled *The Kindergarten Problem* which was published in 1899. The preface to the monograph describes it as "a report upon one year's work in a kindergarten system which had broken somewhat with tradition." The conditions causing the break, and the general plan adopted, in order to bring new life into the Froebelian valley of dry bones, are clearly stated in the following extract:

The conviction, for years latent and urgent for recognition, that free play is the only rational solution to Froebel's plea for self-activity, the undoubted truth of the revelations of child study with regard to the ancestral and racial traits of childhood, led to the adoption of two recess periods of twenty minutes each for spontaneous play in the kindergartens, to take the place of the regular kindergarten games, and the

eagerness with which the play incentives were appropriated and put into active service by the children revealed the strength of their interests. At first, but few incentives were given, owing to ignorance of the best incentives for their use, but as observation and experience strengthened theory, the list gradually increased and modified the original provision made. To a few bean bags, tin street cars, wooden soldiers, and a cloth elephant, whose only recommendation for popularity was his obliging disposition in sacrificing his dignity by becoming a football, and who was rescued from the sure fate which overtakes all who tamper with the game, have been added in the order named, sand piles, dolls, toy dishes, toy brooms and dustpans, toy washboards, reins, gas balls, hammers and nails, garden tools, footballs, facilities for climbing, jumping, seesaws, swings, and the latest achievement, a children's playhouse, where the tiny housekeepers can keep the miniature family in the most approved manner, and still have the benefit of the fresh air and sunshine.

The bean bags, the wooden soldiers, the tin street cars, and his lordship, the elephant, have been consigned to the oblivion of deserved rest—but the sand piles have still the busy chattering groups of little ones, digging wells and tunnels, molding and baking in the sun the succulent pies and cakes so well known to our own happy childhood, sifting the clean, dry, fascinating sand until the sudden temptation to send a mimic cyclonic deluge over unsuspecting comrades is only diverted into more legitimate channels by the prompt action of the ever-vigilant and ever-present kindergartner.

The dolls, the toy dishes, brooms, washboards, and

flatirons have a full share of attention from girls and boys alike. The house is swept and garnished, in the enthusiasm of play, some children considerably sprinkling sand upon the floor, that the broom may have excuse for action; the doll clothes are washed vigorously in the sand with washboard and wooden soap, and ironed while the iron is cold; the dishes are washed and dried with imaginary water and towels; the dolls are washed and dressed, one-eyed Rosie, of long-suffering visage and pathetically dangling appearance being cuddled and loved and lullabied with the fairest in the land; while the hostess sets the table, not omitting the tiny vase of weedy blossoms gathered for the purpose, and proceeds to serve to the sedate and expectant guests a banquet fit for the gods. Sand is the basis and inspiration of the entire menu, and the dignity and propriety of the occasion is not marred by any unseemly behavior, or the necessity for correction to the verge of tears—there is no painted line here to say, "Thou shalt not."

This seems like coöperative housekeeping, but no such adult occupation is in reality the case. Each child is entirely absorbed in her own particular bit of drama, and cares not a whit about the success of the whole.

Meanwhile, fiery steeds, restless chargers, and good, safe family horses are being driven about the grounds, with long grass tucked under the hat brims for manes, with tinkling bells, and drivers with healthily exercised lungs to keep them in subjection; bread, milk, and vegetables are delivered without money and without price to all who may ask. Without rest, or the usual variation of eating and sleeping, with only an occasional visit to the blacksmith for repairs, these

horses and their remorseless drivers, like Tennyson's brook, "go on forever."¹

Whatever else this description may or may not be it is undoubtedly a correct presentation of the ideal of perfectly free play. Each child is to do what he pleases as he pleases. We observe, however, that free play is relegated to the recess period, and taken in detachment from the rest of the monograph, the passage cited merely provokes doubt as to the advisability of forty minutes for recess during a total period of only three hours. The real issue, however, between the traditional kindergarten and the child-study reformers is not whether there shall be free play during recess, but whether the entire three hours children spend in the kindergarten shall become a recess dominated by this ideal. That the answer given to this question by the Santa Barbara experimenters is an almost unqualified affirmative is evident from the following record of two days in a kindergarten:

MONDAY: The morning being pleasant, we had our marching and singing outdoors. One child was chosen captain, the others following where he led.

¹ A Study of the Kindergarten Problem in the Public Kindergartens of Santa Barbara, California, for the year 1898-99, by Frederic Burk, Ph.D., City Superintendent of Schools and Caroline Frear Burk, A.M., in coöperation with Orpha M. Quayle, Supervisor of Kindergartens, Juliet Powell Rice, Supervisor of Music, and Martha D. Tallant. pp. 38, 39.

There was single-file marching, double-file marching, straight-line marching, curved-line marching, slow marching, fast marching, and every other kind of marching that could be thought of *by one little brain*. After the marching came *free-choice singing*, the children volunteering their favorite songs.

At 9.30 they all marched into the schoolroom, and at the signal from the piano took their seats and sat waiting for the usual morning story. This morning the story was of The Wolf and the Crane. As the children had seen the pictures of both a wolf and a crane among their collection of colored pictures, they thought that those were surely the originals of the story. After the telling of the story, the children were *asked to illustrate it on paper*. After the illustrations they were given five minutes for *free drawing at the board*.

From 10.05 to 10.25 *recess was given*. As usual, the football took a prominent place in the games, as did also sand-building, swinging, and jumping.

From 10.25 to 10.30 was occupied in marching to the seats and resting, the piano being played very softly, while all the little heads rested on the tables.

From 10.30 to 10.50 was devoted to color work, the children placing on a string first all beads of one color; next, beads of another color, and so on until all six colors were used. This they all did very readily, with the exception of one little boy, who is apparently color-blind.

From 10.50 to 10.55 the children were allowed to look at a collection of scrap books which had been given them and to *converse freely about them*.

11.05 to 11.25, *recess*.

11.25 to 11.30, marching to seats and resting.

11.30 to 11.50, *free play with any of the kindergarten material which each individual chose.*

11.50 to 12, they put away the material and sang the closing song.

TUESDAY: The school opened with *free marchings*, after which the children sang chosen songs.

At 9.30 the children took their seats, when the story of The Dog and the Bone was told them. Then they illustrated the story on paper and told it. Before the hour closed five minutes were devoted to circle drawing on the board, using the *free-arm movement*.

10.05 to 10.25, *recess.*

The day was foggy, so the greater number of the little girls stayed inside and played house, while the majority of the little boys and girls on the ground *enjoyed climbing upon the fence and jumping down into the sand.* A few of the boys played football, and two little girls played with the swings.

10.25 to 10.30, they marched to seats and rested. (This rest period seems very beneficial, as with very little exception the children seem to enter into the spirit of it.)

10.30 to 10.50, number lesson. I gave them a piece of clay, then, drawing three circles on the board, told them to make that number of marbles. After the lesson they were permitted to make anything they wished from the clay.

10.50 to 11.05, a collection of bird pictures was looked at and talked about. The pictures had been put away for several days, consequently were enjoyed more than usual.

11.05 to 11.25, *recess. Again the fence-climbing and jumping were indulged in to a great extent.*

11.25 to 11.30, marching and rest.

11.30 to 11.50, *free play*.¹

Is it possible to conceive a programme in which the ideal of free play could be more consistently carried out? The marching was free, the singing was free, the selection of games was free, the choice of material was free, the method of using it was free, the illustrations of stories were free, and lest all this freedom should be insufficient for purposes of development, there were given, both days, two recess periods of twenty minutes each. There is not a single word in the diary to suggest that any effort was made to lead the children to build better, draw better, model better, or do anything better than they were originally able to do. The only inconsistencies in the two days' record are the twenty minutes spent in stringing beads, and the five minutes presumably required to make three marbles. With these exceptions the children did nothing but amuse themselves or suffer themselves to be amused by the kindergartner. It may be added that even the stringing and marble-making exercises were practically effortless.

Ignoring for the moment the self-refuting dialectic of the free-play theory as expounded by

¹ The Kindergarten Problem, pp. 118-20. (*Italics mine.*)
—Alice L. Blackford.

its advocates, and assuming that the freedom claimed were possible, let us frankly recognize that to carry out this theory would mean not a modification of the historic kindergarten but a complete revolution of its principles and practices. The institution which Froebel originated was conceived by him as a transition from the nursery to the school. The nursery is a place for free play. The school is a place for work. The kindergarten is a mediatorial realm wherein a transition is made from play to work. As was explained in the preceding chapter of this book, the transition is effected by grafting upon selected plays which reveal germinal tendencies toward the values of human life the higher expression of their own ideal. The value of the graft is two-fold. It develops the mind through its own free impulsion. It renews the energy of ideals which had been paralyzed by their external imposition. The values of life must not be conceived as artificial flowers fastened by some external hand upon a plant which could never have produced them, but as the perfect blossom in which the plant completes its life and provides for its own renewal.¹

Contrasting the free-play programme with the concentric programme we become aware that each is the fruit of a partial conception of the child.

¹ See Chapter V, pp. 140-144.

The concentric programme conceives him as preponderantly a learning being, and thereby retreats from the position of Froebel to that of the traditional schoolmaster. The free-play programme conceives him as a sentient being who reacts upon stimuli from his environment, and by its claim that there must be no interference with "the primal hereditary impulses" retreats from the position of Froebel to that of Rousseau. The Froebelian programme harmonizes the mutually excluding conceptions of established education and educational reform by accentuating those modes of self-expression which reveal and confirm generic selfhood.

A revolution in principle must revolutionize practice, and a revolutionized practice must demand changed instrumentalities. The Santa Barbara experimenters were convinced that "absolutely free play is the only rational solution to Froebel's plea for self-activity." The first result of this changed conviction was the addition of numerous instrumentalities, e. g., seesaws, swings, climbing poles, and promiscuous toys, supposed to be necessary as "play incentives." The second result was a decision that "the kindergarten is loaded down with an unsifted mass of material which has been chosen by the adult mind as suitable for the logical development of the child."¹

¹ The Kindergarten Problem, p. 81.

It was therefore deemed necessary to discover the spontaneous reaction of children toward the traditional kindergarten materials, and a test experiment was made which our monograph describes as follows:

Every day for half an hour the kindergarten materials, the gifts and occupations, were spread on a table, and each child chose what one thing he cared to play with for that time. At first the idea was carried out in the form of a play; the table and its contents were supposed to be a store, and the children came, and, using the tablets or parquetry circles for money, bought what they wanted, so that that half hour of the day came to be known as "store time," a name which clung to it long after the "store" idea was reduced simply to the less romantic "free-choice time." Each child took his material to his seat, as a rule, and there did what he pleased with it.¹

The results of this effort to determine by a "scientific" test the interest of children in the different materials of the kindergarten demand our careful consideration. The materials preferred by the younger children stated in the order of preference were beads, clay, the sewing card, the tile board, parquetry, blocks, and the first gift. The per cent of choices for blocks and balls were, however, very small, being in each case only seven per cent (7%), as opposed to nineteen per cent

¹ The Kindergarten Problem, p. 81.

(19%) for beads, eighteen per cent (18%) for clay, thirteen and one half per cent ($13\frac{1}{2}\%$) for the sewing card, ten and one half per cent ($10\frac{1}{2}\%$) for the tile board, and ten per cent (10%) for parquetry. With the older children there was less variety of selection, forty-one per cent (41%) of all choices being given to the sewing card, and twenty-nine per cent (29%) to clay. The remaining thirty choices were scattering, the only gifts or occupations which received more than three choices being parquetry, eight choices, and blocks, six choices.

The choices of the younger children are readily explained. They were naturally attracted by materials whose possibilities were obvious. They could see at once something to be done with beads, clay, tile boards, blocks, and balls. Sewing and parquetry offer fewer technical difficulties than many other occupations, and hence are generally among the first into whose use children are initiated. The choices of the second-year children force the conclusion that there had been lack of intelligent guidance. These children had not been led to discover the richer possibilities of the building gifts, hence the chart shows a waning interest in blocks instead of the waxing interest which thirty years of collective experience justifies us in expecting. Tablets, sticks, and rings, whose varied uses children need help to find, were scarcely

chosen at all; cutting, now almost universally admitted to be one of the most popular, as well as one of the most educative occupations of the kindergarten, was chosen by only three children. On the other hand, the sewing card received forty-one (41) choices, a preponderance which experienced kindergartners cannot forbear to connect with the fact that of all occupations, sewing is the one which, after its few technical difficulties are overcome, can be given with least strain upon the director; which, for this reason, tends to be constantly declined upon by easy-going kindergartners, and in which, therefore, children most often become capable of creative work. On the whole, the experiment in Santa Barbara would seem to have tested the ability of kindergartners rather than the interests of children, and the judgment the student is forced to pass upon it is, that it failed in the essential conditions of a scientific experiment, because it did not eliminate disturbing influences. It may be added that such elimination is practically impossible in a test of the kind attempted. The jumble of different materials distracts unstable minds, and predisposes to imperative or vacillating choices. The fact that some of the occupations which children like best *after* they have learned to use them do not appeal to them at all *until* they have learned to use them, makes the test of immediate choice unfair

and misleading. The defects of directors create disturbing influences of the most serious kinds. Finally, the director's own judgments of value are sure to react upon her children.¹ The Santa Barbara experiment, for example, was made at a time when the minds of revolutionary kindergartners were under the spell of critics who had raised a mighty hue and cry against the geometry of Froebel's gifts. Therefore, out of a total of two hundred choices only thirteen were given to building blocks, and one and one third to the second gift. Since that time innovating kindergartners have convinced themselves that material which permits representation in three dimensions is preferable to material which permits only representation in the flat. In swift conformity to this changed point of view children's tastes now incline graciously toward the solid gifts—and even the despised and rejected sphere, cube, and cylinder is restored to a place of honor. The practical conclusion to which we are forced by these facts is that, if further test of the Froebelian instrumentalities is necessary, the only reasonable test is the gradually accumulating experience of the collective body of kindergartners. The results of this test as carried out dur-

¹ In later test experiments the jumble of kindergarten materials has been avoided. The other disturbing influences, however, remain in full force.

ing the past thirty-five years would seem to give a priority of both interest and value to building blocks, cutting, drawing, coloring, clay work, parquetry, and sewing. It is, however, a *non sequitur* conclusion that because these occupations lead in interest and value all others are devoid of interest and valueless. The interest and value of tablets, sticks, rings, folding, weaving, and cardboard modeling are very little less than the interest and value of the occupations already mentioned, and, finally, even those Froebelian instrumentalities which possess the minimum of interest and value cannot be entirely discarded without loss to the child and some degree of failure to realize the ideal of the kindergarten as a wise transition from the nursery to the schoolroom.

It is too often forgotten that the traditional material of the kindergarten is justified by the results of test experiments carried out through centuries. Balls, building blocks, and materials for arrangement games have commended themselves to the taste of children and the judgment of parents all over the world and through the ages. An equally extended range of experience justifies simple folding, weaving, twisting, or intertwining and embroidery, and as for the sand pile, clay, pencil, paper, and coloring material, the evidence in favor both of their value and their appeal is surely sufficient to satisfy the most skeptical.

There are so many things still to be found out that it seems foolishness to waste time discovering the already known, and settling the already established.

To the criticisms thus far made upon the test experiment in Santa Barbara some readers may raise the objection that the free-choice period was a temporary device, and that doubtless when its results were attained the jumble of kindergarten materials was discontinued and the planless method of allowing each child to do as he pleased with the object of his capricious election was set aside in favor of a more rational procedure. Our monograph will not permit us to solace ourselves with this false comfort. The experimenting kindergartners, we are told, are eager to keep up the free-choice period for its effect upon the children, and they "pity the poor little starved, straight-laced mortals who are restricted to the paltry pabulum of the dictation exercise." As we read this statement a doubt arises in our minds, which further study of the Kindergarten Problem confirms. Its authors know only the crude antithesis between free play and dictation, and suppose that children must either do exactly as they please, or exactly as the kindergartner prescribes. The mediatorial methods of the kindergarten—the method of transit from imitation toward originality; the method of suggested subject which,

by eliminating indecision as to *what* shall be done concentrates attention on *how* it shall be done, and leaves children free to work out their own plan of procedure; the method of free initiative with expert reaction, the inciting method of the simple problem, the sympathetic method of class or group work, wherein each child profits by the ideas of his fellows, are all conspicuous by their absence. In my judgment, lack of knowledge of these mediatorial methods explains the dissatisfaction of many kindergartners with the instrumentalities of Froebel.

The first fallacy which created the so-called *free-play* movement was the conception of the kindergarten as "a substitute for childish play in its totality." It is with this fallacy alone that our discussion has thus far been concerned. The constant juxtaposition of free play with play incentives suggests a second fallacy which apparently exercises compelling influence over the authors of the Kindergarten Problem. This second fallacy is the conception of the child as a creature wholly dominated by instinct, and therefore a slave to the suggestions of environment. "The system of Dame Instinct," we are told, is quite as complete as most systems furnished by the logical adult, "and not half so stupid, either."¹ . . .

¹ The Kindergarten Problem, p. 44.

"Instinct, however, is not the only factor to be considered. Environment is equally important. For instinct often remains dormant unless the incentive furnished by the environment and necessary to the development of the instinct is present. . . . Environment given, instinct becomes a selective agent."¹ Hence, all kindergarten gifts are offered as "incentives," and bean bags, tin street cars, wooden soldiers, cloth elephant, dolls, dishes, dustpans, washboards, flatirons, reins, hammers, garden tools, footballs, seesaws, and swings presented in motley array either arrest development by delivering little victims of suggestion over to the slavery of imperative impulse, or create vacillating wills by provoking a desultory and constantly changing activity.²

Among the more important facts to which modern psychology has called attention are the pathologic conditions arising from disorganization of the will. Hypochondria is an acute form

¹ The Kindergarten Problem, p. 45.

² "The introduction of some simple reins of red tape with bells has spread the enthusiasm for horse like wildfire. . . . These horses and their remorseless drivers, like Tennyson's brook, 'go on forever.'"—*Ibid.*, pp. 45 and 39. "Rubber balls were furnished freely and were the germs of a chronic and incurable disease of ball-playing. . . . A box of toys has lately been placed in the yard of one of the kindergartens and a general rush is made for this at every recess."—*Ibid.*, p. 45.

of subjection to an imperative impulse or idea. Hysteria is a chaotic disorder of "segmented" will. Lesser degrees of the tendencies which culminate in these acute disorders are common to all men. In virtue of native temperament most little children are prone either toward subjection to a master impulse or toward that "fickleness of conduct" that "irrational change of plan which can itself become a hopelessly fixed habit in a given brain."¹ One great duty of education is to assist them so to integrate themselves that they may escape the danger to which these defects expose them, and the best method yet devised for the accomplishment of this aim is the creation of a healthy selective interest through the doing of typical deeds. Professor Royce tells us that "We must get children to do before they can consciously will this or that particular form of doing." "Involuntary conduct," he writes, "must precede the voluntary, but the right sort of involuntary conduct you can only establish through appeals to the feelings and through presenting the fitting objects of knowledge to the intellect."² The method of the Froebelian kindergarten which incites typical deeds through appeal to imagination, and which, by means of typical deeds,

¹ *Outlines of Psychology*, Josiah Royce, p. 69.

² *Ibid.*, p. 374. See Chapter II of this book.

creates a rational selective interest, is a practical effort to realize this primary demand of true education. The method of the free play kindergarten, which tightens upon the child of strong native bias the chains of heredity and environment, and increases the tendency of capricious wills to hesitant and vacillating choices, is a parody on all education. Persistent surrender to any master impulse augments the danger of becoming enslaved by others, and fickle deeds must beget fickle and irresolute characters.

The self-refuting dialectic of the free-play ideal should now be apparent to the careful reader. That ideal has a bifurcated root. One fork of this root is the gratuitous assumption that the kindergarten should be given over to perfectly free play, the other is that exaggerated emphasis upon hereditary impulse and environment which denies all freedom, and culminates in the conception of play as a fated activity.

The collapse of free play into reflex or semi-reflex activities is more completely illustrated in a chapter of the Kindergarten Problem which relates to plays of physical action. "The essence of play," we are told, is that it "should be directed by the hereditary and instinctive impulses from within. And the æsthetic or morally instinctive games of the kindergarten are to be ranked with

a diet of beefsteak for suckling infants.”¹ Inherited impulses must be called into activity by external stimulus, hence the kindergarten should provide “clean sand to roll, build, and model in. mounds to jump from, poles to climb, balustrades to slide from, paths to run in, bushes to hide in, balls to throw, hammers with which to pound,”² and a goodly number of other incentives, such as swings, jumping-ropes, and seesaws. These incentives quicken hereditary impulses, and call into exercise our larger muscles. “It is a noticeable fact,” says our monograph, “that in running, kicking, jumping, throwing, climbing, wrestling, turning somersaults, etc., only fundamental movements are brought into play. Our tree-dwelling ancestors might have performed, and did perform any and all of these movements, so that they are handed down to the child’s nervous system with such a long and reputable list of references that he is fain to make good use of them before ever he is ready to attempt the newer-fangled accessory movements of finger, hand, and eye, which have been added to the curriculum of life by his nearer ancestor, man.”³

The dogma that “the larger and fundamental muscles which move the greater joints precede in their development the smaller, finer, or accessory

¹ The Kindergarten Problem, p. 34.

² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

muscles which move fingers, throat, lips, and make all the more delicate adjustments,"¹ is responsible not only for much of the arresting practice of the Santa Barbara experimenters, but for widespread neglect of the finger games of the Mother Play, and widespread attack upon many activities through which the traditional kindergarten developed manual skill. It has called forth the demand that nearly all kindergarten material shall be increased in size, and finally, it has been one of the conspiring causes of recent efforts to introduce into the kindergarten such household industries as sweeping, dusting, and laundry work.² The following statement made by the greatest American exponent of genetic psychology

¹ Adolescence, Dr. G. Stanley Hall, vol. i, p. 88.

² The elimination of finger plays seems to me an unmixed evil. The question of household industries in the kindergarten will be discussed in a later chapter. The enlargement of kindergarten material involves in some cases questions which psychologists admit to be still unsettled. For example, the increased size of folding paper brings up the unsettled question of the maximum limit of unstrained vision. In other cases the enlargement of material obviously interferes with educational results, e. g., when children are encouraged to make very large pictures it becomes impossible for them to overlook the picture as a whole, and therefore each object in the picture has to have its place indicated by the kindergarten. Finally, there are cases in which any decision involves balancing many different problems. Thus the enlargement of the blocks brings up the questions of increased expense, diminished space for children to build in or retreat

would seem to indicate that revolutionary activity had been somewhat precipitate.

Somewhere or other the false notion has crept into our pedagogy that the child's fine muscles do not develop until later than the large muscles. How can one believe such a false statement when he sees a young infant clutching with its little fingers and exhibiting in this grip one of its strongest movements? How can one believe this dogma when he sees the boys and girls in the first grade doing all the work that they do in writing with the fine finger muscles—literally overdoing this work in a very noticeable degree? The fact is, the fine muscles are in full operation very early in life.¹

Surrendering the claim of prior development the question emerges whether accent upon the use of larger muscles may not be urged upon the ground of prior muscular coördination. The sufficient answer to this question is that the repetition of already coördinated movements tends to produce arrest of development, except in cases where these movements are included in new and larger coördinations. It is in virtue of the abundance and variety of their diffuse or unorganized movements that children can be led to form new habits of action. "In movement, as in every

from the tables to the floor and loss of that unit of measure which makes the Froebelian building gifts such a valuable preparation for mathematics.

¹ Genetic Psychology for Teachers, p. 222, Charles Hubbard Judd, Ph.D., Leipsic. Int. Ed. Series.

other sphere," writes Dr. Judd, "nature attacks her problems by producing more than she needs, and then picking out the best. . . . Nature starts out with a diffuse brain, as if she would say to the individual, 'I will not place any restrictions upon you, but will let you have at first all the possible movements to select from.' She stirs up the brain in all directions and the diffuse movements begin to appear in abundance. There are movements of the head and arms and feet and trunk. Not all are necessary to the final form of action, and most will drop away as development goes on. But in the whole mass of movements the right ones must be there, and development means the selection of the right movements out of the total mass of diffuse movements. Only one limitation appears in all this provision of many movements. This is the limitation we have already noted.¹ No mechanism could be devised which would not in the general stimulation of the muscles affect the small muscles more than the large ones."

¹ The limitation noted is explained at length in the following sentences: "They (the fine muscles) are the muscles which in diffuse movements are most apt to be called into action. It requires a less powerful excitation from the nervous centers to set the fine muscles into action. They contract at the slightest stimulation. . . . In short, diffusion always exaggerates first of all the movements of the fine muscles."

Two facts would seem to be established. *The fine muscles are in full operation very early in life.* There is therefore no valid reason derived from the condition of the child's nervous system why fingers and eyes should not be duly exercised as well as trunks, legs, and arms. *Development takes place through the coördination of diffuse movements.* To put the almost exclusive emphasis of the kindergarten upon already coördinated movements is, therefore, so far as we are able, to arrest development.¹

No one can study Froebel's chapter on movement plays without assurance of the fact that he provides amply for the needed exercise of the larger muscles. Were his suggestions with regard to garden work carried out, the fundamental muscles would be still further called into use. The question at issue is not whether fundamental muscles shall be duly exercised, but whether there shall be such an elimination of the activities which exercise the fine muscles as to destroy one chief merit of the kindergarten as a factor in education.

"It is evident," writes Dr. Harris, "that if the school is to prepare for the arts and trades, it is the kindergarten which is to accomplish the object, for the training of the muscles, if it is to

¹ Pages 169-174 of this chapter have been submitted to Dr. Judd, and I have his permission to state that I have represented his point of view correctly.

be a training for special skill in manipulation, must be begun in early youth. As age advances it becomes more difficult to acquire new phases of manual dexterity.

"Two weeks' practice of holding objects in his right hand will make the infant in his first year right-handed for life. The muscles yet in pulpy consistency are very easily set in any fixed direction. The child trained for one year in Froebel's gifts and occupations will acquire a skillful use of his hands and a habit of accurate measurement of the eye which will be his possession for life."¹

The suggestions made by the authors of the Kindergarten Problem with regard to representative plays are no less revolutionary than those relating to games of physical culture. We are told that there are three groups of representative plays based respectively on the imitative, the constructive, and the dramatic instincts. Omitting the second group, which relates chiefly to plays about which there is little divergence of opinion,² let us

¹ History of the Kindergarten in St. Louis. Annual Report of that city.

² "A second class of plays requiring more imagination includes those which are based on the constructive instinct. Here the sand pile is the arena supreme. . . . The children build fences, reservoirs, gardens; they pile up mountains; they dig wells, tunnels, and trenches; they erect flag poles; they concoct pies, cakes, tamales."—*The Kindergarten Problem*, pp. 46 and 47.

give our careful consideration to groups one and three. These groups are described as follows:

GROUP I

Being an animal.—Based on the imitative instinct: horse, fishes, bear, frogs, cow, wild turkey, fox, rattlesnake. In a sequent paragraph we learn that “as a horse the child runs and prances about; as a fish, he swims in the sand; as a bear, he runs and growls; as a wild turkey, he flaps his arms; as a fox, he hides in his hole; as a rattlesnake, he writhes his body.”¹

GROUP III

Representation of adult occupations.—Based on the dramatic instinct: blacksmith, train-band, horse-show, merry-go-round, farmer, Santa Claus, baker shop, bakery wagon, dairyman, planting garden, orchard, mother, sisters, doll with variations (holding, rocking, dressing, kissing, talking to, taking to ride, taking for a walk, putting to bed, dosing with medicine, feeding with grass or lunch), washing dishes, washing clothes, ironing, sweeping, party with dishes, burial, kindergarten, school, Christmas tree, loading wagons, hauling and dumping, driving horse, lassoing horses, peddler, pantry with sand for food, hunting wild game, punishment, tomale man, bus, rain-storm with sand for rain.²

¹ The Kindergarten Problem, p. 46.

² *Ibid.*

The disheartening facts forced upon us as we read the list of games in both these groups are the fatal blindness of the experimenting kindergartners to the meaning of imitation and their ceaseless surrender to the momentary caprices of little children.

What a child imitates he tends to become. What he imitates he will notice. What he imitates he begins to understand. Blind to the fact that "nothing less than the child's personality is at stake in the method and matter of his imitations," the free play revolutionizers of Froebelian games are perfectly willing to have children transform themselves into sneaking foxes and writhing rattlesnakes. Ignoring the reaction of imitation upon selective interest they eye with equal favor the representation of garden-planting, or human burial. Aware of the fragmentariness of childish thought they reject Froebel's wise and gentle plan for overcoming it, and arrest development by really encouraging "the distorted prominence of isolated factors of experience." In short, through a specific application of the fatal heresy which underlies the whole free-play programme, they shift upon children the entire responsibility of selecting what they will represent and how they will represent it. By this act of abdication they reduce the kindergarten games to a hotchpotch not only devoid of educational value, but abso-

lutely perverting in its reaction upon intellect, emotion, and will.

The attentive reader will doubtless have observed that in the representative plays described each child acted as an isolated individual, and will therefore not be surprised to learn that our Santa Barbara experimenters intentionally discard circle games. The reason given for this radical change is that the individual child is prior to the social child, and that traditional games which emphasize the group as opposed to the individual belong to the period between seven and twelve years of age. "The sacred circle of kindergarten paraphernalia, we are told, does not seem to be based on any natural penchant of children of kindergarten age for the traditional circle games."¹ The argument advanced is valid only if it be granted that education should never lead children to do anything which in their given stage of development they might not and would not have done of themselves. This assumption underlies the whole free-play programme. Its clear statement is its self-refutation. It has been shown that both in biologic and social recapitulation there are "short cuts" from lower to higher planes of development. Why, therefore, should education be reproached for consciously seeking short cuts, when one of her avowed aims is to help

¹ The Kindergarten Problem, p. 50.

the individual to recapitulate within the span of a single life the achievement of ages?

The kindergarten games mediate between the traditional games of the nursery and the traditional games of the playground. Their content is borrowed for the most part from plays analogous to Pat-a-Cake and Shoe the Horse, which are played by mothers and little children the world over. Their form is borrowed from the traditional ring games of older children. They are, therefore, transitional in type, and may, perhaps, be best described as a repetition by many children standing on a circle and following a leader of the simple movements of nursery plays.¹

The effort of the Froebelian kindergarten is to reënforce in fair proportion generic or ideal modes of self-expression. Froebel recognized in many traditional games the deposit of unconscious reason, preserved what was good in this deposit, and omitted its objectionable features; supplied missing links, and presented a series of games wherein each is related to all the others, and which, by means of dramatic and graphic representation, poetry and music win for the ideals they embody a controlling power over the imagination. In

¹ In some instances, e. g., the farmer, both content and form are borrowed from some simpler traditional ring game. I agree with the authors of the Kindergarten Problem that it is a mistake to introduce complex relationships into our circle games.

like manner, from among traditional toys, he picked out those which possessed most educative value, ordered them into related series, and suggested a method by which they might be consciously used to enrich, interpret, and organize the child's experience, develop his creative power, and awaken in him a selective interest which would begin the process of his deliverance from the coercion of heredity and environment.¹ If these selected and organized games and gifts have no value, then the traditional kindergarten has no *raison d'être*. But if Froebel has translated the hieroglyphic of native play and found means which, without detriment to spontaneity, influence the growth of character and the trend of thought, then the substitution of free play for the mediatorial activity of the kindergarten with its practical consequences in the elimination of many Froebelian instrumentalities and the addition of many educationally valueless toys, is not educational progress but educational atavism.

The gist of the contention between the free-play reformers and the traditional kindergarten is, whether the immediate interests of little children are a sufficient index of what is contributory to their development. With the clear statement of the point at issue hesitation between the opposing views seems impossible. Who does not know, as

¹ See Chapter II of this book.

a fact of familiar experience, that many things children delight in doing it is bad for them to do; that many sense-incentives to which they eagerly respond corrupt their taste, and that, since many instinctive forms of play are survivals of an out-grown stage of human progress, undue accent upon them tends to arrest development at its point of departure. I hope I shall not seem to be trifling with a serious subject if I frankly confess that my own reaction against the hue and cry for recapitulation of feral and animal activities is best expressed in the words of Oliver Herford's nursery rhyme:

Children, behold the chimpanzee;
He sits on the ancestral tree
From which we sprang in ages gone;—
I'm glad we sprang—had we held on
We might, for all that I can say,
Be horrid chimpanzees to-day.

In their attempts to revolutionize the kindergarten games, gifts, and occupations, the Santa Barbara kindergartners acted under the spell of false conceptions of the kindergarten, of the child, and of the nature of play. Their experiments in story-telling seem to have been conducted under the spell of psychologists who insisted that the chief end of literature was to create sense-images and call forth motor responses thereto. The

methods inspired by this psychologic fallacy are described as follows:

In taking up the story work in our kindergarten this year, we decided to try with the entering class of children from four to five years old, the favorite rhymes of Mother Goose. We took up at first the briefest ones, such as:

"Rub-a-dub, dub,
Three men in a tub."

Or:

"Jack, be nimble;
Jack, be quick;
Jack, jump over the candlestick."

Oftentimes we acted them out before asking the children to illustrate. For instance, the morning I told them the rhyme of "Jack, be nimble," I had a candlestick and candle, which we put on the floor; then we suited the action to the words, each child who wished going through the jumping. "Seesaw, Margery Daw," was given the first time with little success for lack of illustration, but again I tried it, erecting a miniature seesaw in the sand-box, with small dolls on either end, and, when given the charcoal and paper, the results were astonishing; each child had now a visual picture to draw from. The first verse of "Jack and Jill" was successfully illustrated in the sand-box, with a hill of sand, dolls, little tin bucket, a well at the top of the hill, with well-frame of sticks and string to pull up the bucket.

"Ding-dong bell,
Pussy's in the well,"

was enjoyed with the above well, and a picture cat to let down and pull out.¹

This report needs no comment. The theory that the one end and aim of story-telling is to create visual images will always call forth methods which chain the mind to sense-perception. Of all the hobbies that have perverted the practice of the kindergarten, the hobby of the visual image has had perhaps the most baleful influence. Its results have been both comic and tragic. One kindergartner poured a bucket of water along the floor of her kindergarten, because she wished her children to visualize a stream. Numbers of kindergartners have described fairy palaces of marvelous beauty and then asked children to build them with the eight cubes of the third gift. Nor is this sin against imagination confined to the kindergarten. In the grammar school the myth of Persephone has been shorn of its beauty and its appeal to imagination by using paper dolls to give children visual images of Ceres, Persephone, and Pluto, and by intertwining yards of black paper and tinsel to represent the realm of Hades. In the Sunday school flaming red liquids made colorless by chemicals have been supposed to recommend to innocent childhood such curiously inappropriate texts as "Though your sins

¹ The Kindergarten Problem, pp. 59, 60.

be as scarlet they shall be white as snow ; " jointed dolls, pierced with arrows, laid upon mimic fires, and crucified upside down have effectually distracted attention from all that is most valuable in the history of the great apostles of the church, and china lambs of many sizes, but of common stiffness and imbecility have stifled the tender and touching appeal of Christ as the lamb of God. Is it not time to call a halt to the experiments of teachers so in bondage to the prosaic understanding, and to point out clearly the errors of those psychologists who value literature chiefly as an instrument for creating mental images, and one of whom hesitates not to ascribe Shakespeare's supremacy to the facts that he had magnificent sensory training, made the proper motor responses thereto, and was blessed with parents who could neither read nor write ?

Having revolutionized the kindergarten games, gifts, and occupations, and destroyed story-telling as a simple art, the Santa Barbara experimenters devote their final attention to kindergarten drawing, which they insist should take exclusively the form of picture-writing, should be preceded by dramatic representation, and should begin with blackboard exercises which demand large, free-arm movements. " Education," we are told, " has been and is burdened by a hapless confusion between drawing as an art and drawing in a more primi-

tive stage of its evolution, found alike in the child and in primitive man—drawing merely as a way of telling something.”¹

It should be frankly admitted that by its neglect of picture-writing, and its exaggerated emphasis upon type forms and conventional design, the traditional kindergarten laid itself open to the criticism of the child-study reformers.² But when the reformers fell into the error of entirely repudiating design, they overlooked a tendency abundantly illustrated in the products of primitive peoples and repeated in the love of all little children for arrangement games. Had this act of repudiation been confined to drawing, its results, though regrettable, would not have been so disastrous as they have actually proved themselves to be. It is because it was extended so as to attack forms of beauty with blocks, tablets, sticks, rings, and lentils, to make all gift exercises illustrative, and to eliminate design from the kindergarten occupations that its influence has been so

¹ The Kindergarten Problem, p. 57.

² In the *Mother Play, The Education of Man, and The Pedagogics of the Kindergarten*, Froebel makes many suggestions with regard to ways and means of developing the power of graphic representation of concrete objects. These suggestions were too much neglected by his followers. See in *The Mother Play the Commentary on the Little Artist*. See also *The Education of Man*, pp. 75-79; and *Education by Development*, pp. 62-68.

subversive, and that it has called forth such an active protest from Froebelian kindergartners.¹

In the earlier part of this chapter I called attention to the two great fallacies which created the free-play movement. I have tried to suggest the results of these fallacies through consideration

¹ The exhibit of children's work made in New York during the fourteenth annual convention of the International Kindergarten Union (April 22 to May 3, 1907), proved beyond dispute, that through the craze for illustration combined with the idea that immediate environment should determine the subjects illustrated, too many kindergartens had become instruments for arresting the intellect and brutalizing the taste of little children. What influence except for evil can it have upon a child to make a cardboard model of the ugly tenement house in which he lives, and to make his copy, if possible, uglier than the original? Wherein lies the educational value of paper articles of clothing badly cut and strung from roof to roof in copy of the laundry methods of the slums? What liberating influence is exercised upon imagination by a faulty reproduction of the garbage man and his cart? In short, why do ugly work in order to rivet attention upon deplorable surroundings?

A second fact proved by the exhibit, was that the mania for illustration had caused many kindergartners to discard traditional materials in favor of tissue paper, clothes pins, strings, cracker boxes, and paper men and animals badly drawn and colored. The leaves and flowers made of tissue paper and used for stringing were an offense to nature and an insult to taste. It is no argument to say that we must meet children on their own plane. Upon every plane of development something may be done to increase efficiency and refine sensibility. To help children to make uglier things than they could possibly have done without adult misguidance is a caricature of education.

of the general programme; the new methods proposed for gift and occupation exercises, the emphasis upon mere movement games, the additions suggested to the instrumentalities of Froebel, and the devices thought necessary in order that the simplest rhymes might penetrate the dense minds of little children. My aim has been to prove that whereas the free-play programme claims to be the only rational solution to Froebel's plea for "self-activity," it is the one programme which most effectually discourages self-activity. By its preference for the fundamental movements of hypothetical tree-dwelling ancestors, it prevents that development of hand and fingers which made the Froebelian kindergarten a transition toward the manual training school; by its insistence upon the visual image, its neglect of symbolism, its distraction of attention through a mixed multiplicity of toys, and its refusal to advance from isolated facts through serial connection to causal agency, it arrests intelligence upon the lowest plane of sense-perception. Worst of all, by its ceaseless surrender to the whim of the moment, it kills the will which is struggling to be born out of feeling and desire. Its methods, one and all, are a refuting commentary, which he who runs may read, upon its major proposition, that "the kindergarten is a substitute for childish play in its totality,"¹

¹ Dr. Harris.

and its minor proposition that play itself can be adequately defined as ancestral impulses called into activity by the solicitations of environment.

It will doubtless be objected to my discussion of the free-play programme that the type of kindergarten described has no actual existence, and that there is not a single kindergartner in America who unequivocally accepts the ideal of free play as a criterion by which to determine her practice. The objection is at once valid and misleading. Doubtless the dialectic of experience has already practically refuted the wholesale fallacy of free play, and the Santa Barbara experiment will never be repeated. On the other hand, many practices which sprang into being during the brief authority of the child-study movement persist in detached kindergartens, and few kindergartners have so consciously interpreted the argument from experience as to be wholly free from danger of perversion. The necessity of the hour is that issues should be sharply defined, frankly stated, and fairly met. Granting therefore that no single kindergarten is exclusively dominated by the fallacy of free play, I maintain that the influence of this conception is still traceable in a tendency to increase unduly the number of running, skipping, hopping, catching, throwing, and climbing games; in an unwise attempt to concentrate interest upon

animals; in sporadic efforts to introduce into the kindergarten toys devoid of educational value; in reversions to street games; in the tendency to discard or minimize all the traditional material of the kindergarten, except blocks, sand, clay, scissors, pencils, paper, brushes, and paint; in the elimination of exercises relating to the organization as opposed to the unselective reproduction of experience; in methods of story-telling which enslave the mind to the mental image; in the repudiation of symbolism as the characteristic form of mental activity between the ages of three and six years, and in a seeming total blindness to the fact that while art is allied to play through its freedom and spontaneity, it develops from the beginning under the influence of that principle of order whose initial manifestations are rhythm, measure, and proportion.¹

The merit of the kindergarten, as that institution was conceived by its founder, is that, recognizing the values of life as approximate definitions of the structure of mind, it is able both to root education in spontaneous activities, and to guide it toward rational issues. The defects of the concentric programme arise from the fact that while recognizing the values of life it imposes them from without instead of developing them from within the child. The irony of the free-play

¹ See Chapter II, pp. 49-52.

programme is that by ignoring the values of life and tacitly denying to mind any true self-activity, it presents the anomaly of an educational method which lacks both a subject matter of education and a person to be educated.

CHAPTER VII

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE RACE

THE self-refuting practice of free-play kindergartens cannot be fully appreciated until it is set in the context of that general demand for a new return to nature, of which it is one of the minor expressions. The most ardent champion of this contemporary Rousseauism is Dr. G. Stanley Hall, and a lucid statement of its main tenets is contained in the following passage of his book on Adolescence:

Rousseau would leave pre-pubescent years to nature and to the primal hereditary impulsions, and allow the fundamental traits of savagery their fling until twelve. Biological psychology finds many and cogent reasons to confirm this view if only a proper environment could be provided. The child revels in savagery, and if its tribal, predatory, hunting, fishing, fighting, roving, idle, playing proclivities could be indulged in the country and under conditions that now, alas! seem hopelessly ideal, they could conceivably be so organized and directed as to be far more truly humanistic and liberal than all that the best modern school can provide. Rudimentary organs of the soul

now suppressed, perverted, or delayed, to crop out later in menacing forms, would be developed in their season so that we should be immune to them in maturer years, on the principle of the Aristotelian catharsis for which I have tried to suggest a broader application than the Stagirite could see in his day.¹

The demand for a new return to nature presupposes a strict parallel between the development of the individual and that of the race, and puts an arresting emphasis upon the rehearsal of savage and pre-human activities.² Biologists and comparative psychologists insist that the individual human organism and the individual human mind go through stages which recapitulate the history of the animal world in its ascent toward man. Anthropologists claim that in the development of each human individual the great culture epochs of history must be repeated. The tendency of any mind to dwell too fondly upon biologic recapitulation obscures its vision of historic recapitula-

¹ Adolescence, G. Stanley Hall, preface to vol. i, pp. x-xi. Has not Dr. Hall perverted the Aristotelian catharsis rather than given it broader application? Aristotle uses the term to explain the influence of the tragic drama and suggests that it purifies the soul through a vicarious experience of the outcome of evil passions. It would seem that his idea is precisely to save the individual from that free fling of impulse which Dr. Hall thinks indispensable to the growth of moral character.

² E. g., the activities of man's hypothetical tree-dwelling ancestors.

tion, and creates theories which, when applied in education yield fatal results. To this class of theories belongs that conception of play, as "the motor habits of the past persisting in the present," which explains the practical paradox that in free-play kindergartens there is no freedom. To the same class belongs the theory that the fundamental traits of savagery should have free fling until the age of twelve years. A being who must rehearse in the short span of an individual life the culture stages of history may not give so much time to the recapitulation of feral and brute activities.

Disciples of the new return to nature have failed to adjust the rival claims of biologic and historic recapitulation. They have also given scant attention to many questions involved in the general conception of a parallel between the development of the individual and that of the race. Is it true that each stage of the process of development is a direct outcome of its next inferior, and a necessary transition toward its next superior? Must the individual live through experiences which the race has outlived? Were all these outlived experiences necessary phases of phylogenetic development, or may it be that in some of them, at least, humanity strayed from the path of progress? Has mankind achieved such goodness and wisdom as it possesses by following na-

ture or by warring against nature? If it made war against nature where did it get the ideal which incited the war?

The answers to these several questions may be most easily approached by considering the method of moral education defended by advocates of the new return to nature. This method has been boldly formulated by Dr. Hall, who insists "that a boy of twelve years of age should have been through most forms of what parents and teachers commonly call badness. . . . He should have fought, whipped and been whipped, used language offensive to the prude and the prim precisian; been in some scrapes; had something to do with bad, if more with good associates, and been exposed to and already recovering from as many forms of ethical mumps and measles, as by having in mild form now, he can be rendered immune to later."¹ This statement clearly implies that the only way of getting rid of badness is by being a little bad. It is a serious proposal to sow wild oats, and akin to the idea that it is necessary for youth to paint the town red. The conviction in which it is grounded would seem to be that every native instinct subserves some good purpose, and has a sphere of legitimate exercise. It may be that some instincts have only a transitory value, and that in the development of man's moral

¹ Adolescence, vol. ii, p. 452.

nature their rôle is analogous to that of the tadpole's tail in the development of the frog's legs. They "exercise atavistic functions which will abort before maturity," but in and through such exercise they stimulate virtues which otherwise would never arise. Hence, "Give nature her fling," and by letting children act as they are, insure that they shall become what they ought to be.

I look over the lists of our native instincts and emotions given in contemporary psychologies, and find among them deceitfulness, jealousy, terror, rage and cruelty. Has deceitfulness a root of blessing? Has jealousy "a soul of goodness" would we observingly distill it out? Are we to conquer courage by surrender to blind terror, win sweet serenity by indulging in rage, and achieve loving-kindness by giving free fling to our native cruelty? And if in these cases, at least, virtue is attained not by self-indulgence but by self-conquest, may it not be well to consider whether the only way that man can make himself what he ought to be is by unmaking himself as he is? ¹ Any considerate survey of our "feeling instincts" will at least convince us that while nature

¹ The reader must distinguish between rage and anger, terror and fear. There is a wise fear and possibly a righteous anger. There can never be a wise terror or a righteous rage. See the chart of man's native emotions prefixed to *Mental Evolution in Man*, by George John Romanes.

supplies many of the materials out of which we build our house of life, she has also left in us some rubbish heaps—*débris* of her own past building, which the human builder must throw away.

Turning from this cursory glance at our native instincts to the process of moral education as carried out in history, we become aware that men have not grown better by permitting themselves to be a little bad, but that always and everywhere virtue has been achieved by the exercise of self-restraint. It is interesting in this connection to recall the statement of Lecky, that "the first form of human virtue is the courageous endurance of suffering, this being the one conspicuous instance in early savage life of a course of conduct opposed to natural impulses, and pursued through a belief that it is higher and nobler than its opposite."¹ The first books of ethics were written by slaves, and Hegel explains their authorship by the fact that being forced to do what masters commanded slaves were subjected to a discipline which lifted them out of servitude to their own appetites and passions. Prohibitory laws precede mandatory laws. Confucius teaches the golden rule in a negative form. The aim of all the ceremonies of Zoroastrianism is to expel

¹ Cited in Love and Law in Child Training, Emilie Poulsson, p. 143.

evil. The cardinal virtues of paganism—justice, prudence, temperance, fortitude—are virtues of self-restraint. Most of the Ten Commandments declare what man must *not* do. It would seem, therefore, that the doctrine of historic recapitulation calls rather for the inhibition than the indulgence of idle, predatory, and fighting proclivities, and discourages the idea that character is formed by giving free fling to natural impulse.

The method of *laissez-aller*, characteristic alike of original and contemporary Rousseauism not only arrests the parallel between the development of the individual and that of the race, at its historic point of departure, but also directly antagonizes the doctrine of psychology, with regard to the function of inhibition. In a striking passage of his *Larger Psychology*, Professor James declares that "we should all be cataleptics and never stop a muscular contraction once begun were it not that other processes simultaneously going on inhibit the contraction."¹ In his very illuminating discussion of deliberate suggestion, Professor Baldwin describes that form of inhibition in which "coördinate sense-stimuli meet, confront, oppose, and further one another," and shows that this tension of opposing incentives is a necessary requi-

¹ *Larger Psychology*, vol. ii, p. 583.

site to the rise of volition.¹ Professor Royce tells us that "all higher intellectual processes are accompanied by processes in the cortex which appear when seen from without enormously inhibitory," and insists that "upon the presence of inhibition—i. e., of the prevention or overcoming of one form of nervous excitement by the very fact of the presence of another, the organization of all our higher life depends. What, in any situation we are restrained from doing, is as important to us as what we do."² The least degree of conscious introspection will make any adult aware that tension is indispensable to his intellectual and moral life. Psychology, therefore, reënforces the lesson of history, and confirms the insight that "only with renunciation can life, properly speaking, be said to begin."

The thoughts I have been suggesting are obvious and commonplace. Their very general recognition almost immediately undermined the influence of the Neo-Rousseau gospel. Its golden rule, "Give nature her fling," made way for the precept, "Substitute acquired for native reactions," and the emphasis of education was placed upon "the organization of habits of conduct and tendencies to behavior."³ In the attempt to form

¹ *Mental Development*, James Mark Baldwin, pp. 126-30, and p. 372.

² *Outlines of Psychology*, Josiah Royce, pp. 71-73.

³ *Talks to Teachers*, William James, p. 29.

good habits, however, appeal was often made to bad motives, and thus a fatal schism was introduced into the moral life. The ground for this divorce between motive and act is suggested in the following statement, which I quote from Teachers' College Record for November, 1903:

It is a folly of both the sentimentalist and the ultra-rational thinker to insist that children should not only think and act rightly, but also from the right motives; that to tell the truth to avoid a beating is no better than to tell a lie. For a mature, responsible person, this may be true, so far as goodness and badness mean respectively things worthy of merit and things worthy of blame—and so far as telling the truth to avoid a beating forms precisely that habit. But with most school children, certainly with kindergarten children, telling the truth to avoid a beating will form the habit of telling the truth in general, the memory of the original motive fading away, into obscurity, while the actual habit of performance remains. For a college student to study to win a large salary is perhaps no better than idleness; for a gentleman to be honest because honesty is the best policy is perhaps no better than to be dishonest. But for the kindergarten child the important thing is that it should be obedient, generous, cheerful, courageous, and kind, the reason why being a matter that will, with proper treatment, die out from the habit and leave it as a general tendency. *We all have to begin with the so-called lower motives*, and can hardly be expected to have sloughed them off by the fourth year of life. It is the good fortune of moral training that the lapse of time so often preserves a good habit,

while allowing the feeling of its source to die out from consciousness.¹

The point of this statement is that right action may be divorced from right motive, and this is a denial of the truth that the motive which inspires an act gives its quality to the act itself. It is explicitly affirmed that "we all have to begin with the so-called lower motives." The reason given by contemporary child-students for this assumed necessity of acting from lower motives is the dominance in childhood of "the individualistic instinct." In his *Fundamentals of Child Study*,² for example, Mr. Kirkpatrick makes the following statements:

The instinct of self-preservation is not only the oldest instinct, but one that has been most uniformly useful to all species from the earliest beginnings of animal life, hence we should expect it to be strong in the young child. There is, however, a still more important reason for expecting it to be strong in the young of all animals including man, viz., because it is the only instinct that can be of any use in this stage of early helplessness. Any tendency on the part of a young animal or child to act for the good of any other being than itself, would be futile and in many cases injurious to itself and indirectly to its species;

¹The Philosophy and Psychology of the Kindergarten, Teachers' College Record, November, 1903, pp. 59, 60. (*Italics mine.*)

hence the individualistic instinct must be dominant in the young of all species that survive.¹

This passage assures us that as a result of the total process of evolution the individualistic instinct is exclusively dominant in childhood. In the following statements we are apprised how it functions in the child of kindergarten age:

The chief motive of life is to get everything possible for himself, objects, sensations, knowledge, privileges, and honors. . . . To be thoughtful of the interests of others, or to be interested in anything not concerned with the advancement of this kingdom of his, would be to be something other than a healthy, normal child.²

In general, the question which the child mentally asks of every object and every person is: "What are they good for?" meaning by good, "What can I get out of them?" He is the center of the universe, and everything and everybody is for his pleasure.³ . . . Upon this rock of truth must be based any sound method of moral education. "Good moral training will lead the child to discover that he can get most for himself in the long run by being kind to others, because of the return favors, rewards, and approbation thus gained."⁴

The mind is a cautious investor that withdraws its capital when it ceases to pay dividends of personal satisfaction. All our means and methods must in the

¹ Fundamentals of Child Study, pp. 92, 93.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 95, 96.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

last analysis be arrangements for making, the good thoughts and acts of profit, and the bad thoughts and acts of disadvantage to the personal cravings of those educated.¹

Summarizing the statements cited we may say that they contain a diagnosis of the child's state of mind and a theory of moral education based upon this diagnosis. The child is declared to be wholly selfish and thinking only of what pays. The method of education proposed is to foster right action by showing that it pays, and to restrain wrong action by proving that it does not pay. It is claimed that notwithstanding the constant appeal to selfish motives they will disappear with age. This, however, is an assertion without proof.

The validity of the method proposed depends upon the correctness of the diagnosis. If little children are really devoid of altruistic emotion, there is nothing to do but to make virtue pay. In this case, however, we substitute expediency for virtue, and should frankly recognize what we have done. "Kant," says Mr. Balfour, "compared the moral law to the starry heavens, and found both sublime. On the naturalistic hypothesis it would be more appropriate to compare it to the protective blotches on the beetle's back and find both in-

¹ *Philosophy and Psychology of the Kindergarten*, p. 56.

genious." We accept adaptive ingenuity in lieu of morality when we seek to make children good by making goodness profitable.

Before acquiescing in such a radical substitution we should be very sure of the fact that in little children love and sympathy are emotions unborn. Romanes claims that social feelings stir in babies ten weeks old; that affection appears in babies of fourteen weeks, and that sympathy is alive and active in the child of five months. Most reputable psychologists recognize the presence of organic sympathy in very young children. The method of making virtue pay rests upon a hypothesis of more than doubtful authority.¹

Waiving the doubts which arise in our minds as we consider the psychologic reasons given for appeals to expediency, we may cordially admit that the effort to form right habits through rewards and punishments which provoke the conviction that virtue pays, finds many parallels in the course of human history. The fear of the Lord has been very generally the beginning of wisdom. The history of the Hebrew people is a typical one, and the Old Testament is one long record of "arrangements for making good acts of profit and bad acts of disadvantage to the cravings of the race whose education it describes." Over the heads of the

¹ See also Professor Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, Chapter VI, "Instincts and Emotions."

chosen people hung constantly the dread of burnings, ague, pestilence, seed sown in vain, wasted cities, desolated sanctuaries, and deliverance into the hands of national enemies. On the other hand, long life, prosperity, and posterity were assured to all those who obeyed the divine commands, and devout Hebrews stayed their hearts upon promises of blessing for themselves and their descendants. The doctrines of heaven and hell as taught in the historic churches of Christendom are the climax of an educational effort to inhibit wrong action and incite right action by appeal to individualistic motives. For the righteous is prepared a heavenly city, with streets of gold and gates of pearl; for the wicked yawns the pit burning with fire and brimstone, where there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.

As I ponder the contrasting plans of moral education proposed by the advocates of a new return to nature and a new war against nature, both and neither seem justified in appealing for support of their practice to the history of the race. The former may urge with truth that men found out what was right only through a long course of experiment in wrong; the latter may claim without fear of contradiction that not by the broad path of self-indulgence but by the straight and narrow path of self-restraint, has man climbed to such moral eminence as he has thus far attained.

The admission of both claims destroys the authority of either. The fact that when, through experiment, any right course of conduct had been discovered, it was immediately enforced, shows that history can change its method. If it has changed once, it may have changed more than once. Therefore the next question we must consider is whether there has been anywhere a second historic revolution in the method of moral education, and whether the result of this revolution has been to set aside both the precept "Give nature her fling" and the maxim, "Make virtue pay."

Anyone who has critically and devoutly studied the Sermon on the Mount must be aware that it initiates just such a revolution as I have described. It is confessedly a revolutionary proclamation, and, as Bishop Brooks has pointed out, embodies a series of protests against the insufficiency of existing laws. "Men say, 'You shall not kill'; I say, you shall not hate. Men say, 'You shall not commit adultery'; I say, you shall not lust. Men say, 'You shall not swear falsely'; I say, you shall not swear at all. Men say, 'You shall love your friends'; I say, you shall love everybody."¹ Power to obey these revolutionary commands is liberated by a revolutionizing motive. Jehovah is not God, and in his stead is a loving Father who maketh His sun to shine on the

¹ Seeking Life, Phillips Brooks, p. 225.

evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust. All men are sons of the one Father, and therefore partakers of His nature. They must live worthily of their divine heredity. Finally, they are able to appreciate the perfect love of God through the germinal love in their own hearts. For they, too, are fathers, though imperfect ones, and being evil yet know how to give good gifts to their children.

Many persons go through life without disentangling the relationship between ideals and emotions. They fail to perceive that, on the one hand, all our higher emotions are begotten of ideals, while on the other, these ideals themselves merely universalize antecedent but partial and limited emotions. Had men no love in their hearts they could never have conceived the ideal of universal love. Had they no native sympathy they would never have invented patriotism or philanthropy. As involuntary conduct must precede voluntary and "we can never directly will an act until we have before done that act, and so expressed the nature of it," so involuntary feelings must precede all the moral ideals which define and extend them. Hence "our first affections" are in very deed, "the fountain light of all our day, the master-light of all our seeing."

The native emotion of parental love dates from insects and spiders. The native emotion of sym-

pathy dates from the hymenoptera. The moral ideals of universal love and sympathetic service date from the Sermon on the Mount and outside of the Christian world are even to-day non-existent. A recent remarkable manifesto entitled, "The Last Word of Islam to Europe," declares that for Mussulmans this world contains two kinds of human beings, believers and infidels, and announces as the highest moral obligation: "Love, charity, brotherhood to the believers; contempt, hatred, disgust, and war for the infidels."¹ In his very discriminating analysis of the Asiatic mind Mr. Meredith Townsend points out that not only does the Asiatic lack power to give any general sympathy, but he lacks even the idea that such sympathy should be given. He adds that "it is, of course, open to anyone to say that the grand Christian rule of love is not observed in Europe either, but that is only an intellectual quip. The European does care for his neighbor to a certain extent, and does to a much greater extent think that he ought to care. The Asiatic does not. He cares for his family, his caste, his class, his clan, and sometimes his profession, but of his neighbor he is little more regardful than one dog is of another. He is not

¹ See note to an article by Dr. Harris entitled *Social Culture in the Form of Education and Religion*, *Educational Review*, January, 1905.

affected by his misfortunes, and will help to inflict misfortunes on him with a serene callousness, which in Europe is for the most part never found. The Asiatic who could not endure to be an executioner, out of sympathy for the victims, is probably non-existent. That want of the power of sympathy is the root of all evil in him, the ultimate cause of all the tyrannies, the massacres, and the tortures which from the first have disgraced Asiatic life." ¹

The method of the Sermon on the Mount is based upon an intuition of the "Expulsive power of higher affections." It aims to enlarge the range, and increase the strength of love and sympathy, and thereby to repel wrath, lust, untruthfulness, and niggardliness. This method is in accord with the doctrines of Neo-Rousseauism in so far as they assert that moral education must work from within outward, and must therefore find the point of departure in some native impulse. It contradicts the later gospel in the fact that it discriminates between our native emotions and while intensifying the power and enlarging the range of some of them, sternly inhibits any indulgence in others. In its insistence upon inhibition it is at one with the educators who seek to substitute acquired for native reactions. It differs from them in directing its prohibitions

¹ Asia and Europe, Meredith Townsend, Introduction, p. 15.

against evil passions instead of evil acts, and one of its most characteristic features is its abhorrence of that contradiction between act and motive which is fostered by the method of making virtue pay.

As an inheritance from his brute and savage ancestry man possesses a stock of native emotions among which are rage, resentment, lust, deceitfulness, and vanity. It was a great day in human history when the blind victim of these imperative impulses awoke to the consciousness that there should be any limit set to the actions which they provoke. It was another great day when this awakened consciousness registered itself in commandments believed to be divine and compulsory. Such commandments, however, had double consequences. They stirred in noble and sensitive minds a prescient feeling of the sinfulness of those initial emotions whose terminal acts they forbade. They called forth in meaner minds all sorts of devices for indulging the passions while seeming to keep the laws. Untruthfulness was tolerated when truth was not buttressed by an oath; cunning devices winked at wrath and lust while insisting upon obedience to the letter of the laws against murder and adultery and through the subtle connivance of that pettiest of all human emotions, the emotion of vanity, acts of devotion were prostituted into acts of self-indulgence by

praying where men could see and applaud, and sounding trumpets to announce the act of almsgiving. There was a complete divorce between the outer and the inner life. Men seemed to others, and even to themselves, good, when in reality they were bad, and self-satisfaction steeled them against reproach and rendered them impenetrable to the most tender and touching appeals.

Aside from the moral catastrophe precipitated by inhibiting actions while cherishing their correspondent emotions, serious dangers lurk in the energy of inhibition even when it is directed not against evil deeds, but evil passions. To directly inhibit wrong feelings involves preoccupation with them, and such preoccupation either increases their sway or creates a pathologic conscience. As Professor Royce reminds us, "A brain that is devoted to mere inhibition becomes in very truth like the brain of a Hindoo ascetic—a mere 'parasite' of the organism—feeding, as it were, upon all the lower inherited or acquired nervous functions of this organism, by devoting itself to their hindrance. In persons of morbidly conscientious life such inhibitory phenomena may easily get an inconvenient and sometimes a dangerous intensity. The result is then a fearful, cowardly, helpless attitude toward life—an attitude which defeats its own purpose and renders

the sufferer, not as he intends to be—'good,' but a positive nuisance."¹

In the Sermon on the Mount, contradiction between the inner and outer life is canceled by directing the activity of inhibition not against terminal acts but initial emotions. This change of direction is its first great revolutionary deed. Its second, and even more revolutionary act is to produce inhibitory results by self-expressive methods. It liberates high energies, and sets them to war with base passions. Through these two revolutions it closes the fatal breach between being and appearance, and escapes alike the danger of hypocrisy and the danger of cowardice.

To do good acts from selfish motives is to seem one thing and to be another. To be forever holding one's self in destroys the power of ever letting one's self out. The good life is a positive life. The good man gives, serves, loves, and through the outrush of generosity, sympathy, and affection, sweeps away his own meanness, tyranny, and lust. Moreover, by a good will which is anxious to do more than selfishness can demand, he calls forth responsive good will in other men. Refusing to retaliate; bestowing on his stern creditor a free gift; always eager to give and lend, and going gladly two miles with the man who would have compelled him to go one, he wakes in other

¹ Outlines of Psychology, Josiah Royce, p. 77.

men "the nobleness which may long sleep but which is never dead." Thus in his own soul and in the souls of others he overcomes evil with good, and the grand transformation is wrought by simply acting toward all men as native affection impels him to act toward those he loves. The seemingly impossible commands of the Sermon on the Mount are fulfilled every day by mothers who yearn over erring children; by fathers eager to save their own prodigal sons; by wives whom cruelty and infidelity challenge only to purer devotion; by friends prompt to lay down life itself for a friend. True love for one is enough to teach any man how he ought to feel and act toward all.

The problem of moral education is such a serious one that no difficulty should be minimized and no question evaded. It is therefore incumbent on us to face the one objection to which the method of the Sermon on the Mount seems open. To command the universal extension of a limited and partial affection is to define an ideal but not to bestow power to realize it. Our native human affections enable us to understand the law; in some of us they are strong enough to make us approve the law; in all of us they are too weak to compel obedience to the law.

The motive power required for carrying out the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount is furnished

to those who believe its teachings by the doctrines of God the Father, His providential rule, and the infinite value of every human soul. It has been well said that "the moral reformation wrought by Christianity may be summed up in the statement that it raised the feeling of humanity from a feeble restraining power to an inspiring passion." Christ created what had never existed before, "the enthusiasm for humanity," and He did this by investing all men with supernatural value through His revelation of each and every man as a child of God. "The highest significance of great men," says Professor Harnack,¹ "is to have progressively enhanced, that is, to have progressively given effect to human value." The unique significance of Christ is to have conferred upon all men supernatural value. Through recognition of this supernatural value all other standards of value are overthrown. The differences between men melt away in the light of a great equality, and there is born a passion which is "neither love for the whole human race, nor love for each individual in it, but a love for the race or for the ideal of man in each individual." And as man is inspired with love for his brethren so he is assured of the watchful love of the common Father. The God who cares even for the flowers of the field and the birds of the air, so loves His own children

¹ What is Christianity? Harnack, p. 73.

that He counts the very hairs of their heads. This assurance of loving providence disabuses men of the blind terror bred in them by age-long struggle with wild beasts and wilder elements, and liberates that free energy which finds expression in hope, joy, and heroic endeavor. "We look at the rise of Christianity," says Mr. Chesterton, "and conceive it as a rise of self-abnegation and almost of pessimism. It does not occur to us that the mere assertion that this raging and confounding universe is governed by justice and mercy is a bit of staggering optimism fit to set all men capering."¹

In the lists of our native emotions given in contemporary psychologies, faith is conspicuous by its absence. Yet some degree of mutual trust would seem to be involved even in the habits of gregarious animals and to lie at the root of any form of human society. Like love, faith is both a native impulse and a celestial virtue. As native impulse it is the response of man to his own peculiar lineaments in other men, the recognition of an identity between himself and the particular persons to whom he is bound by the tie of blood or the tie of special affinity. As a celestial virtue it is the extension of this native impulse from the few to all, through recognition by the individual of correspondence between his total self,

¹ Varied Types, Mark Chesterton, p. 63.

the total self of all other human individuals, and the primal self whence all selves proceed. The naïve psychologists who created our Aryan speech, had a wonderful intuition of the specific quality of faith. "They derived both the verb to believe and the verb to love" from a word *lubh*, which has retained its original meaning in the Sanskrit *lobha*, desire, and the Latin *libido*, violent, irresistible desire. The same word was afterwards taken to express that irresistible passion of the soul which makes man break through the evidence of the senses and the laws of reason (*credo quia absurdum*) and drives him by a power which nothing can control to embrace some truth which alone can satisfy the natural cravings of his being."¹ The whole self seeks the satisfaction of the whole self. To the object which assures this satisfaction it responds with an irresistible outrush of faith and love.

The objection may be raised that I am claiming for Christianity an authority it does not possess. It is important, therefore, to explain that I claim for its psychologic intuition and educational method only that right of the species over the individual recognized in the doctrine of recapitulation. Advocates of the new return to nature urge that since mankind had to make moral experiments, every individual must repeat

¹ Science of Language, Max Müller, vol. ii, p. 439

them. Preachers of the new crusade against nature, insist that when through experiment any action was proved to have destructive consequences future experiments were prohibited by law, and obedience to law enforced by rewards and penalties. Hence respect for the parallel between the development of the individual and that of the race demands not experiment but inhibition. My claim is simply that in history itself both these methods were superseded by a new method which is a synthesis of their merits and an elimination of their defects. If, therefore, we are to learn from history what to do, we must accept her higher as well as her more elementary teachings.

Christianity is at least a historic experiment. It may be that the hope of the world centers in making the experiment more honest and more radical. The characteristic features of the experiment are the evolution of compulsory ideals from native emotions and the guaranty of both native emotion and compulsory ideal by the sanction of the universe. The cosmos has a character akin to, but transcendent of what we recognize as best in ourselves.

Manifestly any method of moral education presupposes the truth of its final premise. The final premise of the Sermon on the Mount is faith in personality as the supreme principle of the uni-

verse, and faith in the soul of man as participating in this principle. Denial of this faith lies at the root of many regressive educational practices. Its vindication to reason was the feat of that great age of which Froebel is the educational exponent. Its rediscovery by a new path of approach and its reaffirmation as the final explanation of physical and mental evolution is the task with which intelligence is wrestling to-day. There are hopeful signs that the task is in process of accomplishment. Discovery of the part played by attention in volition has given new and convincing reasons for a belief in free will, and shown that man is something more than "the psychophysical mechanism into which causal science construed him."¹ "The demand that psychology shall be studied from the point of view of the experient"² instead of that of the external observer, is transferring attention from "the flux of conscious states and the laws by which it is ordered to the unities of mind and the interests and aims which express them."³ The study of mind as "a cause in action working out its own ends in conformity with its own nature,"⁴ is wakening anew the conviction that "all true

¹ Science and Idealism, Hugo Münsterberg, p. 27.

² Personal Idealism. Philosophical essays by eight members of the University of Oxford. Edited by Henry Sturt, p. 170.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

causes are first causes," and a "psychology of first causes" is beating a short, though steep, path of ascent toward the "philosophy of the first cause."¹ From the mount of vision to which this path conducts reality is described as "neither a single being nor many coördinate and independent beings, but a one mind who gives rise to many."² Thus, the fundamental premise of the Sermon on the Mount vindicated by rational psychology in the age of Froebel, is now in process of reestablishment, through a psychology of immediate concrete experience, conceived as the "science of free agency."

Triply buttressed by history, psychology, and philosophy, the method of moral education founded upon appeal to and extension of our primal affections is impregnable against attack. It has always been the method intuitively adopted by mothers with a genius for motherhood. Common practice, however, vibrates perpetually between the extremes of adult coercion and adult surrender. Neo-Rousseauism merely formulated the theoretic equivalent of widely prevalent methods when it announced its golden rule: "Give nature her fling." Disciples of the new crusade against nature have merely reverted to the time-honored methods of the peach switch and the

¹ *Personal Idealism*, p. 192.

² *Ibid.*, p. 391.

slipper, somewhat more judiciously applied and justified by theories of brain-cells, nerve fibers, and native and acquired reactions. There is no progress in this swing of practice between anarchy and a paternalism which is always tending to relapse into despotism.

A wise method of moral education should mediate between the practice of those who hand over the reins to natural impulse and those who believe in driving children by reins held in the hands of the educator and pulling hard upon bits of deterrent consequences. If the correspondence between act and motive be a cardinal point in the moral life, is it not a prime duty of education to nurture those indigenous emotions out of which the virtues grow? If higher affections can wage successful war against lower ones, even after the latter have gained force by indulgence, why might it not be possible from the beginning of life to inhibit selfishness by augmenting the energy of social feeling? Instead of giving one or many beatings to break up the habit of lying, might we save children from falling into this habit by strengthening the ties of faith and love, and directing the attack of these native affections against those emotions of vanity, terror, lust, and greed, which are the most frequent provocatives of falsehood? In general if bad habits can be broken up after they are formed, why might it

not be possible to prevent their formation? These are the problems with which, as it seems to me, Froebel has wrestled more successfully than any other practical educator. His solution of them makes him a teacher of moral hygiene as opposed to moral therapeutics, and he has no equal as a spiritual bacteriologist and a discoverer of spiritual antitoxin.

It does not fall within the compass of this chapter to consider in detail Froebel's many and fruitful suggestions with regard to the development of the virtues from seeds of emotion native to the soil of the mind. The limits of my present discussion permit only the general statement that he bases moral education upon appeal to social sympathy and claims as its point of departure that "feeling of community first uniting the child with mother, father, brothers, sisters, and to which later on is added the unmistakable discovery that father, mother, brothers, sisters, human beings in general, feel and know themselves to be in community and unity with a higher principle, i. e., with humanity and with God."¹ The application of this principle to the evolution of specific virtues and the avoidance of specific vices, is to be found in the *Mother Play*. To this unique book I commend parents and teachers who

¹ *Education of Man*, p. 25.

feel the need of a method of moral education mediatorial between the antitheses of letting children do as they please and either compelling them or bribing them to do as they ought.

With insight into the truth that the feeling of community supplies the point of departure for moral education, we begin to realize that every virtue may be defined as a mode of action called forth by the relationship of individuals to a social whole. Obedience is the expression in action of that faith which is the ideal tie between the immature and the maturer soul. Kindness is good will, astir and active, between equal members of a collective whole. Cleanliness (which to superficial consideration appears a purely self-regarding virtue) is necessary in order that the members of a social whole may not offend one another's senses. Industry makes possible the contribution of something of value to the whole. Without order industry cannot be effective. He who is forever hunting things will have no time to do or make things. Punctuality is respect for other people's time and industry. Respect for the property of others is really respect for their "stored up" industry. Courtesy is treating each member of a whole as if he were that which he ought to be; or, differently stated, it is the recognition in manner that he is fulfilling his communal obligations. In short, every one of these elementary vir-

ties is rooted in and has been evolved from the social tie. All other virtues have the same source, and the way to develop them is by quickening the sense of solidarity.

In old times great stress was placed upon the formation of the habits to which I have referred. But the old-time education failed to produce the best results because it insisted upon external compliance with a taught obligation and ignored the necessity of that internal compliance which alone is efficacious in building character. Many of the educators who to-day are insisting upon the substitution of acquired for native reactions repeat the error of the ancient tradition. A single blow on molten iron has more shaping power than any number of blows on cold metal. So a child's character is shaped more by a single act done because with all his heart he wants to do it, than by any number of acts perfunctorily performed.

Right habits are formed through the frequent repetition of right actions, but right actions must be repeated through the child's own initiative. He who compels another to act against his own desires is a tyrant, and tyranny in him breeds rebellion in his victim. He who knows how to stir in another impulses which make him want to do the things he ought to do, is a benefactor and liberator. To accomplish this feat is to realize the highest ideal of moral education.

I have concentrated the discussion of this chapter upon contrasting methods of education, as illustrated in the moral sphere, and I have done this advisedly. For the more completely methods are illustrated in one sphere, the easier it becomes to recognize their merits or defects in other spheres. It should now need but a few words to suggest that in intellectual, no less than in moral education, the method of surrender to immediate impulse must give way to the method of inhibition, and the inhibition of lower interests must be accomplished by creating higher ones.

It is an incontestable truth that no degree of intellectual culture is possible without the habit of attention, and attention is an inhibiting activity which concentrates intellect upon a chosen subject by checking its surrender to immediate sense stimuli or arresting its idle gaze upon a moving panorama of mental images. This inhibiting activity takes two forms: the form of voluntary attention, wherein will issues a fiat to intellect, and the form of selective interest, wherein either through native or acquired bias, intelligence occupies itself with preferred objects.

Through our acts of voluntary attention we become the determiners of our own selective interest, and choose for ourselves the ideas which shall rule our intelligence and decide our lives. On the other hand, since voluntary attention can

be sustained only for an incredibly short time, our intellectual life would be poor, indeed, without the conspiring influence of passive attention or interest. "The sustained attention of the genius," as Professor James reminds us, "is for the most part of the passive sort. The minds of geniuses are full of copious and original associations. The subject of thought once started develops all sorts of fascinating consequences. The attention is led along from one of these to another in the most interesting manner, and never once tends to stray away."¹ In the drama of intellect, therefore, selective interest plays a rôle analogous to the "expulsive power of higher affections in the moral life."²

The questions proposed in the earlier part of this chapter have been answered, so far as I can find their answers, in the teachings of history. It seems true that in the process of phylogenetic development each step "remembered its next inferior," but its memory was often one of disapproval and the evolution of humanity has been "an evolution by antagonism." Such goodness as men have achieved has been conquered in a war

¹ Talks on Psychology and Life's Ideals, p. 102.

² To strengthen the power of voluntary attention and to create a rational selective interest are chief duties of education. In early childhood stress must be placed upon the latter aim. In the second chapter of this book I have tried to show how Froebel seeks to realize the aim.

against nature. The ideals which incited the war have been discovered by a descent, or rather an ascent of man into his own essential being. It is an indisputable fact that mankind has often strayed from the path of progress. It is not necessary for individuals to repeat the abortive experiments of the race. It is not necessary for them to relive what humanity has outlived. Vestigial emotions are harmful to their possessors, and should be inhibited rather than indulged. In the individual recapitulation of race progress many results formerly reached by devious and winding paths are attainable by "short cuts." The duty of education is to help individuals to rewin ancestral successes and deliver them from the necessity of repeating ancestral failures.

When some fortunate experimenter succeeds in making a flying machine, those who follow him will not repeat plans that failed. In making their flying machines they will recapitulate only the successive steps of the triumphant process. The paradoxes of contemporary Rousseauism are due to the fact that its champions ignore this manifest condition of progress. They seem to think that every individual must experiment for himself, precisely as if no one had ever experimented before. Hence they arrest the development of altruistic feeling by persistent appeals to selfishness; they arrest the growth of will by surrender

to native impulse, and they arrest the development of intellect by methods which chain the mind to sense-perception. They announce as a fundamental principle that the development of the individual must repeat that of the race. In practice they repeat nothing but a discarded terminus *ab quo*.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NEW RETURN TO NATURE

WHETHER we are at one or at war with the new return to nature it surely behooves us to try to understand it, and we cannot understand it without some measure of sympathy with its creative impulse.

Emerson tells us that when quite young he was importuned by a valued adviser to respect the dear old doctrines of the church. He replied: "What have I to do with the sacredness of tradition if I live wholly from within?"

"But these impulses from which you live," suggested his friend, "may be from the devil."

"They do not seem to me to be so," answered Emerson, "but if I am the devil's child, I will live then from the devil."¹

This story lays bare the noblest impulse that beats in the heart of the new return to nature. The integrity of the universe seems bound up

¹ Essay on Self-Reliance.

with the integrity of man's instincts. For these instincts are the record of æonic achievement. They prophesy the trend of future achievement. They are powers without whose conspiracy future achievement is impossible. Man's conscious ideals may be mistaken definitions of the cosmic purpose, whereas that purpose itself so far as accomplished is written in his instincts and emotions. To distrust these holy records is to distrust the universe and introduce a fatal schism into our own souls. To give them frank and fearless expression is to avow the cheery faith that we share the impulse by which all things live, and that we are not afraid to trust the honest purpose of the whole. We may not know whither we are going, but we are going with the universe. We should not try to swim against the cosmic stream but strike out boldly in the direction of its main current. Such as we are, nature has made us, or rather we are nature incarnate and should bravely and joyously accept ourselves as her product and revelation.

"We are nature; long have we wandered but now we return. We are each product and influence of the globe. We have circled and circled until we have returned home again. We have voided all but freedom and all but our own joy." ¹

¹ Walt Whitman.

The power and appeal of the pedagogic creed based upon recognition of instinct as the stored-up result of cosmic action, was largely derived from the breadth of its alliances. It must be frankly recognized as the educational application of a fashion of thought—or rather a fashion of feeling—which for several decades exercised compelling sway over many minds. Its source was the evolutionary dictum that all things may be explained by their process of becoming. Caught in the toils of this specious error, men sought for God in the wind, the earthquake, and the fire, and turned deaf ears to the still, small voice which speaks to the listening soul. Through the influence of the same error all customs, traditions, and institutions were interpreted as vanishing expressions of different racial souls. Art was belittled by defining it as mere copy of nature and forgetting or denying its ideal mission “to transmit the highest and best feelings to which men have risen.” Poets and novelists sounded a challenge for “absolute surrender to the manhood current within,” and a vast body of literature was created, whose most “discernible characteristic,” as described by its admirers, was “the movement away from the summits of life downward toward the bases of life; from the heights of civilization to the primitive springs of action; from the thin-aired regions of consciousness which are ruled over by tact to

the underworld of unconsciousness—where are situated the mighty workshops and where toils on forever the cyclopean youth—Instinct.”¹

A friend has related to me a dream which seems almost typical of this attitude of mind.

In her sleep she found herself upon a straight, narrow, uphill path, bordered by white lilies. She climbed wearily, but resolutely, looking neither to the right nor to the left. At last she stood upon the top of a high hill from which she gazed upon the boundless expanse of an emerald sea. Instantly, with the cry “Depth is better than height,” she had plunged beneath its waves.

Depth is better than height—so declared that now vanishing mode of thought which turned its attention away from the sky toward which we strive to the dust from which we sprang; away from ideals to instincts; away from the bitter strife between what is and what ought to be, to the joy of free abandon to native impulse. The master passion of the new return to nature was life. Living was its longing; more life its goal. Man palpitates with energy and there is ruddy blood in his veins. He should not permit his mind to be “sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought” and refusing to torment himself with the mystery of life, should fling himself into the

¹ James Lane Allen.

excitement of living. For what he is the universe has made him, and now he and the universe are journeying together toward some undiscovered and undiscoverable goal.

The ideal incentive of the new return to nature has never been more sympathetically presented than in Whitman's Song of Myself:

Cycles ferried my cradle, rowing and rowing like
cheerful boatmen,
For room to me stars kept aside in their own rings;
They sent influences to look after what was to hold
me.

Before I was born out of my mother generations
guided me,
My embryo has never been torpid; nothing can over-
lay it,
For it the nebula cohered to an orb.
The long slow strata piled to rest it on;
Vast vegetables gave it sustenance;
Monstrous sauroids transported it in their mouths and
deposited it with care.

All forces have been steadily employed to complete
and delight me,
Now, on this spot I stand with my robust soul.

The inspiration of this jubilant song derives from the conviction that each individual is product and epitome of the universe and may therefore dare to trust his robust soul. Such

a feat of daring has been attempted on a colossal scale, and its history is simply the history of the free-play movement in the kindergarten writ large. As that movement started with the demand for free self-expression and culminated in swift surrender to whim and arresting accent upon the motor habits of pre-human ancestors, so the history of the new return to nature throughout its entire sweep shows a rapid regress from civilization to savagism, and from gay conspiracy with cosmic forces to the defiant or abject acceptance of a fated universe. The literature which started with a challenge for surrender to the manhood current within, has ended by creating a disheartening series of pathological personalities and by setting each helpless slave of imperative impulse in surroundings which move to his own destruction "the machinery of his being." The conception of art as representation culminated in representations which prostituted art. The search of nature to find out God resulted in the discovery of blind forces and chance results; and all that evolutionary science can tell us of the future is that whatever matter and motion have done they will surely undo, and what has been evolved is fated to be dissolved. Finally, the racial souls heralded as the ancestors of institutional ideals, have turned out to be themselves mere corollaries of brain structures created by

heredity and transformable only by cross-breeding. Surrender to this fatalistic view of human nature has called forth denials of those cardinal doctrines of Christian democracy which declare the sanctity of the individual and impose upon all men the duty to safeguard the liberty of each. It has fostered an oriental and pagan disregard for the masses of men, degraded humanity from the image of God to an accidental and vanishing type of life, and reduced history to a meaningless tragedy. In so far as its conclusions are accepted life ceases to be worth living. "It is what it ought not to be, and passage from it into nothingness is the only good." Thus, starting with the repudiation of human ideals and the glorification of human instincts, the new return to nature has culminated, like its historic prototype, in a reign of terror. It is burning itself up in the hellish fire it has lighted and may be safely left to the consuming flames of its own dialectic process.

It has been urged as a criticism against Froebel that his studies of childhood were conducted under the incitement of that philosophical presupposition which affirms that in the structure of consciousness must be sought the key to human development, and it has been tacitly claimed as a merit of the child-study movement that the observations of its advocates are made with more

candid and unprejudiced intellects. Either this claim means nothing, or it means that in their own judgment the minds of contemporary child students are unbiased by any presupposition. It may therefore not be superfluous to suggest that a presuppositionless intellect is an impossibility, though it may be freely granted that many an intellect is swayed by presuppositions of which it is unconscious.

The great majority of child students who have conducted examinations and replied to questionnaires, have doubtless done so without a conscious hypothesis as a guide in their investigations. The leaders of the movement, however, have summarized results and formed conclusions under the influence of a series of presuppositions implicit in the general statement that all facts and subjects are explained by retracing their process of development.

It is through the reaction of these presuppositions that attention has been diverted from ideals to instincts and undue accent placed upon heredity and environment.

Kindergartners who wish to choose intelligently between Froebel and his latter-day critics, must therefore face and settle the question whether the process through which a thing has come to be explains what it is or whether each thing is only explained when set in a clear relation to its origin

and goal. Thinkers accepting the former view will not only seek to appease intellect with processes of becoming, but will always tend to emphasize earlier and lower stages of development. Thinkers accepting the latter view, will seek the eternal reality which includes all processes of becoming and will be impelled to the conviction that completely realized self-consciousness is both the origin and the goal of cosmic evolution, and must therefore be the standard which determines the ascent of life. Hence they will be quick to discern in nature a tendency "to develop such beings as possess internality and energize to realize ideals,"¹ and prompt to recognize this immanent teleology as the highest revelation of the doctrine of evolution.

The fundamental tenet of the Neo-Rousseau creed is that instinct strictly defined as "inherited association between stimuli and particular bodily reactions," is the sole and sufficient guide of life. This dogma implies a biologic psychology which holds that mind is conterminous with brain structure and discredits consciousness as an "upstart novelty";² a "provincial oracle";³ a "wart raised by the sting of sin";⁴ a "late, partial and

¹ Psychologic Foundations of Education, William T. Harris, p. 21.

² Adolescence, vol. ii, p. 61.

³ *Ibid.*, Preface, p. vi.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 67.

perhaps essentially abnormal and remedial outcrop of the great underlying life of man-soul." ¹ The outcome of this psychology is that man is a "specialized and partial being," and the human soul "but one of many types of mind in the world"; perhaps a "temporary and accidental form which force or life has taken on"; at best "a transition from a lower to a higher race to be evolved later." ²

To thinkers accepting these conclusions, man, conceived as a self-creative being, able to free himself from the chains of antecedent and environing causation, ceases to exist. The permanent and universal human person is submerged in the causal stream. With this submergence of the human person is sunk the conception of personality as the power whence the universe proceeds; and the social union of all personal spirits as both the

¹ Adolescence, Preface, p. vii.

² "If we had all that our heredity could possibly bestow, we should be but specialized and partial beings. . . . It is not inconceivable that many a species that has become extinct took with it out of the world the promise and potency of a higher psychic development than that of man, but of a radically different type from his. . . . Although the highest being that is, he is perhaps not the highest, or even among the highest, that might have been, to say nothing of what may be in other planets, or that will be in ours. The best and only key to explain mind in man is mind in the animals he has sprung from, and in his own infancy, which so faintly recapitulates them."—*Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 65.

goal toward which it progresses and the eternal reality through which it is finally explained. With loss of divine and human personality the values of life cease to appeal as standards by which to measure education and the chief, if not the sole concern of pedagogics is directed toward "the ways and means of investing man's capital of native instincts."

The pith of all Neo-Rousseau doctrines is that man and the universe are developing through a process of mutual action and reaction but that toward what climax or anti-climax they are moving, we do not and cannot know. The result of their reciprocal action is deposited in and revealed through our basal instincts, and therefore the duty of education is to assure each child free scope for the exercise of every native proclivity.

The pith of Froebelian doctrine is that man and the universe are evolving in a discernible direction toward a definable goal. In a preceding chapter of this book I have described this goal as an infinite community of souls, each of which fulfills itself through communion with all others.¹ Such a goal of the cosmic process implies that the universe is psychical in its nature; that there is kinship between man and the infinite source whence he proceeds, and that since the distinctive

¹ See Chapter II, pp. 63-64.

characteristic of man is self-consciousness, the structure of consciousness and not the basal instincts of men must determine both the subject-matter and the method of education.

The transcendental self-determining energy which achieves and reveals in self-consciousness its own ideal form, is present wherever there is life. This self-determining energy or will created instincts by acting in definite ways. But it did not die when it had made these instincts—neither did it abdicate the throne of life in their favor. It is just as alive, active, and sovereign as it ever was. It is able to modify the instincts which are deposits of its own past deeds. It is able to undo its own past mistakes. Blind in plants, dim of vision even in the highest animals, it achieves eyes in the intellect of man, and thereafter increasingly directs itself through conscious ideals.

In the dark underworld of unconsciousness the cyclopean youth, Instinct, may perhaps toil on forever. But upon the shining heights of life the celestial youth, Divine Humanity, shall hereafter renounce his brute and savage heredity and claim his "heredity from God." He shall repudiate instincts that are evil and get rid of instincts that are outgrown. He shall purge valid instincts of partiality and redeem them from distortion. He shall create new instincts as allies in his struggle

for freedom. All these things, and greater things than these, he shall do through the power of ideals which will be ascending definitions of his own personality and ascending revelations of the Infinite Person from whom he proceeds.

CHAPTER IX

THE INDUSTRIAL PROGRAMME

THE concentric programme was carried into the kindergarten by that tidal wave of Herbartianism which some years since swept over our school system. The free-play programme was the outcome of the child-study movement. It is well to remind ourselves that neither of these now vanishing methods arose within the kindergarten, but were due to the influence of educators not imbued with the ideals of which it is the embodiment. The same fact holds with regard to the living issues to be discussed in this chapter. They have arisen through the pressure of outside influence, and embody theories not only at variance with but destructive of the fundamental principles of Froebel.

As the most rapid approach to the living issues now dividing the kindergarten public, I present a programme published in the Kindergarten Magazine for October, 1907.¹ The most cursory

¹ I present this programme because it illustrates all the fallacies of the industrial kindergarten and because through the pages of the Kindergarten Magazine it reaches thousands of young and inexperienced kindergartners.

glance will disclose the fact that it is concentric in its form, but differs from its Herbartian progenitor by placing its accent upon primitive industries instead of primitive culture products. The correlating center of this programme is the potato, and the exercises for the several days of the week are as follows:¹

I desire to state explicitly that I do not intend to imply that any leading representative of the industrial ideal in the kindergarten would approve of this programme.

As actually carried out in the kindergarten, the industrial ideal assumes many different forms. Some kindergartners merely represent household industries in play. Others actually introduce such industries into the kindergarten, but call for them at comparatively rare intervals and do not make them centers of correlation. It is impossible to describe all shades of opinion and practice. Judging, however, from printed articles and exhibits of kindergarten work, from lectures, and from the kindergarten supplies called for in different cities, the following tendencies would seem to be quite widespread.

1. The tendency to make household industries a part of kindergarten activity.
2. The tendency to supplant play by work.
3. Preponderant appeal to the understanding.
4. Insistence upon functional values.
5. The substitution of constructive work for free self-expression.
6. The too great restriction of kindergarten games to the representation of industrial activities.
7. The elimination of that appeal to imagination through typical acts which is the most characteristic and valuable feature of the Froebelian kindergarten.

¹ The following prefatory note explains the general ideas underlying this programme:

"This subject should begin with the planting of the potato

I. PLANTING OF THE POTATO

The digging and planting of potatoes. Gather them into a pile, load one of the children's wagons, carry them to the cellar of the person to whom the potatoes are to be given, and store them away.

II. BOILING OF POTATOES

(a) Let the children wash and peel potatoes. (b) In the interval of waiting for them to be cooked, feed the peelings to the chickens, or clean a water bottle with some of them by breaking them up and shaking them around in the same with water. This whole lesson can be given in the kindergarten; *but if at the home of one of the children, the potatoes should not be eaten by the children, but the work can be done as a service to the family, though one potato might be tasted.* Enough more than those required for the family dinner should be cooked that a few may be taken to the school for use the next day.

III. FRY POTATOES, USING SOME OF
THOSE BOILED ON THE
PREVIOUS DAY

(In contrast to the lesson of the day before, let this one be given in the kindergarten.)

in the spring. The potato can be harvested in the autumn. As the season of frost approaches the children begin to wear warmer clothes, the leaves to fall, and the family to make its preparation for the winter. At this time let the children inspect their garden and decide upon whom to bestow their crop of potatoes, and then store them away for the winter."—*Kindergarten Primary Magazine*, October, 1907.

(a) Each one can slice one potato, and turn the same into the skillet. (b) While waiting for them to brown, assign different occupations to different members of the group. *Two at a time can watch the potatoes, some set the table and decorate it with autumn leaves, while others put the kitchen corner of the kindergarten into order, sweeping the floor and washing the soiled pans that previously contained their potatoes.* Of course, at least an hour's time is essential to complete this lesson in an orderly way.

IV. GRATING OF POTATOES FOR POTATO PANCAKES

(a) The children grate the potatoes in water. Turn this grated mass into a cheese-cloth bag and squeeze out the water (saving this water with its sediment until the following day). (b) Beat both parts of one egg, pour it into the grated mass, thinning it with a little milk, grease the frying pan, and bake the cakes, letting each one take part. Let this be done as a surprise for one of the teachers, the children presenting them to her. The children, of course, should have a taste. *They should be given time to wash all the dishes and to put everything away.*

V. THE MAKING OF STARCH

This can be done by pouring off the colored water from the sediment left in the pan from the previous lesson. The sediment will prove to be starch. Let the children find this out by the pouring on and off

of clean water till it grows entirely clear. Draw off the last water entirely, and let the starch dry in the sun.

VI. THE DOLLS' WASHDAY

The dolls come to the kindergarten with *their soiled clothes, and the children wash them*. Be sure to have them sort the white and colored clothes and make laundry books. See a more complete description of how to plan this lesson in the kindergarten outline under the subject of water.¹

VII. IRONING DAY

Of course, the ironing of these clothes must follow the washing, and then the dolls can be dressed in their clean clothes and be invited to listen to a story, and look at some appropriate pictures.

See the set of pictures illustrated by Ludwig Richter. There are several drawings consisting of children washing their doll's clothes, and the like. See his *Aus dem Kinderleben* containing twenty-four pictures, songs and rhymes.

In all these lessons while the children are busy with doing, call their attention to the different changes as they occur throughout a complete process. Do not tell them beforehand that the potato contains starch; let the truth present itself. It will be observed that all these miniature science lessons, however, contain a strong ethical value, the children's activity being based upon an inspiration to serve others.

¹ (All italics mine.)

No person imbued with the educational principles of Froebel can read this programme without an immediate perception of the fact that its author has either consciously rejected or unconsciously lost the idea which originally created the kindergarten. As has been repeatedly stated in this book that creative idea was to freight the form of play with the values of life. The characteristic feature of the programme presented is that in it the form of play has been supplanted by the form of work.

To realize the meaning of this transposition we must consider even more carefully than we have done hitherto the respective marks and values of play and work. The characteristic quality of play is that it is an activity which is its own end. It is therefore free to modify or change itself. The following description of a little child's play with her blocks will illustrate this quality of freedom, and suggest its value:

The child sits on the floor and I ask her to make a church like the one she sees pictured in her book. She begins, lays the foundation of the church: a long line of blocks laid straight, with another line crossing the first about two-thirds of its length. Then suddenly her face lights up and she quickly takes more blocks and lays a third line parallel with the second and crossing the long line at one third of its length. "What are you doing that for?" I ask; "I never taught you to make a church with two cross lines."

"Oh, no; I am making an animal," says she, "with a head and a tail and four legs." She has, to my knowledge, never made an animal like this before, and she certainly did not set out to make an animal. It had come to her in her progress with the church that the arrangement might be altered so as to make an animal. That is, her mental picture had come, in her action upon it, especially in laying the cross line of blocks, to be assimilated with her old mental picture of an animal; and forthwith, by the addition of another line like the former, the church turned into an animal. Now this is an invention in the strictest sense. It is peculiar to the child. Who ever before made an animal out of a church? What external influence suggested to the child the similarity between the essential lines of the two objects? What former single mental picture of her own adequately explains this sudden outcome? If none of these, then all the sources are exhausted and we must say that she is an inventor as much as any historical genius is who has enriched the world by his thought.

But now the child does something further; she calls upon everybody in the room to come and see the animal which she has made; she, no less than the first Maker of whom we are told, looks upon the thing which she hath made, and lo! it is very good. And then she amuses herself by making the animal again and again, and saying also, "It is not a church, for a church doesn't have these two ends (the third line across), I have made it into an animal." So—and this is her second invention—she has *changed her thought of herself*. To herself she is now a person who can make animals out of churches. She is in a new sense—or at least from a new point of view—an agent; her

growing sense of her own originality, power over things, freedom to depart from the thraldom of imitation has received an impulse. The next time she comes to play with her blocks the splendid invention of this occasion is full in her mind, and the blocks, together with the suggestions which I make for their use, are to her things for her domineering ego to trifle with, despise, and utilize as never before. She has, therefore, come to a new thought of herself, and this is also a discovery, an invention.¹

Through play the child becomes original and conscious of originality. He feels himself a creative first cause; rejoices in his sense of freedom; and is impelled to further exercise of creative activity. Through the reaction of creative deeds he creates himself as a unique individual. Without this self-creative activity all human beings would tend to become tiresome repetitions of one dull pattern.

In contrast with play, which is its own motive and whose characteristic mark is its freedom to change itself, work is activity directed to the accomplishment of a purpose and its demand is that the worker shall hold himself persistently to his task. In play, activity and end coalesce; in work they fall apart. The accent of play is upon a process of activity; the accent of work upon its prod-

¹ Social and Ethical Interpretations, James Mark Baldwin, pp. 107, 108.

uct. The value of work is that it subordinates the self; the value of play that it creates the self.

Many recent discussions with regard to play and work betray confusion of mind. It is often assumed that the distinction between work and play implies that some activities always preserve the form of play, while others can never lose the form of work. The truth of this assumed implication being denied, an effort is made to remove entirely the boundary line between the two types of activity. It is urged that many games of strength and skill demand a persistent training which is not its own end and reward. Here, therefore, is play turning over into work. Little children enjoy cooking, sweeping, washing, and ironing for themselves and apart from their results. Here is work turning over into play. "Up to the sixth year," writes Miss Dopp, "when the object begins to stand out more clearly in the child's mind, when the inner and the outer begin to differentiate, there is no distinction between work and play."¹ To be sure there are differences in activities very early, but if not fettered by external conditions the activity is equally free play whether it serves the purpose of utility in the sense of the adult; whether it serves the purpose of play, as making a doll's house, or whether it is purely imaginary, as in the case of dramatic play. It is important

¹ Is not the reason for this, that the child never works?

that the child get his full share of each variety of play and that its free character be maintained."¹

The argument advanced is vitiated by the fallacy of the assumption whence it proceeds. The distinction between play and work does not imply that different activities are bound forever to their respective forms. The same activity may take on at one time the form of play and at another the form of work. The difference between activities depends upon the tendency to assume preponderantly one or the other form. Through a tacit recognition of prevailing tendency, the common sense of mankind has relegated some activities to the class of play and others to the class of work. The housemaid who knew she had become a Christian because contrary to former practice she always swept dust from out the corners and from under the bed divined truly the criterion of work. She knew that the purpose of sweeping was a clean room, and that she was the instrument of this purpose.

Activities which offer scope for originality will tend to assume preponderantly the form of play; those which do not permit original action will tend to assume preponderantly the form of work. There is, therefore, a maximum possibility for play in dramatic games and in building and ar-

¹ The Place of Industries in Elementary Education, Katharine Elizabeth Dopp, pp. 116, 117.

range exercises, and a minimum possibility for play in cooking, laundry work, sweeping and dusting. It is true that from time to time little children imitate these several activities for the pleasure of the imitation. Such pleasure, however, must wane with their enforced repetition, and it is impossible to make them integral exercises of the kindergarten without changing play into work. Moreover, it is unlikely that such work will be well done, and therefore its educative value will be lost. To cook coarsely, scrub, sweep, and dust carelessly, wash without cleansing and iron without smoothing is simply to form bad habits and obscure ideals of cleanliness, thoroughness, and refinement.

The argument against making household industries integral parts of kindergarten activity condenses itself into the statement that this cannot be done without entirely revolutionizing the form of that activity. Fairness demands that we should consider the justifying reasons offered for the proposed revolution. The reasons which seem to have had most influence are lucidly and precisely stated by Miss Katharine Dopp in a book entitled *The Place of Industries in Early Education*, and I cannot do better than quote her words:

From the remotest to the most recent times, in the simplest as well as in the most highly organized societies, industry has been a dominant force in the up-

building and maintaining of social structures. In the more simple social groups it is possible to perceive very clearly the fundamental place of industry in society and the vitality of its relation to all other activities of life. In such societies it appears *as the matrix that holds within itself the other interests of life which it nourishes until they become strong enough to support themselves.*¹ . . .

There is a closer relationship than is usually recognized between the activities of the child and the serious activities of society in all ages.² . . .

It is an accepted truth *that those racial activities which are most ancient and most prolonged have had the most potent influence in determining the attitudes of mankind.* Attitudes due to such causes appear earliest, and although they may early be overlaid with more complex habits, they remain strong throughout life; and when, as decay sets in, the more complex habits one by one disappear, *these native instincts reassert themselves and persist till the last.*

There are instincts that have resulted from later racial activities, but their early appearance as well as their permanence is in direct proportion to the remoteness and duration of the activities which produced them. Comparatively recent racial activities certainly operate in determining the attitudes of the child; but they operate not through physical, but through social heredity.

Darwin is a notable example of those scientists who have attempted to explain human emotional attitudes by reference to those of animals. However fruitful such an investigation may be, it seems to promise less

¹ The Place of Industries in Elementary Education, Katharine Elizabeth Dopp, p. 2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

for educational purposes than investigations along racial lines; for it must be remembered that continuity in emotional attitudes can be explained only on the basis of biological function. For this reason education must wait upon biological science until the conditions needed are established, and even then the use of the materials offered is open to the charge of explaining the more clear by the less clear. Until we know more of the consciousness of animals *we are scarcely in a position to make a profitable use of animal psychology in interpreting the activities of the child.*

*When we attempt to interpret the attitudes of the child in the light of the activities of the race there is more hope of success; for the continuity of the biological function upon which the continuity of emotional attitudes depends is assured.*¹

* * * * *

In proportion as society lays hold of instinctive reactions and harnesses them to present social needs the process of education is promoted. The most serious mistake has been the tendency to ignore the *psychical attitudes* of the child by imposing upon him the highly organized products of present social life. It is beginning to be more generally recognized, however, that *education, to be vital, must be grounded deep in physical heredity*, and to be of real social service must be guided and refined in the light of our own highest social ideals. The natural emotional reactions are fixed, and we need not expect any fundamental change. It is the part of wisdom *to build upon*

¹ The Place of Industries in Elementary Education, Katharine Elisabeth Dopp, pp. 61, 62. (Italics mine.)

*this sure foundation, rather than to seek one among the shifting sands of more recent times. The achievements of recent civilization are of value not in determining the foundation, but in fashioning the structure that is reared upon it.*¹

* * * * *

Civilization is only as yesterday when viewed with reference to the long period of human development . . . the deep-seated, permanent, and abiding impulses are the result of racial experiences before man had emerged from the savage stage; . . . later racial activities influence psychical attitudes in a much less permanent way.²

* * * * *

The child lives in the present. He must find his satisfaction in an immediate way. His pleasurable emotions are bound up with his instinctive reactions. Because these reactions have been marked out by the serious activities of the race in its first steps in human progress, because they represent the processes of modern civilization in their most rudimentary forms, they serve to present the educational opportunity for establishing helpful relations between the life of the past and that of the present. By making use of these instinctive reactions it is possible to make a gradual transition from the dramatic and play interests of the child to the more serious interests of the adult.³

* * * * *

The house industries are especially significant with reference to elementary education. They represent

¹ The Place of Industries in Elementary Education, Katharine Elizabeth Dopp, pp. 88, 89. (Italics mine.)

² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 89, 90.

the experiences of the race in industrial activities, whether private or public, through the long ages which preceded the handicraft period. They are important as factors in the shaping of the early forms of our institutions, and give a significance to much that would be meaningless apart from such a relation. They represent the activities which were instrumental in the formation of our *physical coördinations and psychical attitudes*. In relation to the early years of development they are much more important than the industrial activities of later periods, because they correspond more closely to the psychical attitudes of the child than do the activities of later periods. The activities of later epochs are not without their influence in shaping the attitudes of the child, but they operate more through social than through physical heredity.¹

Let us summarize the thoughts presented in these several extracts in order that we may grasp their logical connection and appreciate the pedagogical conclusion to which they point.

I

Industry is "the matrix that holds within itself the other interests of life."

II

The native interests and instinctive reactions of contemporary childhood have been created by the industrial activities of society throughout the ages.

¹ The Place of Industries in Elementary Education, pp. 14, 15. (All italics mine.)

III

"In proportion as society lays hold of instinctive reactions and harnesses them to present social needs the process of education is promoted."
"To be vital education must be grounded in physical heredity."

IV

"Those racial activities which are most ancient and most prolonged have had the most potent influence in determining the attitudes (or instinctive reactions) of mankind."

V

"In relation to the early years of development household industries are much more important than the industrial activities of later periods because they correspond more closely to the psychological attitudes of the child."

The reader will remember that the free-play programme was dominated by the ideal of biologic recapitulation. The salient fact with regard to the plan of education proposed in the extracts quoted is that it deserts biologic recapitulation in favor of historic recapitulation. Its primary assumption is that contemporary mankind can be more adequately explained by human than by

brute heredity. The deeds and expressions of animals and men have made man all he is. The deeds of men have been more influential in shaping contemporary mankind than the deeds of animals. The most ancient and most prolonged racial activities have contributed most to the shaping of man. Primitive activities explain the instinctive reactions of childhood, and education should begin by repeating them. These primitive activities are represented to-day by household industries. Therefore, let little children cook, wash, scrub, sweep, and dust.

These statements bristle with unproved assumptions. Let us begin with the final one. Is it true that all our present household industries correspond with primitive activities? In the mind of any candid person a visit to the St. Louis Fair would have dispelled the idea that this question could be answered in the affirmative. The one fact which glared upon the observer as he walked about among the primitive peoples there assembled was that they washed little and scrubbed, swept, and dusted not at all. Cleanliness in all its forms is tainted with modernity. When, therefore, we insist that little children shall repeat the cleansing processes of contemporary life, what are we doing but "seeking a foundation for education among the shifting sands of recent times?"

We may close our eyes to the inconsistency of the industrial programme, but we must not evade the doubts which assail our minds with regard to the strength of its theoretic foundation. *Can* man be adequately explained either by his brute or human ancestry, or by both conjoined? *Is* industry the fountain source of the arts and institutions of society? The proof offered in support of these assumptions seems to me insufficient. In the final chapter of this book I shall offer an alternative explanation of man, and in the next preceding chapter discuss the relationship of industries to arts and institutions. For the moment I must restrict myself to a series of denials and a brief confession of faith. I do not believe that the psychical attitudes of childhood can be fully explained by physical heredity. I deny the statement that even instinctive reactions have been created solely or chiefly by racial activities of industrial type. I am sure that industry is not "the fountain source of the arts and institutions of society." I conceive man as self-creative energy. I conceive history as the process through which man makes himself actually what from the beginning he is ideally. I recognize in play, art, literature, ethics, and religion, aboriginal expressions of the free human spirit and denying that they are the offspring of industry confess them its progenitors.

Referring the reader to the final chapter of this book for the vindication of my confessed faith, I pass on to consider an additional reason urged for the introduction of household activities into the kindergarten. "The child of to-day," we are told, "has no opportunity to observe or participate in primitive forms of industrial activity and therefore understands nothing that is going on around him." Carpet sweepers conceal what the broom revealed; the machines used in laundry work hide the actual process of cleansing; the sewing machine bars acquaintance with needle and thread; spindle and distaff are instruments unknown. The homemade candle has yielded to the electric light. Vehicles are decreasingly moved by animals and increasingly moved by invisible forces. In short, nothing is done in the direct way that a child can understand. In virtue of human inventions he is born into a wonder-world and lives in a kind of magic dream. To dissolve this dream of magic is a prime duty of education, and the method of accomplishing it is to repeat the stages of the industrial process from "the stage of the hand, through that of the tool, to that of the machine." "The child who has traced the tool from the action of his own body through the varied stages of its development, has felt as he wielded it, the rhythmic movements of economical adjustments. He is now prepared to see how the mechan-

ical principles with which he became familiar in the study of primitive life are utilized by means of better appliances, and how this action which has been rendered rhythmical, and hence automatic, may be handed over to a machine.”¹

Postponing to a later chapter all discussion of the proposed evolution of industries in its relation to the education of older children, let us concentrate our attention upon the demand that little children shall repeat the primitive stage of industrial development, and that one object of the repetition is to deliver them out of a world of magic into a world of comprehended fact. The clear definition of a purpose helps us to decide our own attitude toward it. Let me be entirely frank, and descending at once to the final root of difference between the industrial ideal and the ideal of the Froebelian Kindergarten, confess that I for one have not the least desire to dissolve the dream of wonder in which young children live. “To the child,” says a thoughtful essayist, “the tree and the lamp-post are as natural and as artificial as each other, or rather neither of them is natural but both are supernatural. For both are splendid and unexplained. The flower with which God crowns the one and the flame with which Sam the lamplighter crowns the other are equally of the

¹ The Place of Industries in Elementary Education, pp. 170, 171.

gold of fairy land." ¹ Far be it from me to invade this realm of miracles. Childhood is the age of dreams and one of the greatest of educational offenses is to waken prematurely the dreaming soul.

The method called forth by the industrial ideal involves a persistent and exclusive appeal to the understanding and thereby condemns itself. The reader will doubtless have observed in the potato programme the careful attention given to the connection between potatoes, starch, and laundry work. In another programme by the same kindergarten a similar connection is made between corn, corn-meal, and cooking. Children are sent to search for flat stones; between these stones the corn is ground; finally, a tripod is set up and mush is cooked. It is conceivable that each household industry might be illustrated in similar fashion and doubtless such illustration would conduce to its better understanding. The important questions to consider, however, are the value of this result; the relative value of other educational aims which must be neglected if this one be made paramount, and finally, the adaptation of this particular form of education to the stage of development represented by children between the ages of four and six.

The potato programme must not be dismissed

¹ Heretics, Chesterton.

until the reader has become aware of its labored attempt to justify all exercises by the criterion of immediate utility. Potatoes are dug, loaded on wagons, and carried to the cellar of a chosen beneficiary. They are boiled for a family lunch and made into pancakes as a surprise to the kindergartner. Starch is made for use when the children wash their doll's clothes. This programme, however, covers only an hour of the time spent daily in the kindergarten, and the question arises whether during the remaining period purpose and prose make way for play and poetry. There can be no doubt as to the answer which industrial kindergartners make to this question. Alike in their writings and through their practice they insist that every exercise shall have some functional value, or in other words, that it shall subserve some immediate and conscious purpose. Children make pumpkin pie for Thanksgiving; pop corn for the Christmas tree; make jelly for a sick playmate. They wash and iron their own dusters, towels, and aprons; color the raffia to be used in weaving; make toys they themselves want, or utensils to be employed in household work. Adding the time required for constructive exercises to the time required for gardening and household industries, reserving a half hour for circle games or their substitute, and allowing a brief period for talk or story, the entire three hours the child

spends in the kindergarten are filled to overflowing.

In order that we may understand how radical is the change wrought by the industrial ideal in the form of kindergarten activity, it is necessary that we should contrast the constructive work it calls forth with the Froebelian gift and occupation exercises. The character and value of such constructive work is explained by Miss Patty S. Hill in the following passage from an article on the Relations of the Kindergarten and the Elementary School as illustrated in their exhibits.¹

One can but be impressed with the similarity in the results exhibited from kindergartens and lower grades. We are tempted to criticise this until we read the grade child's account of what he has done, and find that though the manual products are similar, the intellectual content in each case is entirely different. For example, *we see similar cardboard and wooden boxes and trays in exhibits all the way from the kindergarten to the first grade*, their educational value in each grade depending upon the degree of work done *by and for the child*, the amount of originality, preparation of raw material, conscious measurement, etc., demanded. For example, here is a written record accompanying a simple cardboard tray with careful drawings of the same, made by a ten-year-old fourth-grade child. She writes:

"I have made this cardboard tray in school. The

¹ Kindergarten Magazine, October, 1904. (Italics mine.)

material was seven inches square when I cut it, which made forty-nine square inches. I had to use very careful measurements to get it exact, because it is very expensive material and we have to try not to waste it. When we fold it the bottom is three inches square and one inch deep and it contains nine cubic inches. We had to score some lines to turn it over to make it the shape of a box. Its color is green and it looks very pretty. I am going to use it to put my hair ribbons in. They will just about fit in the box, if I fold them carefully, and it is going to come very handy to me."

If the kindergarten child had made this same object, the conscious measurement would have been thought out by the teacher. *She would have prepared the material and thought out the completed object, the kindergarten child probably originating the method of securing this result with the carefully prepared materials placed before him.* The prepared material often hints and suggests processes of construction to the kindergarten child. At first glance this seems quite limiting to the creativity and originality of the kindergarten child, but a deeper study convinces one that even the discovery of processes of making objects which have been planned by the teacher demands quite good ingenuity and originality from a little child.

The gist of this statement is that children may be educated by doing the same things all the way from the kindergarten to the first grade, the educative process consisting in decreasing the amount of work done for the pupil and increasing the

amount done by him. It seems a rather monotonous and dreary plan of development. We may grant the value of a reasonable amount of constructive work when children are sufficiently mature to conceive a product, prepare material and make accurate measurements, but it is beyond dispute that the traditional exercises of the kindergarten are far better for the little child than constructive work, wherein he confessedly carries out a plan not his own with material prepared by his teacher.

The method of Froebel follows the order of psychologic development, and provides for an ascent of activity from physical movement, through symbolic representation and experimental arrangements with unforeseen results to what may be fairly defined as free creation. The little child begins by rolling, swinging, bouncing, whirling, and spinning his ball, and by swinging and spinning his sphere, cube, and cylinder. His pleasure in the first instance is simply in what he is doing. Soon, however, his rolling ball suggests a wheel, his swinging ball a flying bird, and cubes and cylinders begin to be not only themselves but the manifold objects to which their forms bear crude resemblance. Receiving the third gift the child is content for a time to pile its eight cubes in different ways or arrange them in rows of different kinds. He can scarcely arrange them in any way without

their taking forms which will suggest some object he has seen. If he piles them one above the other a word from the kindergartner opens his eyes to see in the unsought result of his activity a tree, a tower, a telegraph pole, or a lamp-post. If he arranges them side by side, he is confronted with a wall, if in two parallel rows, behold the railroad! The change of a single block transforms one of his rails into a short train of cars and quickly the other rail is added to increase its length. Having, as it were, reached these results accidentally the child next directly aims to reproduce them, and thus through the suggestiveness of his material is helped to take the step from experimental arrangement to conscious production. The fact that while intent only on arranging his blocks he produced an object leads him to observe this object more carefully in order to detect its possible transformation into some other object. Through this mutual reaction of process and product he evolves a series of forms. The fourth, fifth, and sixth gifts offer him a larger amount and greater variety of material. In the use of the fifth and sixth gifts, moreover, attention is transferred from the change of one object into another to changes within the object itself. The child now looks at his dwelling house or church to see how it might be improved and through a variety of experimental changes clarifies his own ideas. Having attained this

stage of development he is prepared for the transition from play to work. The stages of his ascent have been from physical movement, through symbolic representation, experimental arrangement, reproduced result, free creation, serial evolution, to the progressive transformation of a single object so that it may more adequately correspond with a self-defining ideal. To expect of little children that they should clearly image an object and go to work and make that and nothing else is to expect an impossibility. Clear images are created through the interaction of process and product. /

Omitting the first two stages which belong to the period of infancy the method of development followed with the kindergarten gifts is repeated in the use of the occupations. In weaving, for example, the child begins with simple combinations of number; discovers patterns as the result of this combination and thereafter through the reciprocal influence of pattern and numerical arrangement creates interesting and beautiful designs. In folding the beginning is made by creasing and bending paper in different ways; these creases and bends suggest simple objects and finally the child folds with intention to make objects. Further illustration is superfluous, and it is hoped that the reader will have observed how exactly Froebel's genetic developing method corresponds with the spontaneous movement of the

child's mind as shown in the play of Professor Baldwin's little girl with her blocks. The many, and I hasten to add, the just criticisms made against the practice of Froebelian kindergartners arose from the fact that ascent in evolutionary processes was too swift, and that this error sometimes led to the imposition of fixed series in lieu of the free production by children of different series. For many years this error has been recognized, confessed, and lamented. It is, however, one thing to renounce an error in practice and quite another thing to throw away a true principle because it has been mistakenly applied.

Thus far we have considered chiefly that type of exercise known in the kindergarten as "making forms of life." Brief attention must now be given to forms of beauty. In the Froebelian kindergarten these forms are the outcome of an effort to make a concrete genetic development of the principles of design. They begin with arrangements in which simple elements are repeated and advance to the evolution of symmetric figures through application of the principle of contrast. They presuppose the theory explained in the second chapter of this book, that "art is play under the influence of the principle of order."¹ They

¹ The Fine Arts, G. Baldwin Brown, p.16. A more adequate statement by the same author is as follows:

"On every grade of his being man possesses an ideal, self-

further assume that this principle of order is native to the human mind and expresses its constitution and that for this reason both primitive men and little children seek spontaneously to make patterns by the rhythmic repetition of simple elements and to create symmetric figures.

It may be cheerfully conceded that in order to realize the ideal toward which forms of beauty aim Froebelian kindergartners need more knowledge and appreciation of art than they possess. Many of them are conscious of defect and are striving to overcome it. But their own insufficiency does not invalidate their argument and the points for which they contend are that there should be a genetic development of the principles of design; that the traditional material of the kindergarten is the best thus far offered for this purpose; and that by means of that peculiar Froebelian device the mediation of opposites, little children are enabled to satisfy far more completely than is possible to their unaided might the deep human impulses of creation and transformation.

determined life existing side by side with, but apart from this life as conditioned by material needs. This life expresses itself in and is nourished by various forms of free and spontaneous expression and action, which on the lower grades of being may be termed simple play but on the higher grades take the shape of that rational and significant play resulting in art." p. 9.

It would be going too far to say that industrial kindergartners entirely repudiate the idea of a genetic development of design. It is, however, undeniable that their insistence upon functional values makes such a development impossible. If children must always make designs as ornaments for some previously constructed useful object, there will be scant time for the evolution of rhythmic patterns or symmetric figures. As a matter of fact the industrial ideal practically eliminates forms of beauty and as the outcome of such elimination banishes from the kindergarten the surface and linear gifts; substitutes plain sewing and weaving for the pattern creating exercises of Froebel; minimizes the production of symmetric figures in paper folding and cutting, and places the accent of the former occupation upon constructing useful objects and the accent of the latter upon forms of life sometimes cut freely and sometimes cut by following outlines drawn by the kindergarten.

The contrasting methods advocated by Industrial and Frobelian kindergartners indicate that one practical issue between them is to be found in the relative stress which they respectively place upon utilitarian and æsthetic ideals. Since the majority of men must depend upon manual skill for a livelihood one duty of education is to prepare them for the practical arts by early training

of the important muscles of the body and by the cultivation of skill of hand and accuracy of eye. Conversely emphasis upon the craftsman at the expense of the man is destructive of the goal of education, which is the emancipation of the individual from the tyranny of his natural and petty self through the revelation of his ideal selfhood. For this reason Froebelian kindergartners deplore the tendency to make industrial aims paramount in education and believe that the accent of the kindergarten should be placed upon the beautiful rather than the useful, upon the embryo artist rather than the embryo artisan. For American children heightened accent upon the fine arts is especially important. Critics of America are constantly pointing out the fact "that her unparalleled achievement in the practical arts has not been accompanied by any serious contribution to literature and art." She produces great inventors and great industrial kings, but she does not produce great poets, great sculptors, great painters, great scientists, or great philosophers. Industrial ideals dominate her mind and compel her energies, and she seems so increasingly given over to the pursuit of wealth and power that one thoughtful observer hesitates not to affirm that "her soul is tending to atrophy and decay and that she is threatened with the danger of producing men who are not spirits but only intelligent machines."

Is it not therefore both wrong and dangerous to increase the sway of utilitarian motives by making immediate utility our standard of value in any grade of education?

Deeper than the issue between utilitarian and æsthetic ideals is the psychologic issue with regard to the order of mental development. It is claimed that historically industry is the fountain source of art. It is also urged that children must have a motive for activity, and that the image of a product is necessary to stimulate interest in a creative process. In direct contradiction of the former claims Froebelian kindergartners believe that historically art preceded production for use and play preceded art; that in the development of the individual this order is repeated and that, in virtue of the revelations of phylogeny and ontogeny, education should begin with self-expressive activity and advance to self-expression controlled by the principle of order. In opposition to the latter claims they insist that children delight in doing for the sake of doing and need no motive for activity save activity itself. The boy who spins tops and bounces balls has no thought of ulterior consequences from his play. The imitation of adult deeds is made by children with no conscious purpose. Building, drawing, painting, modeling may be begun with some thought of their result but alike with the artist and the child there is a con-

stant tendency to forget the outcome of creative action in the joy of creating. To return once more to the procreant thought of this chapter and to the final issue between Industrial and Froebelian kindergartners whenever it is claimed that activity needs an extraneous motive, and when interest in a product is substituted for delight in a process the form of play yields to the form of work. To give work "the right of way" in early childhood is either to ignore or deny the primary revelation of genetic psychology.

The reaction of the industrial ideal upon kindergarten games is scarcely less marked than its reaction upon the gifts and occupations. The most noticeable tendencies of this reaction are to break up the circle into small groups; to encourage the children in these groups to make their own dramatizations; to discourage the representation of any but human activities and among human activities to give preference to those that are industrial in type. In brief, just as the work substituted for gift and occupation exercises circles around human industries so the interest of dramatic games is to center in portraying these industries.

Since what the child imitates he becomes and what he becomes he sees in the world around him, it is evident that by unduly restricting the range

of his imitations we conspire to create in him a narrow and rigid individuality and a limited outlook. The Froebelian kindergarten portrays the activities of the family and civil society, but it also strives to waken the love of country, to quicken some prescient feeling of the meaning of religion and to suggest those wonderful analogies through which nature becomes the poetic interpreter of human experience. Through these varied representations it aids children to create a large, generous, and plastic selfhood and thereby capacitates them for a sympathetic appreciation of the manifold aspects of life. "Above all things," says that penetrating student of child life, Professor Baldwin, "Above all things, fathers, mothers, teachers, elders, give the children room. They need all they can get and their personalities will grow to fill it. . . . Fill their lives with variety, variety is the soul of originality and its only source of supply."¹

The two most characteristic demands of the industrial programme are that children shall repeat primitive industries and shall be told stories about the people who originally created these industries. We have considered the former demand and discovered that by inducing a secession from play to work it not only revolutionizes the kindergarten but puts it out of existence. We must now direct

¹ Mental Development, James Mark Baldwin, pp. 359, 360.

our attention to the second demand, and I shall attempt to show that it leads to the substitution of manufactured stories prosaic in their content and hortatory in their tone for the fairy tales and myths which are the priceless legacy of the childhood of the race to the children of all ages.

"The function of the story," says Miss Dopp, "is to supply the child with racial experiences that will enrich his own more narrow personal experience." Since such stories do not exist they must be written. Those which follow are quoted from Miss Dopp's book, *The Tree-dwellers*.¹

I

A STORY OF LONG AGO

This is a story of long ago.

It will tell you of the first people we know anything about.

It will tell you how they lived before they had fire.

It will tell you how they worked before they had tools.

Many wild beasts lived then.

They were fierce and strong.

All the people feared them.

The cave-bear could strike with his big paws.

The tiger could tear with his sharp teeth.

The rhinoceros could trample one under his feet.

Each animal knew how to do one thing well.

¹ These stories are written for children of six and a half or seven years of age.

But the people could do a great many things.
They could remember, too, what had happened before.

They learned to profit by their mistakes.
You will learn how they became brave and strong.
You will learn how they used their bodies and minds.
They began the work we are doing to-day.
They took the first steps.

People who lived after them were able to do a little more.

The next people could do still more.
Many people have lived and worked since then.
The work they have done helps us to-day.
We have something to do, too.

We can do our part better if we know what others have done.

We can do it better if we learn to use our hands.
We can do it better if we learn to use our minds.
That is why we have this little book.

II

THINGS TO THINK ABOUT

What do you need in order to live?
What do you think that the tree-dwellers needed?

SHARPTOOTH

Sharptooth was a tree-dweller.
She lived a long, long time ago.
She did not have any home.
Nobody had a home then.
People wandered from place to place.
They had no shelter except the trees.
Each night Sharptooth slept in the branches.

Each day she hunted for something to eat.
Sometimes she was very hungry.
She had hard work to find enough food.
She could not go to a store to buy it.
There were no stores then.
She could not buy food of a farmer.
There were no farmers then.
All the plants were growing wild.
All the animals were wild, too.
Sharptooth was afraid of them.
That is why she climbed the trees.

ALONE ON THE WOODED HILLS

Although Bodo¹ was glad to take care of himself,
he often wished that his mother were near.

Sometimes he called to her.

When she heard his call she would answer him.

Then he would swing on the branches until he found
her.

But sometimes she was too far away to hear.

Then he listened in vain for her answering call.

Sometimes it was hard work to keep back the tears.

Once he sobbed so loud that a sleepy bear heard
him.

The bear started up and began to growl.

Bodo hid in the branches of a tall tree.

He stayed there until the bear went away.

Then he was very hungry.

As he started out to find something to eat, he heard
a rustling among the branches.

He listened.

Bodo hoped that his mother was coming.

¹ Bodo is Sharptooth's little son.

But it was only a boy who was hunting birds' eggs.
Bodo watched him climb among the branches.
He watched him suck the eggs that he found.
How he wished that he might find some eggs!
He began to look for some.
In a moment he saw a bird's nest above him.
He climbed up the branch and peeped into the nest.
There were three beautiful eggs.
His eyes danced with joy.
He sucked the eggs.
Then he smacked his lips and hunted for more.

In these stories everything is explained to the child. He is even told why they were written. The tacit assumption is that education must appeal primarily and persistently to the prosaic understanding. Finally, an explicit statement of this assumption is made in the author's comments upon the story of "Bodo Alone on the Wooded Hills."

The portrayal of the situation which caused our early forefathers to rob birds' nests and kill young animals will no doubt shock the sentimentalist who orders eggs or veal as a matter of course. There might be good ground for his feeling were there not present in the child the instinct to do similar deeds even though living under social conditions that do not justify such acts. Anyone who will take the trouble to recall his own childhood, or to make the acquaintance of children of six and a half or seven years, will realize that such instincts are present, and that they must find expression in one form or another. Is it wise to ignore the facts of the case and allow

the child to form the habit of gratifying his blind instincts, or shall we recognize the situation and meet it with all the wisdom at our command? Is it not the better plan to tell the child frankly of the way in which people lived at the time when they did what he would like to do now, and lead him to discover the changes that have taken place that *lead us to disapprove of actions which, under different conditions, were considered good?*¹

It is a bad fault of these stories that they explain everything they tell. It is a worse fault that they leave so much untold. Sharptooth had many experiences which her biographer forgets. There were nights when perched in the trees she looked with wonder at the sky and stars. There were days when something in her stirred uneasily after she had given Bodo an angry whack. One summer morning while washing him in the river she started at his image in the water and was shaken by a strange surmise that the image near his might be her own. Something more than a reverberation thrilled her when from the distance there came to her the echo of her own voice. There were hours of danger, nights of lonely suffering, seasons of death when the mystery which encompasses all life folded her in its embrace and quickened her soul with prescient forebodings. Being human she had the "blank misgivings of a creature moving

¹ The Tree-dwellers, p. 133. (Italics mine.)

about in words not realized." After a while the faint stirrings of her spirit grew stronger in her descendants and began to seek expression in story. Men dreamed of all-conquering heroes and world-exploring wanderers; of ascents into the sky and descents into depths of the earth; of a golden age when secure from danger and blessed with plenty innocent humanity lived in peace and joy. We dream to-day of our own planet subdued, transformed, and idealized; of future converse with intelligent spirits in other worlds; of "a cosmic community living in glad obedience to a perfect moral law." These dreams are our greatest realities because they are the sacred promises of a God whose earthly sanctuary is the human soul. The little child dreams as we do because he, too, is an original fountain of self-creating energy, and from the beginning of life is haunted by presentiments of his nature and destiny. His feeble power of divination needs nurture from the oracles of human imagination. Without fairy tales, myths, legends, fables, poetry, the eyes of the human spirit will grow blind. When this calamity happens to the children and youth of a nation the fate of that nation is sealed. "Where there is no vision the people perisheth."

The purpose of this chapter is accomplished if the reader has been helped to realize afresh "the

deep meaning which lies hid in childish play." Through play we make ourselves. In work we use ourselves. The inspirer of play is poetic imagination; the overseer of work is the prosaic understanding. Bold, free, adventurous, romantic—imagination scales the heights and descends into the depths of our being. Cautious, deliberate, patient—understanding sets its limited and immediate end, and to this end adapts its means. Through the power of imagination we roam through space and time, assume all characters, enter into all lives; share all passions, sympathize with all great ideals and with wondering minds approach the portals of all mysteries. Through understanding we decide how we may most wisely meet the practical emergencies and compulsory duties of life and with firm resolve concentrate energy to the accomplishment of specific purposes. Without the liberating and expanding activity to which imagination invites us, our thoughts would have no range, our hearts no sympathy, and our wills no final end. Without the efficiency with which understanding endows us and the consecration for which work empowers us our far-faring thoughts would lose themselves in the void; responsive sympathies would fail to provoke unselfish deeds, and the final aims of human existence would beckon in vain to our languid wills.

No thinker who understands the complemen-

tary rôles of play and work in the drama of human life will deny the value of either form of activity. But no student of genetic psychology will fail to recognize the priority of play over work in the order of development. Of all children the most unchildlike is the child who does everything for a purpose and to whom everything is explained. For such a child has ceased to wonder and has forgotten how to play.

CHAPTER X

THE SOCIALIZATION OF THE SCHOOL

THE industrial programme has arisen in the kindergarten through the reaction upon that institution of a movement in general education whose avowed aim is the socialization of the school. It would be unjust to the representatives of this movement to hold them responsible either for the interpretations which kindergartners have made of their ideas or for the manner in which they have embodied such interpretations.¹ On the other hand, the attempted revolution of kindergarten practice described in the foregoing chapter cannot be understood until it is connected with

¹ In this connection I desire to say that I ventured to quote from Miss Dopp in the preceding chapter because so far as I am aware she is the only representative of the industrial ideal who has attempted to apply that ideal in detail to the kindergarten. Her book has undoubtedly had much influence in shaping the practice of industrial kindergartners. On the other hand the industrial ideal, as carried out in many kindergartens, betrays the conspiring influence of the Pestalozzi-Froebel House of Berlin. So far as I am able to judge this latter influence was paramount in the programme cited in Chapter IX.

the greater revolution of which it is a phase. In this chapter, therefore, I shall endeavor to present the ideal of school socialization so far as possible in the words of its most eminent representative, and in the following chapter shall discuss its merits.

The purpose of the larger educational movement to which I have referred is to so reorganize the school that "its standards of value may be determined by functional relation to social life." The value of each particular study and the motives in connection with which each study shall be presented are to be measured by the criterion of social utility. The school is or should be a typical community. Its exercises must be planned to meet community needs. This ideal demands that in method accent shall be placed upon constructive activities. It also demands that ethical character shall be developed through the practical challenge of the community life.

Writing in support of this ideal of education Dr. Dewey makes use of the following very pertinent illustration:

I am told that there is a swimming school in the city of Chicago where youth are taught to swim without going into the water, being repeatedly drilled in the various movements which are necessary for swimming. When one of the young men so trained was asked what he did when he got into the water he

laconically replied, "sunk." The story happens to be true; if it were not it would seem to be a fable made expressly for the purpose of typifying the prevailing status of the school as judged from the standpoint of its ethical relation to society. The school cannot be a preparation for social life, excepting as it reproduces within itself the typical conditions of social life. The school at present is engaged largely upon the futile task of Sisyphus. It is endeavoring to form practically an intellectual habit in children for use in a social life which is, it would almost seem, carefully and purposely kept away from any vital contact with the child who is thus undergoing training. *The only way to prepare for social life is to engage in social life.* To form habits of social usefulness and serviceableness apart from any direct social need and motive, and apart from any existing social situation is, to the letter, teaching the child to swim by going through motions outside of the water. The most indispensable conditions are left out of account, and the results are correspondingly futile.¹

The italicized sentence in this statement throws into clear relief the aim and method of the last attempted reform in education. The school is to prepare for social life. The only way to prepare for social life is to engage in social life. In another paragraph of the same article we are told that "apart from participation in social life the school has no end or aim." The hope by which

¹ Ethical Principles Underlying Education, John Dewey, pp. 13, 14. (Italics mine.)

the socialized school lives is the regeneration of our social order. "When the school introduces and trains each child of society into membership within such a little community, saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments of effective self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guarantee of a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious."¹

If the aim of education be to prepare for social life and if this aim can be realized only by engaging in social life, it follows that the school must be transformed into an "embryonic yet typical community." It is matter of familiar knowledge that in the practical attempts to realize this ideal various forms of active occupation have been made the "articulating centers" of school life.² The phrase "articulating centers" is an important one, for it suggests a connection between the method of the socialized school and the core of interest characteristic of the concentric programme. The fact that the new cores or articulating centers are to be active occupations points to an influence from the child-study movement whose most meritorious achievement has been the transfer of interest from the child conceived primarily as a percipient and assimilative being to the child conceived primarily as a self-expressing being. The

¹ School and Society, John Dewey, p. 44.

² *Ibid.*, John Dewey, p. 28.

further course of our discussion will show that in the concentration of school exercises around industrial occupations a noteworthy attempt has been made to overcome the anarchy of unguided self-expression by relating the spontaneous activities of childhood to the values of life. Readers of this book will recognize in such an effort a rediscovery of the method of Froebel. They will also perceive that radical differences in the application of the method imply different appreciations of the several great human values and different conceptions of the child. In the following chapters of this book I shall endeavor to unearth the root of these differences.

Like the original authors of the concentric method the educators who seek to make industrial occupations the "articulating centers" of school life justify their selection of cores by an appeal to the theory of historic recapitulation. In the application of this theory by the two schools of educators however, there is a difference deeper than their agreement. It will be remembered that the "Gesinnungs-Stoff" of the concentric programme was selected from culture products belonging to successive periods of race development which it was claimed repeat themselves in the development of each individual. A change so radical that it can only be described as a revolution, was made when the industries characteristic of

successive periods of history were substituted for culture products. The reasons which it is claimed demand such a substitution are clearly presented by Dr. Dewey in his interpretation of the Culture-Epoch Theory. Quoting the statement of Professor Felmly that "The appropriate food for each of our spontaneous interests is the mass of ideas that engaged the ancestors to whom the instinctive interest is due," he suggests that "the term activities be substituted for the term ideas, or better yet, that the two terms be conjoined."¹ Commenting upon the amended statement he writes as follows:

Whatever words he used, the point is that the interest and instinct correspond not primarily to the *products* of a given age, but to the psychical conditions which originated those products; these conditions secured for the child then he is prepared to deal educatively with the products. When the child is in the "agricultural" stage, it is sheer assumption to suppose that his chief interest is in the literary or institutional products of that epoch; it is also sheer assumption to suppose that this agricultural interest is adequately met on the educational side by allowing it to feed at first on the cultural products of this epoch. It is an interest *which demands primarily its own expression*, and not simply an acquaintance second handed with what that interest effected at some remote period.

¹ Interpretation of the Culture-Epoch Theory, John Dewey, Second Herbart Year Book, p. 92.

The agricultural instinct requires, according to the true analogy, to be fed in just the same way in the child in which it was fed in the race—by contact with the earth and seed and air and sun and all the mighty flux and ebb of life in nature. It requires to be fed by knowledge of how agriculture is *now* carried on, what its products are, how these reach the market, etc. Then the child may be brought into contact with the historical cultural products, and will have some “apperceptive organs” for them, and will be able to use them vitally. I do not say that to give him contact with these products before his interests have found some expression of their own is to give him a stone instead of bread, but it is not too much to say that it is giving him relatively a toy instead of a reality.¹

The ideas which have created the last revolution in education should now be clear. The school is to be transformed into a typical community life. The “articulating centers of this life” shall be industrial occupations. In connection with these occupations the historic development of man is to be recapitulated. Our next task is to apply this conception of the school to the methods and subject matter of education, for the claim is made that by its application to method we solve the question of school *discipline*; by its application to the subject matter of instruction we estimate the rela-

¹ Interpretation of the Culture-Epoch Theory, Second Herbart Year Book, pp. 92, 93.

tive values of the several studies of the school curriculum.

The socialized school seeks to solve the problem of discipline by offering to children opportunity for participation in common productive activities. Dr. Dewey writes:

Order is simply a thing which is relative to an end. If you have the end in view of forty or fifty children learning certain set lessons, your discipline must be devoted to securing that result. But if the end in view is the development of a spirit of social coöperation and community life, discipline must grow out of and be relative to this. There is little order of one sort where things are in process of construction; there is a certain disorder in any busy workshop, there is not silence, persons are not engaged in maintaining certain fixed physical postures, their arms are not folded, they are not holding their books so and so. They are doing a variety of things, and there is the confusion, the bustle that results from activity. But out of occupation, out of doing things that are to produce results, and out of doing these in a social and coöperative way, there is born a discipline of its own kind and type. Our whole conception of school discipline changes when we get this point of view. In critical moments we all realize that the only discipline that stands by us, the only training that becomes intuition, is that got through life itself. That we learn from experience and from books or the sayings of others *only* as they are related to experience are not mere phrases. But the school has been so set apart, so isolated from the ordinary conditions and motives

of life, that the place where children are sent for discipline is the one place where it is most difficult to get experience—the mother of all discipline worth the name. It is only where a narrow and fixed image of traditional school discipline dominates that one is in any danger of overlooking that deeper and infinitely wider discipline that comes from having a part to do in constructive work, in contributing to a result which, social in spirit, is none the less obvious and tangible in form, and hence in a form with reference to which responsibility may be exacted and judgment passed.

The great thing to keep in mind then regarding the introduction into the school of various forms of active occupation is that through them the entire spirit of the school is renewed. It has a chance to affiliate itself with life; to become the child's habitat; where he learns through directed living, instead of being only a place to learn lessons having an abstract and remote reference to some possible living to be done in the future. It gets the chance to be a miniature community, an embryonic society. This is the fundamental fact.¹

A wisely directed participation in industrial occupations not only solves the problem of school discipline but makes possible the unification of all school studies. Upon this subject Dr. Dewey writes as follows:

The unity of all the sciences is found in geography. The significance of geography is that it presents the

¹ School and Society, pp. 30-32.

earth as the enduring home of the occupations of man. The world without its relationship to human activity is less than a world. Human industry and achievement, apart from their roots in the earth, are not even a sentiment, hardly a name. The earth is the final source of all man's food. It is his continual shelter and protection, the raw material of all his activities, and the home to whose humanizing and idealizing all his achievement returns. It is the great field, the great mine, the great source of the energies of heat, light, and electricity; the great scene of ocean, stream, mountain, and plain, of which all our agriculture and mining and lumbering, all our manufacturing and distributing agencies, are but the partial elements and factors. *It is through occupations determined by this environment that mankind has made its historical and political progress.* It is through these occupations that the intellectual and emotional interpretation of nature has been developed. *It is through what we do in and with the world that we read its meaning and measure its value.*

In educational terms, this means that these occupations in the school shall not be mere practical devices or modes of routine employment, the gaining of better technical skill as cooks, seamstresses, or carpenters, but active centers of scientific insight into natural materials and processes, *points of departure whence children shall be led out into a realization of the historic development of man.*¹

In illustration of the method proposed Dr. Dewey tells how the occupations of sewing and

¹ School and Society, pp. 32, 33. (Italics mine.)

weaving may actually be made points of departure for the studies of history and science:

The children are first given the raw material, the flax, the cotton plant, the wool as it comes from the back of the sheep (if we could take them to the place where sheep are sheared so much the better). Then a study is made of these materials from the standpoint of their adaptation to the uses to which they may be put. For instance, a comparison of the cotton fiber with wool fiber is made. I did not know until the children told me that the reason for the late development of the cotton industry as compared with the woolen is that the cotton fiber is so very difficult to free by hand from the seeds. The children in one group worked thirty minutes freeing cotton fibers from the boll and seeds, and succeeded in getting out less than one ounce. They could easily believe that one person could only gin one pound a day by hand, and could understand why their ancestors wore woolen instead of cotton clothing. Among other things discovered as affecting their relative utilities, was the shortness of the cotton fiber as compared with that of wool, the former being one tenth of an inch in length, while that of the latter is an inch in length; also that the fibers of cotton are smooth and do not cling together, while the wool has a certain roughness which makes the fibers stick, thus assisting the spinning. The children worked this out for themselves with the actual material, aided by questions and suggestions from the teacher.

They then followed the processes necessary for working the fibers up into cloth. They *reinvented* the first frame for carding the wool—a couple of

boards with sharp pins in them for scratching it out. They redevise the simplest process for spinning the wool—a pierced stone or some other weight through which the wool is passed, and which as it is twirled draws out the fiber; next the top, which was spun on the floor, while the children kept the wool in their hands until it was gradually drawn out and wound upon it. Then the children are introduced to the invention next in historic order, working it out experimentally, thus seeing its necessity and tracing its effects, not only upon that particular industry, but upon modes of social life—in this way passing in review the entire process up to the present complete loom and all that goes with the application of science in the use of our present available powers. I need not speak of the science involved in this—the study of the fibers; of geographical features; the conditions under which raw materials are grown, the great centers of manufacture and distribution; the physics involved in the machinery of production; nor, again, of the historical side—the influence which these inventions have had upon humanity. *You can concentrate the history of all mankind into the evolution of the flax, cotton, and wool fibers into clothing.*¹

* * * * *

As industrial occupations supply concentration centers for history and science, so taken in connection with these studies they are indispensable prerequisites to the proper appreciation of literature. This relationship is clearly brought out in Dr.

¹ School and Society, pp. 34-36. (Italics mine.)

Dewey's discussion of myths. "It seems to be assumed," he writes "that the myth is a primitive simple product which the mind sheds by a sort of direct radiation, or to mix the metaphor, by spontaneous combustion termed fancy. And that, therefore, there is some special, almost pre-ordained fitness in it for the child. But *naïveté* belongs rather to this view of the myth than to the myth itself. The myth is a complete social product, reflecting in itself the intellectual, the economic and the political condition of a certain people." . . . It is "of permanent value as a story in just the degree to which the child has been led for himself first to appreciate the natural facts and the social conditions which are reflected in it. If he has been led in his nature study to realize the part played by the sun in the economy of life, if he has been led to appreciate the historic condition of people with a precarious relationship to fire, myths of the sun and fire may play a serious and worthy part. Let us treat the intellectual resources, capacities, and needs of our children with the full dignity and respect they deserve and not sentimentalize nor symbolize the realities of life nor present them in the shape of mental toys." ¹

Besides supplying concentration cores for history, science, and literature industrial activities

¹ Interpretation of the Culture-Epoch Theory, Second Year Book of the National Herbart Society, p. 95.

are to be made the "allies of art." The following passage from *School and Society* shows how this alliance is effected:

The expressive impulse of the children, the art instinct, grows out of the communicating and constructive instincts. It is their refinement and full manifestation. Make the construction adequate, make it full, free, and flexible, give it a social motive, something to tell, and you have a work of art. Take one illustration of this in connection with the textile work—sewing and weaving. The children made a primitive loom in the shop; here the constructive instinct was appealed to. Then they wished to do something with this loom, to make something. It was the type of the Indian loom, and they were shown blankets woven by the Indians. Each child made a design kindred in idea to those of the Navajo blankets, and the one which seemed best adapted to the work in hand was selected. The technical resources were limited, but the coloring and form were worked out by the children.¹

Thus far we have considered the plan of making industrial activities the "articulating centers of school life" only from the point of view of the final purpose of education. We must now consider it from the point of view of an effort to mediate between the native interests of childhood and the studies of the school. It is claimed that the "fourfold interests of the child—the interest in

¹ *School and Society*, p. 60.

conversation or communication, in inquiry or finding out about things; in making things or construction and in artistic expression" ¹ are all met by the plan proposed, and that it offers the best connection between his immediate experience and the experience of the race. For his forcible statements of the truths that education must find its point of departure in the native manifestations of childhood and its goal in the assimilation of race experience, Dr. Dewey deserves the thanks of all those who are wrestling either theoretically or practically with the problems of elementary education. Kindergartners owe him a special debt of gratitude for his effectual aid in destroying the prestige of the new return to nature and undermining faith in its golden rule "Give nature her fling." The following extracts from the *Child and the Curriculum* will perhaps sufficiently indicate his point of view:

Abandon the notion of subject matter as something fixed and ready-made in itself, outside the child's experience; cease thinking of the child's experience as also something hard and fast; see it as something fluent, embryonic, vital; and we realize that the child and the curriculum are simply two limits which define a single process. Just as two points define a straight line, so the present standpoint of the child and the facts and truths of studies

¹ *School and Society*, p. 61.

define instruction. It is continuous reconstruction, moving from the child's present experience out into that represented by the organized bodies of truth that we call studies.

On the face of it, the various studies, arithmetic, geography, language, botany, etc., are themselves experience—they are that of the race. They embody the cumulative outcome of the efforts, the strivings, and successes of the human race generation after generation. They represent this, not as a mere accumulation, not as a miscellaneous heap of separate bits of experience, but in some organized and systematized way—that is, as reflectively formulated.

Hence, the facts and truths that enter into the child's present experience, and those contained in the subject matter of studies, are the initial and final terms of one reality. To oppose one to the other is to oppose the infancy and maturity of the same growing life; it is to set the moving tendency and the final result of the same process over against each other; it is to hold that the nature and the destiny of the child war with each other.

If such be the case, the problem of the relation of the child and the curriculum presents itself in this guise: Of what use, educationally speaking, is it to be able to see the end in the beginning? How does it assist us in dealing with the early stages of growth to be able to anticipate its later phases? The studies, as we have agreed, represent the possibilities of development inherent in the child's immediate crude experience. But after all they are not parts of that present and immediate life. Why, then or how, make account of them?

Asking such a question suggests its own answer.

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To see the outcome is to know in what direction the present experience is moving, provided it move normally and soundly. The far-away point, which is of no significance to us simply as far away becomes of huge importance the moment we take it as defining a present direction of movement. Taken in this way it is no remote and distant result to be achieved but a guiding method in dealing with the present. The systematized and defined experience of the adult mind, in other words, is of value to us in interpreting the child's life as it immediately shows itself, and in passing on to guidance or direction.¹

The convictions out of which has grown the effort to socialize the school may be summarized as follows:

I

The purpose of the school is to prepare for social life.

II

Such preparation can only be made by engaging in social life.

III

The school must therefore be transformed into a miniature community.

IV

The articulating centers of life in this miniature community shall be industrial occupations.

¹ The Child and the Curriculum, pp. 16-18.

V

The organization of community life around industrial occupations calls forth methods whose "emphasis is upon construction and giving out rather than upon absorption and mere learning."¹ Through this change of emphasis selfishness is attacked and the spirit of social service developed.

VI

In so far as the spirit of social service is developed and the habit of coöperation formed the problem of school discipline is solved.

VII

Industrial occupations may be so taught that they not only foster the spirit of social service but become the organizing centers of science, history, literature, and art. Hence, in addition to solving the problem of school discipline they unify all branches of school study.

VIII

The point of departure for education must be sought in the native interests of childhood. The goal of education is the assimilation of race experience. "The facts and truths that enter into the

¹ Ethical Principles Underlying Education, p. 15.

child's present experience and those contained in the subject matter of studies" can be connected because "they are the initial and final terms of one reality." The concentration of school life around industrial occupations achieves this connection because while meeting the child on his own plane and responding to the impulses of "saying, making, finding out, and creating" it moves forward from these impulses toward appreciation of the great values of life embodied in the studies of the school.

CHAPTER XI

THE LIVING ISSUE

HAVING listened to Faust's confession of his pantheistic creed Goethe's Gretchen speaks from the depths of her troubled soul:

Das ist alles recht schön und gut;
Ungefähr sagt das der Pfarrer auch,
Nur mit ein bischen andern Worten.

As the Froebelian Kindergartner ponders the ideals which have created the socialized school she finds herself in a state of mind analogous to Gretchen's. For she, too, believes that education should strive to create a nobler social life. She admits a correspondence between the development of the individual and that of the race. She accepts with whole heart the dictum that "the child must be conceived primarily as "an agent or doer."¹ She knows that instincts and impulses must be kept from "discharging at random and running off on side tracks." She wrestled with

¹ Ethical Ideals Underlying Education, Dr. John Dewey, p. 27.

might and main against the free-play programme because it encouraged such "random discharges," and because of its emphasis upon activities which were "symptoms of a waning tendency"¹ and survivals of an outgrown past. Her own most cherished conviction speaks to her in the words: "Guidance is not external imposition. It is freeing the life process for its own most adequate fulfillment."² To her as to the creator of the socialized school the problem of education is to find "the most effective points of attachment between the spontaneous activities of the child and the aims which we expect these powers to realize."³ In her anxious mind the question forms itself, With so many points of agreement why do I so deeply disagree? Are not the ideals of the socialized school, she further queries, the very ideals I learned from Froebel, or do the similar sounding words express a different meaning? Is this different meaning responsible for the practices I cannot approve? Is the explanation of this different meaning to be found in a context of ideas which must modify or rather completely transform every principle which advocates of school socialization seem to hold in common with the founder of the kindergarten?

¹ The Child and the Curriculum, p. 19. ² *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³ Ethical Principles Underlying Education, p. 27.

Many kindergartners are honestly perplexed by these questions. To answer them they must search their own minds and define their points of disagreement with the ideals of the socialized school. May I blaze a rough path for such an exploring party by frankly confessing what I discover as I explore myself?

INDUSTRIES AND LITERATURE

I begin by considering the relationship assumed to exist between industrial occupations and literature. Dr. Dewey seems to hold that the characteristic industries of different periods of history stand in ancestral relation to their culture-products.¹ He claims that the chief value of these products lies in their reflection of natural facts and social conditions. He believes that children must develop apperceptive organs for such products by repeating the industries from which they descend. To borrow his own illustration contact with earth and seed, air and sun, knowledge of how agriculture is now carried on, what its products are and how they reach the market are necessary preliminaries to sympathetic appreciation of the culture products of an agricultural stage of historic development.²

Looking into my own mind I discover that I

¹ See Chapter X, pp. 292-3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 287.

do not share these convictions. I do not believe that industries are the progenitors of culture products. I am sure that the reflection of local and temporal conditions is not the chief value of literature. My most cherished psychologic insight forbids the approach to imagination through the understanding. The elaborate preparation of an apperceiving mass for the seizure and digestion of culture-products seems to me to invert the true order of development whose point of departure is always the typical fact.¹

A simple illustration may help to define my point of view. In the story of David there are details which point to a pastoral stage of development. David is a shepherd lad. He has developed courage by struggling with the wild animals that attacked his sheep. In the lonely watches of the night he has learned to confide in a God who will protect him as he protects his flock. He fights with a shepherd's sling and with five smooth stones carried in a shepherd's bag. These details are picturesque and appealing, and if I may trust my own memories of childhood they can be appreciated without any actual experience of pastoral life. The supreme value of David's story, however, lies not in the coloring of its details by a

¹ See Chapter II, where I have attempted to show that with little children typical facts must be presented in the guise of typical acts.

pastoral experience but in the fact that through a most appealing concrete example it suggests every implication of the highest ideal of heroism. It opposes physical strength and vainglorious self-confidence to the high courage of a believing and ardent soul. Goliath is a giant completely armed. David is an unarmed and tender youth. The former is a braggart who magnifies his own prowess; the latter a hero of faith and humility fighting for the deliverance of his people in the strength of his God. "Come to me," shouts the champion of the uncircumcized Philistines, "come to me and I will give thy flesh unto the fowls of the air and to the beasts of the field." "Thou comest to me," responds the young hero of Israel "with a sword and with a spear and with a shield, but I come to thee in the name of the Lord of Hosts, the God of the armies of Israel whom thou hast defied. This day will the Lord deliver thee into mine hand."

Every effort I make to test the tie between industry and literature confirms my conviction that it is a very slender one. What essential relationship exists between the stories of Boots, Dummling, or Cinderella, and any form of industrial activity? What light is cast by industrial avocations upon the myths of Bellerophon and Horatius, the stories of Daniel and Elijah, or the legends of the Holy Grail? What explanation of

the Oresteia of Æschylus or the Œdipus of Sophocles can be found in the industries of Greece during the lives of these two great dramatists? What clew to the tragedy of Hamlet is furnished by the economic life of England in the Elizabethan age?

The reader who has given careful attention to the fourth chapter of this book will not accuse me of ignoring the connection between literature and life. But *life* and *industry* are not coextensive terms. The spirit of a people or an age is not fully expressed *in* and cannot be adequately interpreted *by* its industries. Every civilization embodies some specific ideal of family life, some peculiar social conventions, some determinate mode of political organization, and some characteristic type of religious dogma and worship, as well as some particular kind or kinds of industry. Its literature mirrors not one but all of the forms in which its spirit has sought incarnation. Hence the literature of an age should not be approached through its industries, but the industries, arts, and institutions of an age may all be approached through its literature.”¹

¹ “There are five or six categories of facts or ideas which are the natural framework and afterwards continue to be the evidences for any civilization worthy of the name. They are language and grammar, religious dogma and worship, literature and fine art, philosophy and science, social organization and political institutions.”—*Taine summarized by*

Not only is the life of each historic people and age to be approached through its literature, but life and literature alike derive their supreme value from the conceptions which they embody of nature, of man, and of the power whence both proceed; or, from an awakened sense of defect in inherited conceptions and a struggle to make clearer and more comprehensive definitions. The culture-products of a constructive age mirror the ideals it is incarnating; the culture-products of a transitional age reflect the problems with which it wrestles. All great historic ideals are partial expressions of generic humanity; all great human problems express the recurrent effort of man to define his generic nature more adequately and to comprehend more clearly its final presuppositions. It is because all true literature reveals mankind to men that the culture-products of each people and each age appeal to all people and all ages.

This insight interprets the permanent interest of the literary products referred to in an earlier paragraph of this chapter. We do not outgrow Boots because the type of character he represents belongs to elect individuals in all ages. "He is the man whom Heaven helps because he can help himself, and so after his brothers try and fail, he

Boutmy—Le Parthenon et le Génie Grec. I quote the passage as translated in *The Athenian Drama: Sophocles, Introduction*, pp. xix, xx.

alone can watch in the barn, and tame the steed, and ride up the glass hill, and gain the princess and half the kingdom.”¹ We can never forget Bellerophon until the progeny of the Chimæra are extinct. Horatius will live so long as brave hearts respond to the call of country. Daniel and Elijah can never die while immortal spirits aspire toward communion with eternal reality; and until we renounce our Christian faith in the infinite worth of each human soul, we shall be spurred to romantic adventure by the example of the Knights of Chivalry.

In the life of mankind as in the lives of individuals there are dramatic crises—periods of transition when “the old order changes making way for the new.” Such a crisis is portrayed in the sublime trilogy of Æschylus whose argument is the deliverance of man from the duty of blood-revenge by the establishment of a great court of justice. The *Oresteia* is “the glorification of Athens—that is, of a truly human civilization,” and to each appreciative reader “the adventures of individual passion will seem as naught beside this colossal type of tragedy whose theme is the destiny of nations.”²

If literature is to reveal mankind to men it

¹ Dasent's *Norse Tales*, Introduction, p. cxliv.

² Journal of Henri Amiel, translated by Mrs. Humphrey Ward.

must not only celebrate human triumphs but unveil the sources of human disaster. All men are "guilty innocents," perpetually betrayed by passion and pride into sins they would never have committed with intent. Of this guilty-innocent humanity the *Cedipus* of Sophocles is the consummate portrait. *Cedipus* solves the riddle of the Sphinx, yet, notwithstanding oracular warning of his impending fate slays his father and marries his mother. The poet psychologizes the old myth by showing that "the soul contains the event that shall befall it." He heaps one dramatic improbability upon another in order to make manifest the profundity of his hero's blindness. Hence the tragedy of the son of Laius is a revelation which forever "confounds the conceit of human self-sufficiency in horror."¹

In contrast with the *Cedipus*, which discloses the fatal outcome of overweening self-confidence, *Hamlet* is a tragedy of the world-order which is perpetually challenging mankind to bring forth greater men by imposing upon existent humanity tasks it is not able to perform. "It is clear," says Goethe, "that in the character of *Hamlet*, Shakespeare meant to represent the effects of a great action laid upon a soul unfit for the performance of it. . . . There is an oak tree planted in a costly

¹ The Athenian Drama: Sophocles, Introduction, p. 1.

jar which should have borne only pleasant flowers in its bosom: the roots expand, the jar is shivered. A lovely, pure, noble, and most moral nature, without the strength which creates a hero, sinks beneath a burden which it cannot carry and must not cast away." ¹

The two insights I have striven to suggest are that the literature of each nation and each age reflects *all* aspects of its life, and that the varied life thus reflected is itself either an approximate embodiment of universal and abiding ideals, or expresses a struggle of the generic spirit to define these ideals more adequately. Manifestly neither the embodied ideals of a constructive age nor the haunting enigmas of an age of transition can be explained by their contemporaneous industries although it may be freely granted that industrial conditions conspire with other causes to create the *Zeit Geist*. In our own days, for example, the nearer intercourse between the East and West brought about by commercial enterprise is inciting a comparison between oriental and occidental ideals of religion, of domestic life, and of political organization, upon whose outcome depends the future of history. Commerce has furnished the occasion for this pregnant comparison, but it neither offers solutions of the questions at issue nor

¹ Wilhelm Meister, Carlyle's translation.

capacitates intellect for their adequate apprehension.

The question as to what constitutes the chief value of culture-products is one of such moment in education that I am unwilling to leave it without some discussion of Dr. Dewey's view of the myth. In a statement already quoted ¹ he affirms that "the myth has permanent value as a story in just the degree in which the child has been led for himself first to appreciate the natural facts and social conditions reflected in it." In another sentence of the article from which this statement is quoted, he says that "it is self-deception to suppose that by some inner affinity between the myth and the child's nature he is being morally introduced *into the civilization from which the myth sprung*, and is receiving a sort of spiritual baptism through literature." Finally, referring particularly to the sun-myth, he tells us that if the child "has been led in his nature-study to realize the part played by the sun in the economy of life, if he has been led to appreciate the historic condition of people with a precarious relationship to fire, myths of the sun and fire may play a serious and worthy part." ²

¹ See Chapter X, p. 293.

² Interpretation of the Culture-Epoch Theory, Second Year Book of the National Herbart Society. (Italics mine.)

I am not sure I understand these statements, for I find it impossible to believe what they seem to imply. I cannot suppose that Dr. Dewey really means that children should translate such myths as those of Herakles, Arthur, or St. George, into poetic portrayals of the conflicts of the sun; should recognize his rays in their invincible weapons, or his noonday splendor in their flaming eyes and streaming locks. But if this be not what he means and if we may tell our cherished myths in simple fashion and without explanation of their solar lineage, how shall we interpret the statement that "myths of the sun play a serious and worthy part in education in so far as the child has been led through nature-study to realize the part played by the sun in the economy of life?"

Waiving these intrusive doubts and confining ourselves to statements whose purport is unambiguous, it is evident that to Dr. Dewey the spiritual baptism of literature means introduction to some local and temporal form of social life and some particular natural environment. The word baptism suggests the thought which lies at the heart of my opposing contention. Baptism is the outer and visible sign of a regenerating agency. The natural man must be made over into a spiritual man, and baptism is the rite under which the church symbolizes this transforming process. The

baptism of literature means that it is one of the conspiring agencies through which the process of regeneration is effected.¹

The prototype of all the heroes of myth is the hero in man. It was heroic man who made the sun battle with night, storm, and eclipse, and who in the victories of the Lord of Day beheld adumbrations of his own conquering career. Having thus idealized natural phenomena by imputing to them human meaning, men promptly forgot the phenomena idealized and the solar substrate of primitive myths remained hidden until it was re-discovered by the modern science of comparative philology. The interest of children in Heracles, Siegfried, and St. George is as unaffected by their solar descent as it is independent of the local and temporal setting of their heroic deeds. The value of myth is that through it deep calls unto deep and man challenges men. Humanity is a hero born to a conquering destiny. It is because myth portrays this hero and foreshadows his victorious career that it becomes for each participant member of humanity a baptism of the spirit and of fire.

In its insistence that the child should be fed with nursery rhymes, fairy lore and myth Herbartianism did its most righteous deed. In its

¹ See Chapter V, Literature and Life. See also in Symbolic Education, Chapters III and IV.

insistence that these culture products should be made cores of interest it committed its great educational offense. With the substitution of industrial avocations for classic stories as the articulating centers of school life, the vices of concentric instruction are increased and its one redeeming virtue lost.

INDUSTRIES AND ART

Literature is not the child of industry. Neither, I hasten to add is art. No "proud utility" gave birth to architecture, sculpture, painting, music, or poetry. Long since wise Herr Teufelsdröckh made the startling suggestion that "the first purpose of clothes was not warmth or decency but ornament," and that "the first spiritual want of barbarous man is decoration." It is interesting to find this suggestion repeated and amplified by that serious economic historian Carl Bücher in his book on Industrial Evolution.

"Industrial activity," he writes, "seems everywhere to start with the painting of the body, tattooing, piercing or otherwise disfiguring separate parts of the body, and gradually to advance to the production of ornaments, masks, petrograms, and similar play-products. In these things there is everywhere displayed a peculiar tendency to imitate the animals which the savage meets with in his immediate surroundings, and which he looks

upon as his equals. The partly prehistoric rock drawings and carvings of the Bushmen, the Indians and the Australians represent chiefly animals and men; pottery, wood-carving, and even wickerwork begin with the production of animal forms. Even when the advance is made to the construction of objects of daily use (pots, stools, etc.), the animal figure is retained with remarkable regularity; and lastly, in the dances of primitive peoples, the imitation of the motions and the cries of animals plays the principal part. All regularly sustained activity finally takes on a rhythmic form and becomes fused with music and song in an indivisible whole.

"It is accordingly in play that technical skill is developed and it tends to the useful only very gradually. The order of progression hitherto accepted must therefore be just reversed: play is older than work; art older than production for use." ¹

Assuming that Professor Bucher has thoroughly verified the facts he presents in support of his statement of the historic priority of both play and art over production for use, we must deny to the educators who make industries the point of departure for art the right to buttress their procedure by appeal to the parallel between the devel-

¹ Industrial Evolution, Carl Bucher. Translation by S. Morley Makett, Ph.D., pp. 27, 28.

opment of the individual and that of the race. From the point of view of historic recapitulation the invented loom and the Indian blanket are not only unnecessary but misleading forerunners of decorative design. Is it not a psychologic error to suppose that the art instinct grows out of the constructive instinct? Is it not a pedagogic blunder to claim that children need a motive for making designs other than pleasure in designing? ¹

The attempt to derive art from industry not only violates the order of history but implies a conception of art which ignores its defining mark. Such a defective conception of art is implied in the following sentence: "Make the construction adequate; make it full, free, and flexible; give it a social motive, something to tell, and you have a work of art." This statement identifies art with picture-writing and fails to recognize that "the distinctive principle of art is order, including under this general term rhythm, measure, proportion, and all those modes of arrangement used by artists which may be summarized as composition." ² A concrete genetic development of the

¹ The children made a primitive loom in the shop; here the constructive instinct was appealed to. Then they wished to do something with this loom, to make something. . . . They were shown blankets woven by the Indians. Each child made a design, kindred in idea to those of the Navajo blankets. See in Chapter X, the context of this passage.

² See the discussion on art in Chapter II of this book.

principles of composition must be included in any valid method of teaching art.

The historic point of departure for the evolution of art is the tattoo, which is a regular pattern pricked over the human body in order to make it more conformable to savage taste. It betrays a love for monotonous repetition which the savage himself does not understand but which is explicable through "the identity in form between the rhythm of his soul-activity and the sense-perception by which he perceives regularity."¹ A similar delight in repetition is shown by every art in the earliest stage of its development. The first musical instruments are gongs, triangles, cymbals, jawbones, and rattles, whose sole purpose is to accentuate rhythmic intervals of time. The first poetry consists of metrical chants and refrains. Man creates art because he desires to reveal and know himself and he enjoys the regular recurrence of graphic elements, musical notes, and verbal phrases, because it corresponds with the primary fact of conscious intelligence which is that it involves a constant return of the self to the self. Art is therefore an aboriginal expression of the free human spirit; it is play or spontaneous activity which imposes upon itself the structural form of human consciousness. Self-consciousness in-

¹ *Psychologic Foundations of Education*, Wm. T. Harris, p. 354.

volves first the ever-recurrent return of the self to the self; second, the antithesis of the self and its object; third, the penetration by the self of its own manifold distinctions. To these several implications of self-consciousness correspond the three great principles of art, regularity or rhythmic repetition, symmetry or balance, and harmony.

Like the savage the young child enjoys percussion instruments and rhythmic phrases and delights in making rhythmic arrangements of buttons, shells, pebbles, or other objects. Both history and child study therefore suggest rhythmic arrangement as the psychologic point of departure for the development of art. We read that

There are nine and sixty ways
Of composing tribal lays,
And every single one of them is right.

There are likewise countless ways of spacing and grouping concrete objects, graphic elements, and freely drawn figures. The primary aim of the art teacher should be to incite her pupils to original discovery of varied rhythmic arrangements. Later the principles of balance and harmony may also be learned through their creative application. In short, through a method of guided self-expression mind and hand may be trained to artistic

creation, and appreciation of the beautiful may be developed.¹

"On every grade of his being," says Mr. G. Baldwin Brown, "man possesses an ideal self-determined life existing side by side with but apart from his life as conditioned by material needs. This life expresses itself in, and is nourished by, various forms of free and spontaneous expression and action, which on the lower grades of his being may be termed simply play, but on the higher grades takes the shape of that rational and significant play resulting in art." We liberate the artist in the soul when we induce the child to impose upon creative activity its own ideal forms.

INDUSTRIES AND HISTORY

As the crowning values of literature and art are destroyed through relating them to industrial avocations, so the eminent meaning of history is lost sight of when spinning, weaving, and sewing are made its "articulating centers." To my mind the most puzzling sentence in *School and Society* is the sentence which affirms "that the history of all mankind can be concentrated into the evolution of the flax, cotton, and wool fibers into clothing." The view of history which this sentence

¹ See *Composition*, Arthur W. Dow. The Baker and Taylor Company, New York.

implies is amplified in the statement that "it is through occupations determined by natural environment that mankind has made its political and historical progress."¹ The pedagogic conclusion drawn is that "industrial occupations shall be made points of departure whence children shall be led out into a realization of the historic development of man."

Any conception which commends itself to honest and earnest thinkers must contain some vital truth. If I am not greatly mistaken the view of history presented owes its power to the fact that it ascends from the idea of extraneous relations between man and the world to the idea of a self-related totality of historic experience. This conception gets rid of two fallacies of thought. It throws away the idea of a fixed environment to which man must adjust himself, and the idea of a predetermined self, i. e., a self in which faculties exist prior to their exercise. History is a process of becoming wherein both man and his world are constantly changing. Combining with his fellows, man makes over his world, and nature is the instrument of his "ever-increasing purpose." Through interaction between the individual, the social whole, and the physical environ-

¹ In order to avoid repeating a quotation given in full in Chapter X, I have ventured to substitute the word *natural* for the word *this*. See Chapter X, pp. 289, 290.

ment, all three are constantly modified. Neither men, societies, nor nature are fixtures. All are fluid, transitive, evolutionary.¹

The new return to nature was dominated by the idea of biologic recapitulation, and its master-word was Instinct. The socialized school is dominated by the idea of historic recapitulation, and its master-word is Purpose. It has been discovered that man has or rather is will. The entity known as consciousness may be fictitious, but the entity known as will is real and in essence is an activity directed toward the accomplishment of ends. For the sake of interrelated ends men act together and use nature as their tool. Through the accomplishment of these ends individuals, societies, and the earth are progressively transformed.

There is great inspiration in the belief that nature and humanity are not made but in process of making, and the interpretation of history as man's continuous creation of himself and his world challenges our gratitude for its service in delivering us from that relic of faculty psychology, the predetermined self, and that relic of mechanical evolution the fixed environment. It is, however, a *non sequitur* conclusion from this con-

¹ For a more adequate presentation of this view of history, see *The Educational Theories of Herbart and Froebel*, Dr. John Angus MacVannel, pp. 102-106.

ception of history that "it is through occupations determined by geographical environment that mankind has made its historical and political progress." Before this conclusion I halt, for I am sure that mankind has made its most notable advances not through purpose and prose but through free self-expression, in play, in love, in art, in literature, and in religion.

In the essays of that most poetic evolutionist, W. K. Clifford, I find a passage giving his view of the way in which "freedom or action from within has effected the evolution of physical organisms. The improvement of a breed," he asserts, "depends upon the selection of sports, that is to say, upon modifications due to the overflowing energy of the organism which happen to be useful to it in its special circumstances. Modifications may take place by direct pressure of external circumstances; the whole organism or any organ may lose in size and strength from failure of the proper food, but such modifications are in the downward not in the upward direction. Indirectly external circumstances may, of course, produce upward changes. . . . *But the immediate cause of change in the direction of higher organization is always the internal and quasi-spontaneous action of the organism.*"¹

¹ Lectures and Essays, W. K. Clifford, vol. ii, p. 293. (Italics mine.) I should prefer to say that ascending changes are due

As sport or quasi-spontaneous activity is the immediate cause of ascending changes in the physical world, so, free activity is the final source of human progress, and as we have seen the order of historic evolution is from play, through art to production for use. Activity for a purpose is historically later than activity which is its own end and reward. Moreover, it is always through activities which are ends in themselves that humanity ascends to higher levels. The fine emotions, begotten of subtle personal relations, quicken the spirit of romance and spur to chivalrous adventure. "Beauty" which "is its own excuse for being" is forever beckoning responsive souls to new heights of life by its more perfect self-revelations. Religion, which is a spontaneous leap of free spirit toward the eternal freedom, augments the energy of intellect and will by its solution of the enigmas of origin and destiny. Out of the romance of love, the delight in beauty, the fervor of moral enthusiasm, and the zest of intellect must be created nobler industries and a higher organization of social and political life. Faust may end his career by draining a marsh but he would never

to the action of life conceived as an energy transcendent of organism. I quote the passage not because it tallies exactly with my own point of view but because I hope it may approximately suggest my point of view to persons holding the tenets of deterministic evolution.

have dreamed of the free man, among a free people, on a free soil, had he not loved Gretchen, wandered through classical Walpurgis Night, been wedded to Greek Helen, and learned from Christianity of that divine grace which his poet creator symbolizes in the vision of the Ewig-Weibliche.

In so far as we comprehend that through the varied forms of free self-expression man mounts from height to height of historic achievement we shall know that not industry but *religion* is the foundation of social life and the creator of civilization. For how can love be joyful, fervent, and faithful if haunted forever by prevision of its own sure and swift extinction? How can great literature and art arise unless man learns to translate aright "the inner meaning of nature and human life?" And how shall he discover this meaning save as he agonizes to answer the questions whence am I, whither go I, and for what reason am I here? The belief that civilization has arisen out of man's struggle to get food, shelter, and clothing is an illusion. It has been created by his passionate quest for God, freedom, and immortality, and its different types are only to be explained by different answers to the haunting questions of human origin, human nature, and human destiny.

I contrast the dominant religion of Asia whose supreme power can tolerate no freedom save its own with the Christian revelation of a loving God,

whose eternal life is persistent communication of His own free being to His creatures. I contrast Nirvana where individuality is forever lost, with the city of God, where individuality is forever established through social communion. I contrast the governments of Asia where the ruler is everything and the people nothing, with the nations of Europe and America where the state is great in proportion to the greatness of its citizens. And, as my mind lingers over these contrasts, I become aware that their final explanation is to be found in the fact that the orient has interpreted nature and human life through the principle of proud and selfish exclusion, while the Christian occident has interpreted both through that participant humility whose root is love. Brahma shares nothing with the ephemeral manifestations of his abiding life. The Christian God yearns to share all He is with His creation, believes that men are worthy to participate in His being, and by the power of divine humility spans the chasm between utter nothingness and eternal perfection.

It is because Asia models her life upon the life of an excluding first principle "that she has despotic governments and caste systems." For the same reason every typical Asiatic is both a slave and a tyrant. The nobleman is a slave to his emperor and a tyrant to his retainers. Each retainer is a slave to his lord and a tyrant to those less in

rank than himself. The lowest man is a tyrant to his wife and children. Nothing is common, not even morality. The meaning of nature and human life, as read by Asia, is that both are arbitrary and vanishing manifestations of a Power which is "infinite, single, eternal, alone." In this answer to the question of origin lies the clew to her history and the explanation of her institutions.

"Blessed are the poor in spirit for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." The humble God who shares His being with His children expects of them conformity to His character. They must believe in each other as He believes in them. They must share with each other as He shares with them. Hence they must accept the truth that in some very deep sense all men are free and equal; must recognize that in virtue of such freedom and equality every individual is sacred; must confess that the effort of all is needed to safeguard the liberty of each, and as the practical corollary of their generous creed must "mutually pledge to each other their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor that they will strive to secure equal and exact justice."

In the convictions which I have briefly summarized is contained the key to occidental civilization. Their inspirer is the Christian religion. They tally with the conception of history as a process

wherein man is making himself and his world. The freedom that they claim for each individual means that every man is a self-making energy. The equality they assume means participation in this energy. The consummation toward which they aspire is a self-related totality or social whole, each of whose members reflects its wholeness and which will tolerate in its physical environment nothing upon which it has not set its own stamp.

In so far as man suspects himself to be a free being he liberates energy and develops wants. "Will the whole finance ministers and upholsterers and confectioners of modern Europe," exclaims Carlyle, "undertake in joint-stock company to make one shoeblack happy? They cannot accomplish it above an hour or two; for the shoeblack also has a soul quite other than his stomach, and would require for his permanent satisfaction and saturation simply this allotment and no more, and no less: God's infinite universe altogether to himself, therein to enjoy infinitely and fill every wish as fast as it rose."¹ This "infinite shoeblack" must learn that his cravings can be satisfied only by the spiritual goods which are infinitely shareable. Meantime, as a by-product of Christianity, we have the marvels of modern in-

¹ Sartor Resartus.

dustry. When man discovered his own infinite nature his wants increased and productive energy rose in its might to meet them. That most careful student of Asiatic civilization Mr. Meredith Townsend reminds us that "Asiatics have halted everywhere in their march toward mastery of nature." . . . "They have treated earth as if they feared it. Dung is burned for fuel above unused coal-bearing strata," . . . and "though Asiatics work in all metals yet from end to end of Asia great stores of iron, of platinum and tin, of copper, silver, and gold lie untouched."¹ Asiatics will never master nature until they learn that they are masters of nature, and they cannot know themselves as masters of nature until they discover themselves as children of God.

Dear lover of playing childhood for whom I write—glad confessor of the faith that "Man made in the image of his Creator must from the beginning be conceived and treated as a creative being"—look into your own consciousness and see if it does not corroborate mine. Recall once more the fact that in the order of historic evolution "play preceded art and art preceded production for use." Remember that in ages beyond the reach of our chronology men dreamed of a man who had triumphed over space and time and

¹ *Asia and Europe*, Meredith Townsend, p. 9.

who was equipped for free activity as even yet industry has not learned to equip her sons. Listen to the roar of the great battles of history from Marathon to Gettysburg and hear beneath their din the music of liberty. Let the great historic individuals whose names humanity cherishes with fondest reverence, march before you in stately procession and as you recognize Confucius, Gautama, Zarathustra, Moses, Isaiah, Christ ask yourself if they do not live forever in men's minds because of their ascending revelations of the truth which makes man free. Summon before imagination the great monuments of history and try to enter into the spirit which created them. Prostrate yourself in the Jewish Temple and confess your most enslaving sin! Lift adoring eyes toward the eternal loveliness enshrined in the Parthenon. Stand in the Roman Forum with head uncovered before the majesty of law. Enter the Pantheon, and lifting your eyes toward its wonderful dome reflect that as each stone is supported and protected by all the rest, so the freedom of each individual must be established in and through his relationship to the social whole. Last of all kneel in a great Gothic cathedral and feel divine love reaching downward to your nothingness and striving to lift you into the blessedness of its communion. Then shall you, too, confess with fervor that "history is the progress of

man into the consciousness of freedom," and that the stages of historic progress are defined by the knowledge that "*One* is free; that *some* are free; that *all* are free."

INDUSTRIES AND SCIENCE

We have considered the results which flow from the attempt to make industries "articulating centers for literature, art, and history. There remains the consideration of their relation to science. In this case the connection is a more valid one. The principles of physics may be illustrated through the machinery of production; chemistry may be approached through cooking exercises; botany through agriculture and horticulture; and natural history through care of domestic animals. On the other hand the method of scientific study illustrated in *School and Society* is open to two serious criticisms. The first is that children between the ages of eight and twelve are not capable of making the wide syntheses which it demands. They cannot intelligently trace the "effects of a mechanical invention upon modes of social life," neither are their minds capable of a process of unification including "the study of fibers, of geographical features, the conditions under which raw materials are grown, the great centers of manufacture and distribution, the phys-

ics involved in the machinery of production.”¹ Such large unities belong to the period of maturity not to the period of childhood. The second criticism is that following this method we lose all possibility of a scientific evolution of the sciences. For to teach a science according to scientific method involves first, individual observation of its typical facts; second, discovery of the relations subsisting between these facts; and, finally, insight into the principle which unifies these relations. The method illustrated in *School and Society* is so busy with the relationship of each subject to every other that it cuts itself off from the consideration of any particular subject as a self-related whole.

MERIT AND DEFECT OF THE SOCIALIZED SCHOOL

The socialized school made a memorable contribution to scientific pedagogy in its effort to guide the spontaneous activities of childhood toward the corresponding values of life. It has, however, undone its own best deed by assigning paramount value to human industries and by its attempt to make industries “articulating centers for science, history, literature, and art.”

In defense of its procedure the socialized school invokes the principle of historic recapitulation. I

¹ See Chapter X of this book, pp. 291, 292.

have tried to show that the principle invoked condemns its procedure. It may be conceded that each science is related to a corresponding art, but it must never be forgotten that the final spur of scientific activity is the search of a causative agent for a causality akin to its own. Literature and the fine arts are projections of a spirit which reveals in order to discover itself. The first book of human *history* as opposed to human *annals* was written when a great people awakened to the consciousness of freedom. Greece refused the tribute of earth and water demanded by the Persian king, and the father of history celebrated the immortal deeds which followed hard upon her high defiance. Science, literature, art, and history are all revelations of the free, self-creating, self-defining activity of the human spirit. It may be added that lacking free activity man could never have developed and organized industries, but must have remained forever "a root-digging, fruit-eating animal."¹

The condensed result of our critical discussion is that the methods of the socialized school have been vitiated by an erroneous view of the process of historic development. This misleading interpretation of history in turn has apparently been provoked by the conviction that the sole aim of the

¹ *Industrial Evolution*, Bucher, p. 29.

school is to prepare for social life, combined with a conception of social life whose almost exclusive emphasis is upon the relationship of the individual to the economic organization. It is true that in theoretic presentations of its ideal we are told that the school should prepare not only for industrial activity but for membership in the family and the state. Even in these theoretic presentations, however, the ideal of economic efficiency is paramount, and in practice it becomes not only paramount but almost exclusive of other aims. The result is that the socialized school fails to make adequate provision for the "things fertile of distinctive individuality." In the choice of subject matter preference is given to industries and applied science. In method the preponderant appeal is to dry and frigid understanding. In character the qualities most valued are "force, efficiency in execution, initiative, insistence, persistence, courage, and industry."¹ The man whom the socialized school aims to produce is the worthy and efficient member of a developing industrial organization. Gazing upon his portrait we understand the process proposed for his creation:

We are in the midst of a tremendous industrial and commercial development. New inventions, new machines, new methods of transportation and intercourse

¹ Ethical Principles Underlying Education, p. 29.

are making over the whole scene of action year by year. It is an absolute impossibility to educate the child for any fixed station in life. So far as education is conducted unconsciously or consciously on this principle, it results in fitting the future citizen for no station in life, but *makes him a drone, a hanger-on, or an actual retarding influence in the onward movement. Instead of caring for himself and others he becomes one who has himself to be cared for.* Here, too, the ethical responsibility of the school on the social side must be interpreted in the broadest and freest spirit; *it is equivalent to that training of the child which will give him such possession of himself that he may take charge of himself; may not only adapt himself to the changes that are going on, but have power to shape and direct those changes.*¹

¹ Ethical Principles Underlying Education, p. 12. (Italics mine.)

I hope my readers will understand that I am not attacking the need of that form of education which prepares for industrial efficiency, but that I am questioning whether this form of education should be given paramount value in our elementary schools. Dr. Dewey tells us that "hardly one per cent of the entire school population ever attains to what we call higher education; only five per cent to the grade of our high school; while much more than half leave on or before the completion of the fifth year of the elementary grade."—*School and Society*, p. 42. It seems to me a great mistake to lose our short opportunity of helping children to create a larger personality and therefore a richer life, by concentrating our attention upon preparing them for industrial efficiency. As a recent article in the Outlook points out, "An education which trains men only to make a living and does not fit them to make a life would sap the very sources of inspiration and make a monotonous workshop of the modern world."

"Consider the ant," says a brilliant contemporary essayist, "Consider the ant and beware of her. She is there for a warning. In universal anthood there are no ants. From that fate may men save man."¹ The condemnation of the socialized school is that its practice "engenders indistinction." If a nation be great in proportion to the greatness of its individuals then one aim of education should be to liberate all forms of spiritual energy, to accentuate the idea of personal distinction, and to cultivate not only practical intelligence and efficiency but fine perception, sensitive feeling, delicate and discriminating taste, prescient imagination and rational insight. Such an education will have in view not only or chiefly the efficient member of a developing industrial system but the statesman, the poet, the artist, the spiritual seer, and the philosopher. May it be in part because education has been overzealous to give practical knowledge that America is failing to produce her quota of great individuals.

The dominance of industrial ideals has not only reacted unfavorably upon the school curriculum but has also created a false conception of school discipline. I agree with Dr. Dewey that "order is simply a thing which is relative to an end." The kind of order enforced will therefore depend

¹ A Modern Symposium, G. Lowes Dickinson, p. 156.

upon the end set. If the aim of the school be to prepare for social life and if participation in social life be construed to mean efficient coöperation with the economic organization then, manifestly the school must be transformed into an embryonic community of industrial type and its order will be the order of a busy workshop. But if the functions of the school are to endow the individual so far as possible with the experience of the race and to make him master of the instrumentalities through which he may increasingly assimilate this experience, then its discipline must conform more nearly to that sanctioned by the best tradition.

There is one feature connected with the substitution of the order of the workshop for the order of the traditional school which has not received sufficient attention. In the actual workshop there is work which must be done, and the workmen are there to do it. This work is not for their development. They labor for the sake of a product and the great lesson they learn is that of self-subordination. In the socialized school, on the contrary, "the typical occupations followed are freed from all economic stress," and "the aim is not the economic value of the products but the development of social power and insight."¹ In other words, the order of the workshop is dissociated from the

¹ School and Society, p. 32.

purposes of the workshop; is, therefore, not relative to its own end and losing this relation cannot be maintained.

One of the most valuable lessons of history is the ruin which results when one institution borrows the form and usurps the function of another. The socialized school borrows the form and usurps the function of civil society and thereby condemns itself. Civil society is the institution through whose organizing agency each individual profits by the labor of the social whole and in return contributes to the whole his mite of service. The principle of this great institution is economy. Human power is economized through the specialization of vocations. By making it possible for each individual to do something which in virtue of natural aptitude he can do rapidly, easily, and well, the amount of production is increased and the drudgery of life diminished. Furthermore, specialized vocations increase the dependence of each individual upon all others and thereby contribute to the solidarity of society. The educational influence of participation in the activities of civil society is very great, but it is dependent upon the existence of actual duties and genuine responsibilities. When the school models herself upon the economic organization she does its educational work badly and minimizes her ability to do her own.

THE METHOD OF FROEBEL VERSUS THE METHOD
OF THE SOCIALIZED SCHOOL

If the questioning kindergartner for whom this book is written has followed me as I have explored my consciousness, she should now be aware of the contrast between the method of Froebel and the method of the socialized school. The reason for this contrast should also be apparent to her mind. Both forms of education accept as their point of departure the spontaneous activities of childhood. Both confess that from among such activities those which relate to the values of life must be selected. The procedure of the socialized school, however, is dominated by the assumptions that all man is, he has made himself in and through the historic process and that the "articulating centers" of this process have been industrial avocations determined by geographical environment. Recapitulating this process it seeks to relate literature, science, art, and history to industries. The method of the traditional kindergarten, on the contrary, presupposes that both the great human values and the manifestations of childhood which point toward them, are primal outpourings of the free human spirit.

The kindergartner who participates in this insight will reject the idea that children need extraneous motives to induce them to dance and

sing, play dramatic games, string beads, arrange pebbles or tablets; build, draw, paint, model, investigate, or listen to fairy tales. Her aim will be to call forth the varying forms of self-creative activity; her emphasis will be upon the artist as opposed to the artisan; her supreme desire will be to stir those primal affections which are the emotional equivalents of our religious, ethical, political, and æsthetic ideals, and the characteristic feature of her method will be appeal to imagination through typical acts, facts, characters, relations, and processes.¹

- In so far as the methods of the socialized school have reacted upon the kindergarten they have resulted in the substitution of work for that mediatorial activity wherein the form of play is freighted with ideal values. They have likewise substituted appeal to understanding for appeal to imagination, and they have galvanized into spasmodic activity the moribund theory of concentration. The living issue between kindergartners is whether the influence of these reactions shall persist. The indications are that their prestige is waning and that their hour of prevailing vogue draws to its close.

¹ See Chapter II.

CHAPTER XII

THREE WORLD VIEWS

IN that great soul drama which faces all the problems, wrestles with all the doubts, and battles with all the sins of the modern world there are two contrasting passages whose structural significance escapes the notice of many readers. The first is the soliloquy in which Faust, immediately before signing his compact with the devil, curses the whole world-order, and as the climax of his blasphemy curses patience most of all. The second is the passage in which the aged Faust, reconciled to the world-order, denounces the impatient and inconsiderate deed through which Baucis and Philemon lost their lives, and shakes himself forever free from the toils of Mephistopheles. Between the curse directed against an arbitrary and malignant universe, and the denunciation of a deed done in violation of the nature of an altruistic universe, the poem runs its redeeming course.

The curse upon the world-order follows the scene in which Faust makes a last vain struggle to hold his faith in God. As the result of all his

study he has come to the conclusion that nothing can be known. Therefore, the loves, the hopes, the aspirations of life are lying dreams. With inexorable logic Faust curses hope, for there is nothing to look forward to; curses faith, for there is nothing to be believed; and curses patience most of all, for why should man, the conscious and suffering product of an unconscious universe, submit patiently to the stings and arrows of his outrageous fortune?

The mental attitude of imprecation is frequent in contemporary literature. To give only a single example the following passage from Maeterlinck's *Life of the Bee* reads almost like a repetition of the curse of Faust. "Human consciousness is probably the most surprising phenomenon this world contains. It is this which permits us to raise our head before the unknown principle and say to it: What you are I know not, but there is something within me that already enfolds you. You will destroy me, perhaps, but if your object be not to construct from my ruins an organism better than mine, you will prove yourself inferior to what I am and the silence which will follow the death of the race to which I belong will declare to you that you have been judged. And if you are not capable even of caring if you be justly judged or not, of what value can your secret be? It must be stupid or hideous. Chance has enabled

you to produce a creature that you yourself lacked the quality to produce. It is fortunate for him that a contrary chance should have permitted you to suppress him before he had fathomed the depths of your unconsciousness; more fortunate still that he does not survive the infinite series of your awful experiments. He had nothing to do in a world where his intellect corresponded to no eternal intellect, where his desire for the better could attain no actual good."

This passage states the haunting issue in men's souls with the greatest precision. Man is conscious. If there be no eternal consciousness to which his consciousness corresponds, he is an outcast of the universe.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURALISM

"I have swept space with my telescope," says Lalande, "and found no God." The picture which materialistic science unveils before the mind's eye is that of a chance and purposeless process. "While the embryo of a new world is being formed from a nebula in one corner of the vast stage of the universe, another has condensed into a rotating sphere of liquid fire in some far-distant spot; a third has already cast off rings at its equator which round themselves into planets; a fourth has become a vast sun whose planets have formed a secondary retinue of

moons." Thus are the worlds born but they are born only to die, for "after a while the frozen moons shall fall onto their planets; the planets onto their suns. Two distant suns perhaps already stark and cold rush together with inconceivable force and melt away into nebulous clouds, and such prodigious heat is generated by the collision that the nebula is once more raised to incandescence and the old drama begins again."¹

The universe thus described is a mad dance; a nauseating whirl from nothingness to nothingness. Our earth is one of the partners in its backward and forward swing, and upon its surface life in all its stages enacts a monstrous drama. In the plant world individual is arrayed against individual, species against species, and scarcely a speck of earth can be found where warfare is not as ceaseless as it is cruel. In like manner every animal preys upon other animals and is in turn preyed upon by creatures frenzied with the blind struggle for life. Moreover, with sensibility is born malignant passion and the mad dance of stars and planets, the mad slaughter of the vegetable world begins to feel itself in the animal world as lust, hatred, cruelty, revenge, and murderous impulse. Human history presents a spectacle of similar malignity and futility. Its incitements are fated

¹ Haeckel, *The Riddle of the Universe*. Translated by Joseph McCabe, pp. 72, 73.

emotions and fated ideas for every feeling which stirs the human breast, "every decision at which mankind have arrived and every consequent action which they have performed was implicitly determined by the quantity and distribution of the various forms of matter and energy which preceded the birth of the solar system."¹ The outcome of this fatal history is a common grave for the successive races and nations which for a brief hour strut across earth's tragic stage. "Final wreck and tragedy," says Professor James, "is of the essence of scientific materialism as at present understood. The lower and not the higher forces are the eternal forces or the last surviving forces within the only cycle of evolution which we can definitely see."²

THE REACTION AGAINST NATURALISM

Against final wreck and tragedy the human mind rebels, and alike in contemporary novels and essays and in contemporary psychology and philosophy may be discerned the effort of thought to free itself from the disheartening conclusions of materialistic science. The novelists who a few years ago could portray nothing but the fatal conflict of blind passions, and some of whom, carried away by their interest in instinct preferred ani-

¹ The Foundations of Belief, Balfour, p. 20.

² Pragmatism, William James, p. 105.

mal to human heroes, are now depicting men and women who take their "fighting chance" and with resolute will attack hereditary evil. Essayists are writing of individual and national *purposes* as opposed to individual and national *impulses*. Science suspects that natural selection cannot fully account for evolution, and that in attempting to explain the history of the organic world we must give due weight to the action of human and animal intelligence. Psychology discovers that in virtue of "the part played by voluntary attention in volition a belief in free will and purely spiritual causation is still open to us."¹ The conviction gains currency that the atoms out of which science evolves the universe are nothing but naïve projections of man's own sensations, and that its assumed unknowable force is a projection of his blind will. Thought shifts its center of gravity from the outer to the inner world and once again makes man "the measure of all things." A cheering revival of faith, hope, and courage begins to make itself felt. The essayist, who incontestably interprets most sympathetically the consciousness of his contemporaries, justifies this revival by the following reasons:

We are just at the moment when a thousand new reasons for having confidence in the destinies of our

¹ Talks to Teachers, William James, p. 191.

kind are being born around us. For hundreds and hundreds of centuries we have occupied this earth; and the greatest dangers seem past. They were so threatening that we have escaped them only by a chance that cannot occur more than once in a thousand times in the history of the worlds. The earth still too young was poisoning its continents, its islands, and its seas before fixing them. The central fire, the first master of the planet, was at every moment bursting from its granite prison; and the globe, hesitating in space, wandered among greedy and hostile stars ignorant of their laws. Our undetermined faculties floated blindly in our bodies, like the nebulae in the ether; a mere nothing could have destroyed our human future at the groping hours when our brain was forming itself, when the network of our nerves was branching out. To-day the instability of the seas and the uprisings of the central fire are infinitely less to be feared; in any case it is unlikely that they will bring about any more universal catastrophes. As for the third peril, collision with a stray star, we may be permitted to believe we shall be granted the few centuries of respite necessary for us to learn how to ward it off. *When we see what we have done and what we are on the point of doing*, it is not absurd to hope that one day we shall lay hold of that essential secret of the worlds which, for the time being, and to soothe our ignorance (even as we soothe a child and lull it to sleep by repeating to it meaningless and monotonous words) we have called the law of gravitation. There is nothing mad in supposing that *the secret of this sovereign force lies hidden within us or around us within reach of our hand*. It is perhaps tractable and docile, even as light and electricity; it is per-

haps wholly spiritual, and depends upon a very simple cause which the displacing of an object may reveal to us. The discovery of an unexpected property of matter, analogous to that which has just disclosed to us the disconcerting qualities of radium, may lead us straight to the very sources of the energy and life of the stars; and from that moment man's lot would be changed and the earth, definitely saved, would become eternal. It would, at our pleasure, draw closer to or farther from the centers of heat and light; it would flee from worn-out suns and go in search of unsuspected fluids, forces and lives, in the orbit of virgin and inexhaustible worlds.¹

Hope revives "when we see what we have done and what we are doing." The most characteristic feature of contemporary thought is the transfer of attention from instinct to will, from human passions to human purposes. Singularly enough there seems a lack of agreement as to what these purposes should be. The end of man is assumed to be action. But action itself needs a final end and what this final end should be our prophets seem not to know.

"The golden rule is that there should be no golden rule." Into this pointed epigram Mr. Bernard Shaw condenses the result of a fashion of thought which, while recognizing human volition, tends to disparage human reason by conceiv-

¹ The Double Garden, Maurice Maeterlinck, pp. 341-344. Translated by Alexander Teixeira de Mattos. (*Italics mine.*)

ing it as nothing but a weapon forged by will for the accomplishment of its blind purposes. We cannot depend upon any of our present moral imperatives because they represent "merely temporary adaptations made in the struggle for existence." "The will of man is forever outgrowing his ideals, and therefore conformity to them is constantly producing results no less tragic than those which follow the violation of ideals which are still valid."¹ Men "ought to be as careful how they yield to a temptation to tell the truth as to a temptation to hold their tongues"; and as for women, "the desirability of their preserving their chastity depends just as much on circumstances as the desirability of taking a cab instead of walking."² The taking of life is a frequent duty. The hereditary criminal "is a coil of wild serpents which seldom are at rest with each other, thus singly they depart to search for prey in the world."³ He should be put out of existence through love for the beyond man toward whom life is striving.⁴

¹ Ibsen, Bernard Shaw.

² *Ibid.*

³ Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche, p. 46.

⁴ "The rôle, then, of those whom our plan would eliminate consists of the following classes of individuals *coming under the absolute control of the state*; idiots, imbeciles, epileptics, habitual drunkards, and insane criminals; the larger number of murderers; nocturnal housebreakers, *such criminals, whatever their offense as might through their constitutional organization appear very dangerous*; and, finally, criminals who might

As defective organization makes life worthless, so hopeless disease makes it a prolonged misery. The responsibility of ending it may be freely assumed by individual physicians and nurses. The Ten Commandments have not only budged but toppled to pieces, and as we learn from one of the most widely read novels of the hour "*La vraie morale se moque de la morale.*"¹

In so far as the adaptive ingenuity with which it is proposed we should replace "our conventional morality" sets itself any ends, these ends seem to be the preservation of healthy human life and the improvement of the human brain. "Believe me," says the spokesman of the new ideal in Maeterlinck's drama of Monna Vanna, "believe me nothing is worth a life that one saves; all the virtues, all the ideals of man, all that he calls honor, fidelity, and the like, seem but a child's game in comparison."² "Life," declares the hero of Mr. Shaw's drama, *Man and Superman*, "is a force which has made innumerable experiments in organizing itself . . .

be adjudged incorrigible. Each individual of these classes would undergo thorough examination, and only by due process of law would his life be taken from him."—*Heredity and Human Progress*, by W. Duncan McKim, M.D., Ph.D., p. 192. (Italics mine.)

¹ The Fruit of the Tree, by Edith Wharton.

² Monna Vanna, translated by Alexis Irénée Du Pont Coleman, p. 24.

the mammoth and the man, the mouse and the megatherium, the flies and the fleas, and the fathers of the church, are all more or less successful attempts to build up that raw force into higher and higher individuals, the ideal individual being omnipotent, omniscient, infallible, and withal completely, unilludedly self-conscious; in short, a god." ¹ With this effort of life mankind must conspire. "Liberty is no longer catholic enough," and hereafter "men will die for human perfection to which they will sacrifice all their liberty gladly." ² The way to create this human perfection is by getting "better births and a better result from the births we get," ³ and "any collective human enterprise, institution, movement, party, or state is to be judged as a whole and completely, as it conduces more or less to wholesome and hopeful births, and according to the qualitative and quantitative advance due to its influence made by each generation of citizens born under its influence toward a higher and ampler standard of life." ⁴

I have tried to indicate as briefly as possible the more marked tendencies of contemporary literature. Their point of departure is a transfer

¹ *Man and Superman*, pp. 113, 114.

² *Ibid.*, p. 110.

³ *Mankind in the Making*, H. G. Wells, p. 30.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 19. The same ideal is presented in a novel by this author entitled *The Food of the Gods*.

of interest from instinct to will conceived as free and indeterminate. Their point of arrest would seem to be the repudiation of "absolute standards and eternal values." Intellect is conceived as the tool of a sovereign though rather blind energy of volition. This energy must perforce act, but the brains it has thus far created are able to conceive with clarity only proximate ends. It will therefore concentrate effort upon improving the instrument of intellection, will frankly recognize that the purpose set involves "a transvaluation of all moral values," and will relegate final problems to the greater humanity it aspires to create. When it has made superman, possibly, he may know what is worth doing.

Each age has problems peculiar to itself. Its solutions of these problems are reflected in its literature and later interpreted by its philosophy. Feeling, action, imagination, and discursive reflection must always outrun philosophy, because philosophy is consciousness exploring, inventorying, organizing, and explaining its own content. The philosophy which most nearly interprets the content of much contemporary thought is beginning to be generally known as Pragmatism.¹

¹ I do not mean to imply that Pragmatism indorses all the subversive opinions which have found expression in literature. It is, however, undoubtedly attacking the same problems as contemporary literature and making *analogous* though not *identical* solutions.

PRAGMATISM

In his Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology Professor Baldwin defines Pragmatism as "the opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following maxim for attaining clearness of apprehension: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

Strictly speaking the above definition applies only to the *pragmatic method*. It is vindicated by the fact that it was as a method alone that pragmatism made its modest *début* upon the stage of thought. The word Pragmatism Professor James tells us, "was first introduced into philosophy by Mr. Charles S. Peirce," "who in an article entitled *How to Make Our Ideas Clear*" pointed out "that our beliefs are really rules for action," and urged "that to develop a thought's meaning we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce."¹ "To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object," adds Professor James, "we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what

¹ Pragmatism, William James, p. 46.

sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.”¹

In brief, the *pragmatic method* is that which tests ideas by their consequences. Its Achilles tendon is that it lacks any criterion by which to test these consequences themselves. Professor James admits that pragmatism has to postpone dogmatic answer with regard to the truth of any form of religion because pragmatists do not “yet know certainly which type of religion is going to work best in the long run.”² But how can a consistent pragmatist *ever* know what religion will work “best?” Upon his own principle who or what shall decide that “best” whose working is the criterion of selection? Lacking an eternal and absolute standard for the “Best” he can never know the true. Neither, it may be added, can he know the good, and hence his estimate of moral values must be as shifting and uncertain as his estimate of religious values. Is he not in the same case with our literary prophets who, sure as they are that “the end of man is action,” seem unable to find for action any final and consistent ends?³

¹ Pragmatism, p. 47.

² *Ibid.*, p. 300.

³ The doctrine (Pragmatism) appears to assume that the end of man is action. . . . If it be admitted, on the contrary,

A dilemma so obvious as the one suggested could not fail to escape the notice of pragmatists themselves. Its solution has been attempted by the extension of pragmatism from a method of philosophic procedure to a theory of truth. As a method, pragmatism asks what will work? As a theory of truth it is the conviction that ideas become true in so far as they accomplish the work of uniting new experience with old. "Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally."¹

This instrumental theory of truth was reached, as Professor James points out, by generalizing the process through which men settle into new opinions. "The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new experience that puts them to a strain. Somebody contradicts them; or in a reflective moment he discovers that they con-

that action wants an end and that that end must be something of a general description, then the spirit of the maxim itself, which is, that we must look to the upshot of our concepts in order rightly to apprehend them, would direct us toward something different from practical facts, namely, to general ideas."—*Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, by James Mark Baldwin.

¹ Pragmatism, William James, p. 58.

tradict each other; or he hears of facts with which they are incompatible; or desires arise in him which they cease to satisfy. The result is an inward trouble to which his mind till then had been a stranger, and from which he seeks to escape by modifying his previous mass of opinions. He saves as much of it as he can, for in this matter of belief we are all extreme conservatives. So he tries to change first this opinion, and then that (for they resist change very variously), until at last some new idea comes up which he can graft upon the ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance of the latter, some idea that mediates between the stock and the new experience and runs them into one another most felicitously and expeditiously."

"The new idea is then adopted as the true one. It preserves the older stock of truth with a minimum of modification." . . . The most violent revolution in an individual's beliefs leave most of his old order standing. . . . New truth is always a go-between, a smoother over of transition. It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity. . . . The reasons why we call things true is the reason why they are true, for to be true means only to perform this marriage function."¹

Justice to the pragmatic conception of truth

¹ Pragmatism, pp. 59-64.

demands explicit recognition of the fact that man is conceived not as its sole creator, but only as one of the participant agencies in its continuous creation. This limitation of man's creative function redeems the pragmatic doctrine from the reproach that it destroys all objective standards. Reality exists; it is "something resisting yet malleable."¹ This resisting yet malleable reality consists of "the flux of our sensations . . . the relations that obtain between our sensations or between their copies in our minds,"² and, finally, of "the previous truths of which every new inquiry must take account."³ According to pragmatism man is "pent in . . . between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from the past and the coercions of the world of sense about him."⁴ He feels the "immense pressure of objective control."⁴ On the other hand "in our cognitive as well as in our active life, we are creative. We add both to the subject and the predicate part of reality. The world stands really malleable waiting to receive its final touches at our hands. Like the kingdom of heaven it suffers human violence willingly. Man *engenders* truths upon it."⁵

Not only are such truths as we possess man-made, but man might have made quite other

¹ Pragmatism, p. 258.

² *Ibid.*, p. 245.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 244.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

truths. Common sense, for example, means in philosophy the "use of certain intellectual forms or categories of thought."¹ These categories or "fundamental ways of thinking about things are discoveries of exceedingly remote ancestors which have been able to preserve themselves throughout the experience of all subsequent time."² . . . "Like our five fingers, our ear bones, our rudimentary caudal appendage, or our other vestigial peculiarities, they may remain as indelible tokens of events in our race history. Our ancestors may at certain moments have struck into ways of thinking which they *might conceivably not have found*. But once they did so and after the fact the inheritance continues. When you begin a piece of music in a certain key, you must keep the key to the end."³ The categories of common sense are merely working hypotheses. They seem, moreover, to be products of our psycho-physical organisms, for we read that "were we lobsters or bees it might be that our organization would have led to our using quite different modes from these of apprehending our experiences. It might be, too (we cannot dogmatically deny this), that such

¹ Pragmatism, p. 171. The following enumeration of these categories is given on p. 173. Thing; The Same or Different; Kinds; Minds; Bodies; One Time; One Space; Subjects and Attributes; Causal Influences; The Fancied; The Real.

² *Ibid.*, p. 170.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 169-70.

categories unimaginable by us to-day would *have proved on the whole as serviceable for handling our experiences as those which we actually use.*"¹

The net outcome of the pragmatic doctrine is that "to an unascertainable extent our truths are man-made products."² The "trail of the human serpent," as Professor James himself declares, "is thus over everything."³ "The question What is *the* truth? is no real question (being irrelevant to all conditions) . . . the whole notion of *the* truth is an abstraction from truths in the plural, a mere useful summarizing phrase like *the* Latin language, or *the* law."⁴ "The true, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving."⁵

With the dissolution of the right and the true into the expedient the accord of pragmatism with the spirit of contemporary literature becomes evident. Into the lineage of both enters the presupposition that truth conceived as correspondence with eternal reality is nonexistent, and this, for

¹ Pragmatism, p. 171. (Italics mine.)

Professor Schiller seems to me rather more respectful to our actual categories than Professor James. He says: "I have faith that the process of experience that has brought us to our present standpoint has not been wholly error and delusion and may on the whole be trusted."—*Humanism, Preface*, p. xix.

² *Ibid.*, p. 242.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

the excellent reason that there is no eternal reality with which to correspond.

With the emergence of this presupposition into clear consciousness pragmatism becomes not only a method for testing the validity of ideas and a genetic theory of truth, but also a hypothesis with regard to the structure of the universe. Briefly stated this hypothesis is that the universe is still in the process of making; that it has alternative possibilities, and that its future is not assured. It has no will of its own. Tennyson's confession "Our wills are ours to make them thine" has no longer any meaning. As we substitute truths in the plural for "Truth with a big T and in the singular," so we must substitute wills in the plural for one eternal and absolute will. As has been already said pragmatism "postpones dogmatic answer with regard to the subject of religion," because it is not yet certainly known "which type of religion will work best in the long run,"¹ but the sympathies of pragmatists are with "the view that the universe is ultimately a joint-stock affair."² "The only obvious escape from paradox," writes Professor James, "is to cut loose from the monistic assumption altogether and to allow the world to have existed from its origin in pluralistic form as an aggregate or collection

¹ Pragmatism, p. 300.

² Humanism, F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., Preface, p. xx.

of higher and lower things and principles rather than an absolutely unitary fact."¹

The salvation of this adventurous universe is uncertain. It has, however, "a fighting chance" of safety.² The condition of its safety is that "each several agent does its own 'level best.' . . . It is a social scheme of coöperative work genuinely to be done."³ Pessimism holds that the salvation of the world is impossible. Optimism declares it inevitable. Pragmatism rejects both optimism and pessimism in favor of meliorism or the doctrine that salvation is possible, but not assured.⁴

As salvation is possible but not certain so (in the opinion of Professor James) it is partial.⁵ He gives up "the claim of total reconciliation."⁶ I can believe, he writes, "in the ideal as an ultimate, not as an origin, and as an extract not the whole. When the cup is poured off, the dregs are left behind forever, but the possibility of what is poured off is sweet enough to accept."⁶ "The way of escape from evil," according to his doctrine, "*is by dropping it out altogether, throwing*

¹ The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 132.

² Pragmatism, p. 292.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 285.

⁵ He says that on this subject he cannot speak officially as a pragmatist.

⁶ Pragmatism, p. 296.

*it overboard and getting beyond it, helping to make a universe that shall forget its very place and name."*¹

Pragmatism sounds a clarion call. Its universe with a fighting chance stirs the blood and makes the nerves tingle. It restores to man the dignity of freedom. The pragmatist has awakened from the nightmare of naturalism. He knows that "life is not the mere rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago."² He believes that in "our voluntary life things are really being decided from moment to moment"; he is convinced that these decisions have momentous consequences and therefore once again "life and history tingle with tragic zest."³ But has he spoken the solvent word? Is his world of plural truths, plural wills, and plural possibilities the world in which we actually live? I think not.

ORIENTAL RELIGIONS AND MODERN PHILOSOPHIES

We have all heard that history is philosophy teaching by example. It may be claimed that it is likewise psychology teaching by example. As we study it we learn how the human mind develops. One of its surest revelations is that this develop-

¹ Pragmatism, p. 297. Author's italics.

² Briefer Psychology, William James, p. 238.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 237, 238.

ment is vortical in form and that thought is perpetually tracing, ascending, and widening circles, which correspond with the lower and smaller circles of earlier periods.

It has been recognized by many thoughtful students of contemporary science that its solution of the universe as the ephemeral manifestation of a single, persistent, and unknowable force is closely akin to the religious doctrines of farther Asia. This kinship is more clearly defined in the statement that conclusions reached by Asia through the intuitions of feeling and imagination are reaffirmed by science upon the plane of the conscious understanding. A single passage from the Bhagavad Gita or Sacred Lay will suggest the characteristic tenets of the great Oriental Creed:

The high-minded, inclining to the nature of the gods, worship me with their hearts turned to no other object, knowing me to be the imperishable principle of all things. There exists no other thing superior to me. On me is all the universe suspended as pearls on a string. I am the savor in the waters, and the luminous principle in the moon and sun, the mystic syllable, Om in all the Vedas, the sound in the ether, the masculine essence in man, the sweet smell in the earth, and I am the brightness in the flame, the vitality in all beings, and the *power of mortification in ascetics*. . . . I am the eternal seed of all things that exist. I am the intellect of those beings which possess intellect, the strength of the strong. . . . I am

*the lust in all beings which is prevented by no law. And know that all dispositions whether good, bad, or indifferent proceed also from me.*¹

It is impossible to mistake the sense of this passage. Brahma is the characteristic quality in each thing. He has no distinctive quality of his own. In him are obliterated not only all physical, but all moral distinctions. He is ascetic mortification, and he is lust. All dispositions whether good, bad, or indifferent proceed from him. As we learn from another passage of the same lay, "He is the same to all beings and has neither foes nor friends." "Even if one who has led a very bad life worships me," says Brahma (or Vishnu), "he must be considered a good man for he has judged aright."

It is characteristic of this ancient faith that it seeks deliverance not through moral action but through the extinction of thought. The devotee we are told practises devotion in the following way: "Holding his body, head, and neck all even and immovable, firmly seated regarding only the tip of his nose and not looking around in different directions, the devotee should remain quiet with passionless soul. Thus he attains the supreme extinction and is conjoined with Brahma."²

¹ Bhagavad Gita, p. 52. Translated by J. Cockburn Thomson. (*Italics mine.*) Vishnu speaks in this quotation as Supreme Being identical with Brahma. ² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

The three characteristic tenets of the great oriental creed are one unity; indifference to moral distinctions; and the goal of extinction. The revival of these three tenets in the creed of naturalism is too patent to require illustration. All students of the scientific thought so popular within the past fifty years are familiar with Herbert Spencer's many formulations of the doctrine of a single persistent force as the final cause and explanation of the world. "The one fact," he tells us, "which underlies all experience as its necessary presupposition is a single great force." This force is unknowable. It is in all things, but revealed by none: It "wells up in man under the form of consciousness," but this form is as ephemeral as any of its other forms. Like old Proteus it takes on all shapes but abides in none. Humanity is only one of its vanishing embodiments. Therefore conscious individuality is an accident. Free will is an absurd illusion. Every human action was predetermined before our solar system was born. All life is misery and the one hope of man is extinction of the will to live. The ablest statement of this naturalistic creed is that of which Goethe makes Mephistopheles the exponent.

Believe me who for many a thousand year
The same tough meat have chewed and tested,
That from the cradle to the bier
No man the ancient leaven has digested.

Trust one of us, this whole supernal
Is made but for a God's delight!
He dwells in splendor single and eternal,
But *us*, he thrusts in darkness out of sight,
And *you* he dowers with day and night.

It has been necessary to renew our appreciation of the old thought which the world has so recently revived and outgrown in order to understand the great change which is even now going on immediately around us. For, precisely as naturalism revived the intuitions of Brahmanism and Buddhism upon the plane of the understanding, so contemporary pragmatism is reaffirming the characteristic tenets of the religion variously known as Dualism, Mazdaism, or Zoroastrianism.

The most characteristic fact about this ancient religion is its renunciation of unity and its setting up of distinction. This distinction seized originally as an antithesis of light and darkness develops gradually into an antithesis of good and evil. Two rival powers, Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu, are at work in the world, and each man must choose with which one of them he will conspire. A few passages from the Zend-Avesta will show how the world is parceled out between them:

The first of the good lands and countries which I, Ahura Mazda, created, was the Airyana Vaego by the good river Daitya.

Thereupon came Angra Mainyu, who is all death,

and he counter-created by his witchcraft the serpent in the river, and winter a work of the Daevas.

The second of the good lands and countries which I, Ahura Mazda, created, was the plains in Sughdha.

Thereupon came Angra Mainyu, who is all death, and he counter-created by his witchcraft the fly Skaitya, which brings death to the cattle.

The third of the good lands which I, Ahura Mazda, created, was the strong holy Mouru.

Thereupon came Angra Mainyu, who is all death, and counter-created by his witchcraft sinful lusts.¹

So the enumeration proceeds through many creations of Ahura Mazda and counter-creations of Angra Mainyu. Ahura makes a beautiful land which Angra curses with "stained mosquitoes." Another good land is brought forth and followed by counter-creation of the sin of pride. A number of good lands are created and instantly succeeded by counter-creations of excessive heat, witchcraft, unbelief, and different dreaded illnesses.

No alert mind can ponder these creations and counter-creations without becoming aware of two facts. The human mind had become aroused to distinctions in both the material and spiritual worlds. By some of these distinctions it was attracted, by others it was repelled. The men who created the Zend religion did not like winter, flies,

¹ Sacred Books of the East, vol. iv, pp. 4-6.

stained mosquitoes, witchcraft, pride, lust, unbelief, or oppression by foreign rulers. So they lumped all these undesirable things together and branded them as creations of Angra Mainyu who was all death.

The consciousness out of which the Zend-Avesta sprang has its crudest analogue in such questions as "Why did God make flies and mosquitoes?" A more dignified example of this mental attitude is given in the following poem of William Blake:

Tiger, tiger, burning bright
 In the forests of the night,
 What immortal hand or eye
 Could frame thy fearful symmetry?
 * * * * *
 In what distant deeps or skies
 Burns the fire of thine eyes,
 On what wings dare he aspire?
 What the hand dare seize the fire?
 * * * * *
 What the hammer? What the chain?
 In what furnace was thy brain?
 What the anvil? What dread grasp
 Dare its deadly terrors clasp?
 * * * * *
 When the stars threw down their spears
 And watered heaven with their tears
 Did He smile His work to see?
Did He who made the lamb make thee?
 * * * * *

Tiger, tiger, burning bright
In the forests of the night,
What immortal hand or eye
Dare frame thy fearful symmetry?

As I have said this poem suggests the state of mind out of which sprang the religion of the Zend-Avesta. Men had become so keenly aware of the dark side of life that they could no longer believe in a single power as the source of all things. This dark side of life includes the baffling phenomena of nature, the problems of pain and sin in their relation to the individual, and the many seeming tragedies of human history. The creators of the Zend religion faced the darkness of life with quickened intelligence and quickened courage, and out of dauntless hearts answered the challenge of evil with the assertion that they would fight it. This is their great deed. They will not sit down, look at the end of their noses and say Om. They will not seek peace in extinction. Granted that Ahura Mazda is not all powerful. He is, nevertheless, locked in deadly combat with Angra Mainyu. They incline to the belief that he will be victorious. But whether victory or defeat await him, they will help him in his fight.

Like its religious prototype pragmatism has arisen out of an honest and resolute grapple with the enigma of evil. The revelations of science shroud this enigma in deeper mystery. The phi-

philosophy of naturalism conspicuously fails to explain it. Idealism seems to make the absolute responsible for it and such a solution repels the moral consciousness. Better no Creator than an immoral Creator. Better a plural and insecure universe with a "fighting chance" for getting rid of evil than a universe wherein the existence of evil is permitted because "it enriches the life of the absolute first principle."

The deliverances of both Professor James and Professor Schiller make evident the fact that they understand this immoral doctrine of evil to be characteristic of the philosophy of absolute idealism. "Under the auspices of the Hegelizing idealists," writes Professor Schiller, "Philosophy has uplifted herself once more to a metaphysical contemplation of the absolute, of the unique whole in which *all* things are included and transcended. Now, whether this conception has any value for metaphysics is a moot point on which I have elsewhere expressed a decided opinion; but *there can hardly be a pretense of denying that it is the death of morals.* For the ideal of the absolute whole cannot be rendered compatible with the antithetical valuations which form the vital atmosphere of human agents. They are partial appreciations which vanish from the standpoint of the whole. Without the distinctions of good and evil, right and wrong, pleasure and pain,

self and other, then and now, progress and decay, human life would be dissolved into the phantom play of an unmeaning mirage. *But in the absolute all moral distinctions must, like all others, be swallowed up and disappear.*¹ In even more emphatic protest Professor James writes as follows:

It is perfectly safe to say now that if the Hegelian gnosticism which has begun to show itself here and in Great Britain were to become a popular philosophy, as it once was in Germany, it would certainly develop its left wing here as there and produce a reaction of disgust. Already I have heard a graduate of this very school express in the pulpit his willingness to sin like David, if only he might repent like David. You may tell me he was only sowing his wild, or rather his tame oats, and perhaps he was. But the point is that in the subjectivistic or gnostical philosophy oat-sowing, wild or tame, becomes a systematic necessity and the chief function of life. After the pure and classic truths, the exciting and rancid ones must be experienced; and if the stupid virtues of the philistine herd do not then come in and save society from the influence of the children of light, a sort of inward putrefaction becomes its inevitable doom.²

Evidently both the authors quoted sincerely believe that the absolute of Hegelian idealism is

¹ Humanism, F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., pp. 2 and 3. (*Italics mine and the capitals of the original mostly changed to "lower case" letters.*)

² The Will to Believe, by William James, pp. 171, 172.

a kind of Brahma in whom all distinctions even those of good and evil are transcended, and they rightly prefer Ahura Mazda and his age-long conflict with Angra Mainyu. Their interpretation of absolute idealism seems strange to one who, like myself, has learned from its study that "the whole search of philosophy is for a distinction that will hold,"¹ and who seems to herself to have found that abiding distinction in an eternal personality. I have attempted to state as briefly as possible the tenets of naturalism and pragmatism. I shall now endeavor to present with equal brevity the insights of absolute idealism as I understand them.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

The fundamental presupposition of this philosophy is that the final explanation of the universe must be sought in a completely realized self-consciousness. It seems to me a significant fact that underlying every practical issue discussed in this book has been some theory of self-consciousness which attacked either its priority, its value, or its actual existence. It will be remembered that Herbart defined the Ego as "a result of presentations which unite and interpenetrate one another." For Herbart, therefore, "the

¹ Dr. Harris.

self is a composite," and "consciousness not the condition, but rather the resultant of ideas which are primarily forces."¹ By the leader of that child-study movement whose educational outcome was the free-play programme, consciousness was hypothetically conceived as "a wart raised by the sting of sin," "a product of alienation," or "a remedial process." The greatest interpreter of pragmatism is persuaded "that breath moving outward between the glottis and the nostrils" is "the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known as consciousness. That entity," he adds, "is fictitious while thoughts in the concrete are fully real."²

Denying the fundamental postulate of idealism the philosophies referred to are naturally hostile to a method of education which is intrinsically related to the idealistic view of the world. In this intellectual hostility lies the final explanation of the several attempts made to revolutionize the kindergarten. Conversely the final justification of the traditional kindergarten is impossible unless the idealistic philosophy be the most adequate statement of truth thus far achieved by human reason.

¹ The Educational Theories of Herbart and Froebel, by John Angus MacVannel, p. 69.

² Does Consciousness Exist? Prof. William James, *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, September, 1904, p. 491.

It must be granted that many interpreters of idealism have aided to bring their fundamental postulate into disrepute by assuming that the perfect self-consciousness "includes all individual selves." As has recently been pointed out by a thoughtful writer such inclusion of individual selves in a common consciousness "is one instance of that fertile source of philosophical error—the misapplication of spatial metaphors." "Minds are not Chinese boxes which can be put inside one another."¹ . . . "To talk of one self-conscious being therefore as including or containing in himself or being identical with other selves is to use language which is wholly meaningless and self-contradictory, for the essence of being a self is to distinguish one's self from other selves."² In my judgment it is in virtue of the fact that so many idealists have been betrayed by this "spatial metaphor" that their explanations justify the strictures of Professor James and Professor Schiller.

"Mind is communicable but not divisible." It cannot be described as having "parts" or being made up of "elements." The human soul is not a "part" of God. It is not an "element" in God. It is not an "aspect" of God. It is not a "fragment" of the self-consciousness of the Ab-

¹ H. Rashdall, *Personal Idealism*, p. 388.

² *Ibid.*, p. 388.

solute. What then is it and how is it related to its creative source? The answer to this question which I accept is that each human soul is a duplicate of the self-determining form of the divine self-consciousness.

The distinctive characteristic of self-consciousness is subject-objectivity. The self makes itself its own object. In this act of self-objectification intellect and will are conjoined. The self objectifies itself. This is an act of will. It recognizes itself in its object. This is an act of intellect. The self-objectification and self-recognition are not two acts but one act having two phases or aspects.

When we attempt to explain to ourselves this self-objectifying act, we realize that it involves not only the objectification of determinations but the objectification of *self-determining energy*. If the thoughts of God are deeds, then nature is the drama of those deeds, and with the arrival of nature at living beings the process of self-objectification reaches that dramatic moment when it objectifies its own free self-making energy. Thenceforward, free energies must make themselves.¹

Without pausing to consider the bearing of this insight upon the nature of living, but non-human

¹ The attentive reader will soon realize that I am stating a theory of creation which must be amended.

beings let us ask what it means as related to the nature and destiny of man and what light it casts upon the character of God.

The first insight which suggests itself is that the objectification of the divine self-determining creates noumenal and not merely phenomenal being. If God gave men only a seeming power of self-determination He would not really objectify Himself; therefore He could not know Himself, and lacking self-knowledge would not be the absolute self-consciousness which is the final postulate of idealism. In other words, unless man is really self-determining and therefore free and responsible God cannot be Eternal Personality. The freedom and moral responsibility of each individual soul are therefore guaranteed by the realized self-consciousness of the divine first principle.

As the final postulate of idealism guarantees the freedom of man, so it establishes the goodness of God and supplies an absolute criterion for morality. The condition of an absolute self-consciousness is that it shall make itself objective. It cannot do this without conferring its own freedom and independence upon its object. It gives, therefore, of its best. It gives itself. Giving itself it reveals itself as love. For what is love if not the giving of itself to the object loved? A self-objectifying first principle is therefore an altruistic

first principle. " ' God creates because He has no envy.' The fundamental principle of morality is goodness in the sense of grace or loving kindness. Its nearest illustration is mother-love, which endures the caprices and misdeeds of infancy and saves it from destruction through much pain and trouble. Goodness presupposes the giving of real being to the creature; not a phenomenal being but a noumenal being, and such noumenal being is self-activity, freedom, independence, responsibility, both intellect and will." ¹

Thus far we have considered only one aspect of self-objectifying activity. The consideration of this aspect *seems* to have yielded an altruistic God and a free man.² We must now consider its second aspect. Having objectified himself God recognizes Himself in His object. Can He so recognize Himself in nature and in man? Can the perfect recognize himself in the imperfect? Can the Infinite and Absolute Being recognize Himself in finite and developing beings? If not, may we have been mistaken in our identification of the act of divine self-objectification with the process of nature and its culmination in man?

Pondering more closely our fundamental presupposition that a perfect self-consciousness objectifies and recognizes itself we become aware

¹ Hegel's *Voyage of Discovery*, by W. T. Harris.

² Here begins the amendment of my original statement.

that its object cannot be less perfect than itself. To admit a process of evolution as the object of the divine self-consciousness is to define a finite God who passes through stages of imperfect doing and knowing. To accept a finite God is to conceive a God who had a temporal beginning. The contrast between time and eternity is not quantitative but qualitative. The eternal must have realized all its potentialities—the temporal is always in process of realization. All temporal processes presuppose an eternally realized energy as their source. A temporal God is neither self-explanatory nor explanatory of the universe. The logical results of conceiving God as finite and temporal are atheism and acosmism.

If, therefore, we accept the fundamental postulate of idealism that the final explanation of the universe is a completely realized self-consciousness, we are impelled to the conclusion that the self-realization has been complete from eternity. *The object of such a consciousness cannot be a process of becoming. It must be another consciousness in every respect equal to the first, but differing from it in the fact that it has been eternally generated by the self-objectifying act.*¹ The fact that all idealists have not reached this conclusion does not militate against its logical necessity. It merely suggests that the implications of

¹ Amendment.

the idealistic pre-supposition have not been adequately apprehended.

The results of this inadequate apprehension have been the philosophies of monism and pluralism. Monism has tried to explain nature and human history as the process of the divine self-knowing. The result has been that it merged human individuality in the divine and thereby lost human freedom, responsibility, and immortality. Pluralism has insisted upon the separateness and independence of each individual self-consciousness. To justify its insight it has been driven either to make "Reality consist of eternal souls without God,"¹ or to accept a God who is not a creator but merely one member (though the greatest member) of a society of interconnected souls. The philosophy of pluralism is confronted with two enigmas. How can *eternal* souls be in a process of becoming? How can the universe be whole and one if there is no absolute mind which wills and knows its wholeness? Pluralism makes an unsuccessful attempt to answer the former enigma by distinguishing between souls as "eternal realities" and the same souls as appearing in time. It seeks to get rid of the latter enigma by substituting a possible empirical unification of things for their rational unity.²

¹ Personal Idealism, p. 393.

² Pragmatism, p. 280.

The division of idealists into the rival camps of monists and pluralists suggests the possibility of a synthesis which would give validity to the truths for which they respectively contend. It may be that the conception of an eternal self-consciousness objectifying and recognizing itself in a second self-consciousness which is in every respect its equal but differs from it in the fact that it was generated through this objectifying act, offers the point of departure for the synthesis required. Let us endeavor to approach this synthesis by asking ourselves wherein the second self-consciousness above described will differ from the first, and since self-consciousness and personality are synonymous terms let us now drop the expression first and second self-consciousness, in favor of the expression first and second person. Between the first and second persons (as between all true persons) there is both identity and difference. They are alike in that both are eternally realized self-objectifying minds. They differ in the fact that the self-objectifying consciousness of the first is that of an aboriginal generator, while the self-objectifying consciousness of the second is that of a generator who has been himself eternally generated. He is possessed of the same perfection as the eternal generator and since *to know*, is *to cause to be*, his knowledge of his perfect personality is objectified as a third perfect person. He knows

himself, however, not only as eternally perfect but as eternally generated, and this knowledge makes objective his own derivation as a process ascending from nothingness toward identification with the first perfect person. This objectified process is the evolutionary ascent of nature and man. It is "a becoming from that which is not to that which is and is perfect."¹ Hence on the one hand it contains eternally all degrees of imperfection and on the other it is a process wherein imperfection is forever being eliminated.

The most difficult act of thought in its attempt to explore the implications of a completely realized self-consciousness is to understand how the self-objectifying act closes with the eternal procession and its culmination in a third perfect person. The question arises, "Must not this third person also objectify himself and thus cause a fourth who in turn originates a fifth and so on in infinite progression?"² The answer to this question is that such an infinite progression is superfluous because the third person *does* forever objectify his eternally complete *processio* in an actual process of becoming and his eternally realized personality in the eternally renewed mutual recognition of the first and second persons.

¹ Hegel's *Logic*, by W. T. Harris, p. 379.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

If we have correctly apprehended the implications of a completely realized self-consciousness, they would seem to point inexorably to the conclusion that perfect personality must be triune. Each of these triune persons conspires in the single act of self-objectification through which their reciprocal relationship is eternally defined. The First Person "in knowing Himself generates the Second from all eternity. The Second in knowing His derivation recognizes His origin in the knowing of the First. But the First, too, recognizes the recognition of the Second,"¹ and this mutual recognition is objectified in a process of evolution ascending from utter nothingness to perfect personality. The evolutionary process must be carefully distinguished from the Third Perfect Person, in whom on the one hand it has eternally completed itself and through whose conspiring activity it is on the other hand forever renewed. "This evolutionary process," says Dr. Harris, "has unique relations to each of the Divine Persons. To the First it is the recognition of His own process of generating through goodness or altruistic action; to the Second it is the recognition of another's goodness and altruism—namely, that of the First; to the Third it is a recognition

¹ Hegel's *Logic*, p. 379. This is the final amendment of my original statement.

of His own double procession through the altruism of the First and Second." ¹

Our analysis of the implications of a completely realized self-consciousness has led to conclusions in substantial agreement with the theology of the Christian Church. These conclusions, however, are not offered as dogmas to be accepted upon authority, but as insights to be actively reproduced by the individual thinker. Moreover, they add to Christian theology a more precise conception of the Holy Spirit and of His relationship to the process of creation, to the individual human soul, and to the church universal.

In order that we may actively assimilate these more precise conceptions, we must make a clear distinction between the Holy Spirit and that continuous creation of worlds in time and space which is His eternally renewed procession. This procession in turn must be conceived as an eternal return of the imperfect toward the perfect. It involves an ascent of being from chaos through matter, motion, star dust, revolving spheres, organic life and human institutions, to the perfect institution or cosmic community which (like the human institutions wherein it is imperfectly mirrored) "collects power from each of the members and endows each with the power of all." ² This

¹ Hegel's *Logic*, W. T. Harris, pp. 379, 380.

² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

cosmic community has existed from all eternity, and since it is necessarily postulated through the implications of a realized self-consciousness, it harmonizes the eternal society upon which pluralism insists with the noetic unity for which monism contends.

It will be remembered that the conclusions to which we have been impelled had their point of departure in the contradiction which arose from our attempt to explain man as the objectified thought of a monistic God. This contradiction inheres in most interpretations of idealism, and, as Dr. Harris has pointed out, its source is Hegel's identification of creation with the Logos or Second Divine Person.¹ Through this identification fini-

¹ "I have often before alluded to this distinction of the Processio from the Second Divine Person as the important thing neglected by Hegel, a neglect that in some measure justifies the censure of pantheism that has been so freely cast upon him. It is not, however, with Hegel precisely as the charge has made it to be. Hegel does not in any wise fail in the proper characterization of the Third Person, nor in the doctrine of the invisible church and the 'Communion of Saints.' Freedom and immortality in the most concrete sense are held by Hegel. The defect pertains to the conception of the nature of the Second Person. The Processio is taken for the Logos. Hence there is an implication, that the First in knowing himself perceives in himself finitude originating and passing over into perfection. Recognizing this in himself, he at the same time creates it; for his knowing is creating. 'In God knowing and willing are one.' But such recognition of the origin of finitude in himself implies a consciousness of a

tude is thrust without warrant into the perfect consciousness which idealism presupposes. With this thrust, therefore, idealism slays itself. Thereafter, stating its theory as "the positive inclusion of all finite facts in the unity of the supreme consciousness of the absolute," it virtually makes God the author of sin and justifies the valiant attack of Professor James against a divine being who is responsible for the Brockton murderer.¹

Do we escape this dilemma when we conceive creation as arising through the contemplation by the Logos of His own derivation? It seems to me that we do. For the self-objectifying act through which He creates all living beings involves recognition of His own *self-determining energy* and therefore of *their freedom*. The self-objectifying act through which He creates man involves recognition not only of self-determining energy but of self-determining energy which has achieved the final form of self-consciousness, and in which therefore the generic ideal can be realized in the individual. Even plants and animals are self-creative energies, and their many genera and

derivation, a begottenness, and this shows at once that Hegel has conceived the First as the Second. He has attributed to the Father the consciousness that belongs to the Logos."—*Hegel's Logic*, W. T. Harris, p. 381.

¹ See *The Will to Believe*, William James, pp. 160, 161, 177.

species arise through the varying forms in which they adapt themselves to environment and modify environment to themselves. Man is not only a self-creative being but a responsible being, because in virtue of his form of self-consciousness he can discriminate between his partial, accidental, and temporary self, and his total, essential, and immortal self. According to our doctrine, therefore, God is not the Creator of sin. He creates free beings and they create their own sin.

We have seen that the giving of real freedom to the creature implies goodness in the Creator. Goodness is altruism or love which gives itself. This *real freedom* conferred upon the creature by divine altruism can only be recognized by holding him (man) responsible for his deeds. Such recognition of responsibility involves man's right to the consequences of his own actions. Being free, man is amenable to justice, whose principle is the return of the deed upon the doer. To deny him this return is to mock him with the semblance of freedom. Hence, as Christian intuition has deeply discerned, hell is a final tribute of respect from the Creator to the creature made in His own image. As a tribute to freedom, however, hell implies the immortal persistence of freedom and therefore of the possibility of amendment. Man cannot justly receive the return of his deed unless he is responsible for it. He cannot be responsible

unless he is free and capable of amendment. Should he lose his freedom even through his own sin he could no longer be punished for sinning. Implicit in the doctrine of hell is the insight which triumphs over hell. Man may stay in hell forever if he so choose.¹ He may always escape from hell if he will. Being free, he will not choose forever to contradict his freedom. The resources of infinite love will be taxed to the utmost to illuminate his intelligence and influence his recalcitrant will. The only impossibility is that he should cease to be, for his immortal existence is bound up with that eternal act in which divine knowing and willing are one.

Perfect justice in the sense of a complete return of the deed upon the doer can only be exercised toward a perfect being. To exercise it toward imperfect beings would make an evolutionary world-order impossible. Since this evolutionary world-order is necessarily presupposed by the self-objectifying act through which the Logos makes actual His own timeless derivation, goodness, or altruism, must be recognized as the fundamental principle of the divine character and justice be given validity only in so far as it does not collide with, but on the contrary furthers the aim of goodness. Out

¹ W. T. Harris, *Spiritual Sense of Dante's Divina Commedia*, second edition, p. 19.

of reciprocal relationship between the goodness that gives freedom and the justice or righteousness which respect for freedom demands arises that providential process through which "God educates the human soul."

(1)

THE END



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